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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigated the influence of situational knowledge on the performance of
two common tasks; category member generation under a free-emission procedure and
the judgement of similarity between two items using rating scales. In both tasks, self-
report protocols were used to identify the strategies that people seemed to be using to
complete the tasks. The main goal was to identify the role of situational knowledge in
the organisation of semantic memory. Traditional models would not predict a role for
situational knowledge in either of the target tasks. In the category member generation
studies (Chapter 2) participants frequently instantiated situations or perspectives to
cue retrieval of category members for both taxonomic and ad hoc categories. Chapter
3 investigated the factors that determine subjective similarity: category type,
typicality, context and presence or absence of self-report. The quantitative data
analysis showed the need for careful qualifications to previous claims concerning the
effect of context on similarity (Barsalou, 1982). Specifically, ad hoc category
members were rated more similar with context only when judgements were made
without self-report and when items were relatively typical. Self-report protocols
showed that co-occurrence of items in a situation frequently entered into judgements
of similarity. Chapter 4 investigated the role of events in determining the strength of
this 'thematic' similarity. Individual indices of association strength between the items
and an event were shown to predict similarity ratings - thus confirming that thematic
similarity is driven, at least partially, by the association of items to common settings.
The findings lend empirical weight to theoretical positions that present memory for
situational information as an integral part of conceptual knowledge. This approach
may underpin a new direction for research into concepts in both normal and clinical
adult populations.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Theoretical and Empirical Scope of the Thesis
This thesis is concerned with conceptual knowledge. By this term is intended the
knowledge that humans have of entities in the world. Itwill be taken as self-evident
that this knowledge is garnered from the individual's experience of those entities.
Arguments from philosophy that we are able to have knowledge beyond that which is
experienced will be disregarded here since they seem to apply principally to
mathematical and scientific concepts and not to the common concepts which tend to
be the of interest to cognitive psychologists. Itwill be assumed therefore that
knowledge may be gained from first hand experience resulting from direct interaction
with an entity or second hand experience through receipt of information from a third
person or media. It seems that memories of these experiences become associated with
each other such that separate encounters with, say, a tree, do not remain distinct and
unique in our minds but rather form part of a more inclusive memory of all things that
we believe to be classified as trees. Itwill be taken that such close associations
between memories of experiences relating to trees, which will entail accumulating
knowledge of these items, constitute a concept of tree. Concepts "capture the notion
that many objects are alike in some important respects, and hence can be thought
about and responded to in ways we have already mastered" (Smith and Medin, 1981,
p.l).
The aim of the programme of work was to address a particular question concerning
conceptual knowledge. Namely, what is the role of 'situational knowledge' in
elementary cognitive operations such as the generation of category members and
assessments of similarity between familiar items? 'Situational knowledge' refers to
that information which relates to the events, environments and situations in which
items are commonly encountered. Theoretical arguments concerning the organisation
of conceptual knowledge will be considered in the light of the empirical data. This is
an epistemic investigation in that it focuses on demonstrations of what people know
about existing, real world entities and how that information is accessed and utilised to
support performance in specific cognitive tasks. In addition to the stored knowledge
that one may hold in relation to a given item, knowledge is implicated in the study of
14
concepts from the point of view that to recognise an item as x is to experience a
'moment of knowing' (Smith and Samuelson, 1997, p.161). That is to say to
recognise a rabbit as a rabbit is to know that you have seen a rabbit. Not everyone is
content to assume that in studying concepts we are asking questions about conceptual
knowledge. Indeed, Fodor (1998; 2004) is highly critical of assumptions that
'questions about what a concept may be' depend upon answers to questions about
'what it is to possess a certain concept'. In Fodor's view, equating concepts with
epistemic capacities has represented a 'wrong turn' on the part of psychologists and
cognitive scientists. Fodor would agree that concepts carry information but not in the
form of a related list of propositions. The issue of how researchers may best
understand what constitutes a concept will be returned to in the final discussion of this
thesis. It will be argued that psychologists may legitimately pursue questions of what
sort of knowledge people access and utilise when they engage in tasks that require
them to think about categories of items without necessarily taking a particular stand
on which parts of that knowledge (if any) may reasonably be called a concept.
In an attempt to maintain clarity and consistency in a minefield of terminology, this
introduction will next deal within interpretation of the key terms concept and category
followed by related issues. A summary of traditional theories concerning the nature of
conceptual organisation and also more recent, relevant theoretical developments will
be provided, followed by a brief background to the two main tasks that have been
chosen to investigate the role of situational knowledge; category member generation
and similarity judgements. The conclusion of this chapter will highlight the aims and
preview the empirical content of the thesis.
Clarification of terms
Concepts and Categories
It has been claimed that categories are classes (kinds) of things that exist in the world,
and concepts are corresponding mental representations of them. Medin (1989),
however, counselled against this intuitively appealing notion for two reasons. The
first is the existence of empty concepts, i.e. concepts that have no real world referent,
such as unicorn and Father Christmas. The second is that the claim implies realism
about categories in the world that may not be appropriate. This latter objection alludes
15
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to a philosophical debate concerning whether there are in the world objective kinds of
entities based on essential properties that humans notice and learn, or whether
maximally informative mental arrangements of information are projected, as
categories, out into the world (see Malt, 1995). Medin prefers the following
distinction; "a concept is an idea that includes all that is characteristically associated
with it. A category is a partitioning or class to which some assertion or set of
assertions might apply." (Medin, 1989, p.1469), By contrast, Barsalou (1993) rejects
the use of the term concept for all the information associated with an idea. He
maintains that engagement in cognitive tasks requires only partial activation of
knowledge of any given entity, and wishes to reserve the term concept for the
temporary representation of that subset of knowledge which is constructed in working
memory to meet a specified goal. However, many authors often fail entirely to make
explicit the intended referents of the terms; concept and category are frequently used
interchangeably in the psychology literature.
The term concept is also on occasions conflated with meaning, so that one's concept
of cat is often taken to be what one 'understands' by the term cat. Laurence and
Margolis (1999) move between theories from philosophers of language concerning
the meaning of words (Kripke, 1972; Putnam, 1975), linguists (Jackendoff, 1987) and
theories of concepts. The authors freely acknowledge this; "Throughout we'll
ignore certain differences between language and thought, allowing claims about
words to stand in for claims about concepts" (Footnote 12, p.ll). However, the
authors make no argument for the legitimacy of this position. Fodor (1998) also
states his intention to "move back and forth pretty freely between concepts and word
meanings; ... it may tum out in the long run, for the purposes of the present
investigation word meanings just are concepts" (p.2).
It is perhaps unsurprising that meanings of words and concepts are often seen as
equivalent given that influential early work in empirical psychology concerning
concepts (Collins and Quillian, 1972) sprang from attempts to explain text
comprehension (Quillian, 1968). Furthermore, theories of word meaning frequently
appear to be readily applicable to concepts. To equate meaning with a mental
particular (i.e. a concept) is to lose its essential role in reference. Putnam (1975)
maintained that a stereotype, i.e. a linguistic description (as in a feature list) of an
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item forms part of its meaning but only a part. The actual entity in the world that is
picked out by its linguistic label also forms part of the meaning. Barsalou,Yeh, Luka,
Olseth, Mix and Wu (1993) indeed argue strongly that meanings are not equivalent to
concepts. Under their view of a concept (a frame that encompasses specialised models
of individuals), concepts may assist in establishing reference but since they do not
have physical counterparts in the environment (individuals do have counterparts but
concepts do not) it is not possible that they should refer. Ifreference is accepted as an
essential part of meaning and if concepts, as envisaged by Barsalou et al. do not refer
then concepts cannot be equivalent to meaning. Naturally one may take issue with the
need for meaning to involve reference andlor with Barsalou and his colleagues'
notion of concepts but it is clear that a considerable amount of debate has taken place
around this is issue and a consensus has yet to be reached on its resolution. It is not
intended that the issues investigated in this thesis should be discussed in relation to
meaning and so to err on the side of caution, it will be assumed that whilst it is not
necessarily the case that theories of word meaning cannot explicate concepts, the
equivalence of word meanings and concepts must be carefully questioned and argued
for rather than assumed to be the case
Throughout this thesis the Medin (1989) use of concept will be adopted, that is "a
concept is an idea that includes all that is characteristically associated with it"
(p.1469). To think ofa concept, as Medin does, as the total knowledge associated
with an idea, represented in some format in memory, is the most traditional way of
using the word. However, it will be seen from the literature review that the scope of
the 'total knowledge' is often limited to perceptual and functional features. The term
category will be used throughout to refer only to the accepted culturally driven
partitioning of items in the world. There are clearly a number of topics that are
closely related to concepts, such as semantic memory, representation and
categorisation. The nature of their relationship to concepts will now be briefly
addressed.
Semantic Memory
Inmany texts on cognitive psychology, semantic memory is described as that part of
memory that deals with 'general knowledge' about the world. This may include
17
general facts ('the present Queen is Elizabeth II') and also facts about items such as
'trees have branches'. This, then, would be the natural home of conceptual
knowledge. What characterises semantic memory is that the information therein can
be accessed without recall of the specific episode in which it was first learned.
Tulving (1972) first contrasted semantic memory with episodic memory. The latter
was used to refer to "memory for personal experiences and their temporal relations,
while semantic memory is a system for receiving, retaining, and transmitting
information about meaning of words, concepts, and classification of concepts" (p.401-
402). Tulving considered that there were sufficient "fundamental differences"
(p.384) between the two to merit separate consideration. Tulving originally suggested
this classification as a heuristic which could aid memory researchers by facilitating
laws and principles which may explain one set of related phenomena independently of
those which govern the other domain. He did not, however, rule out the possibility of
reciprocal influence between the two systems. Despite his disclaimer that the naming
of these systems did not necessarily express "any profound belief about the structural
or functional separation of the two", the distinction became increasingly reified in the
literature over the next 10 -15 years. Tulving subsequently updated his conceptual
model (the 1984 version proposes that episodic memory is embedded in semantic
memory as opposed to being a distinct system), but the distinction was maintained
despite heavy criticism (see McKoon, Ratcliff and Dell, 1986) and the proposal of
single storage models which would account for data previously held to support the
distinction (Anderson and Ross, 1980).
Glenberg (1997) in a radical review article, claimed "I am explicitly equating episodic
and semantic memory systems in the sense that there are no separate episodic and
semantic memory, hierarchically arranged ....or otherwise." (p.8) and further "thus the
distinction between episodic and semantic memory probably reflects a difference in
the frequency with which memories are used, the methods of assessment, and the
context of the information, rather than any intrinsic differences in memory systems"
(p.9). The need to specifically refute the distinction bears witness to the influence
that it continues to exert in people's thinking about the organisation of memory, and
of conceptual knowledge. This issue is raised because throughout this thesis, a case is
made for greater recognition of the role played by knowledge of situations and events
in the way in which we think about objects. Whilst the knowledge of relevant
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situations may well be itself generalised and not limited to specific episodes, this
approach almost certainly requires that semantic memory should not be conceived of
as a separate form of memory.
Concepts and Mental Representation
The relationship between concepts and representation is dependent on a particular
perspective of what characterises cognition. Van Gelder (1995, p.375) claims that
"Cognition is distinguished from other kinds of complex natural processes (such as
thunderstorms, subatomic processes, etc.) by at least two deep features: on one hand,
a dependence on knowledge: and distinctive kinds of complexity ..." (emphasis
added). The dependence on knowledge is subserved by mental structures that can
represent that knowledge. These structures, as symbols, can be systematically
manipulated. This is the basis of the computational view of mind that pervades
cognitive psychology and cognitive science. The notion of representation is thus
central to this view and the mental representation ofx is one's total knowledge of x,
held in long-term memory and is thus equated with one's concept ofx.
Concepts and Categorisation
One of the most highly investigated functions of concepts is the way in which they
permit categorisation. By virtue of having a concept. one is able to make decisions
about which things fall under that concept. Performance on categorisation tasks has
been therefore used to infer the nature of conceptual structure. Note that identifying
an item as falling under a particular concept, e.g., that is a table, that is a chair etc.,
automatically involves assessing the willingness of participants to apply a particular
word (concept label) to a particular item and therefore overlaps again into areas of
word meaning and use. One should accordingly be wary of whether these tasks really
offer an insight into the organisation of conceptual structure (by indicating concept
boundaries etc.) or whether they indicate only something about the way in which
people are prepared to apply naming words.
An alternative means of investigating conceptual structure is to examine the way in
which participants learn classifications of artificially created stimuli. As Smith and
Medin (1981, p.6) argue, "if natural concepts are hypothesised to have a particular
structure, one can build this structure into an artificial class and see if people use this
19
class in the same way they use a natural one; if they do, we have added support for the
hypothesised structure of natural concepts". It is possible that such methodologies
have had the effect of placing an extreme emphasis on the role of intrinsic features of
objects in categorisation tasks, which in tum has led to a similar over-reliance on
these features in constituting the concept of the object. Consequently, the
methodology in this thesis does not rely on artificial classifications created by the
experimenter.
The following section will provide a review of the most influential theories regarding
the organisation of conceptual knowledge.
Theoriesof the Organisationand Structure of ConceptualKnowledge
Psychological theories concerning the organisation of human conceptual knowledge
have evolved through a process of empirical testing over the past 50 years. The
earliest psychological research adopted, from classical philosophy, a rule-based
notion of category membership that required objects to possess defining features.
The inability of such theoretical positions to account for empirical data from human
conceptual systems that operate to meet the demands of a complex, real world has
obliged the development of more sophisticated theories. In common with Komatsu
(1992) and Smith and Medin (1981), this review will initially consider psychological
theories of conceptual organisation to fall under one of five descriptions; the classical,
the family resemblance, the exemplar, the schema, and the explanation or theory
based view. With perhaps the exception of explanation-based theory of concepts, all
of these theories place the notion of shared or matched features at the heart of the
theory. Items are organised in such a way as to maximise the intra-category similarity
and minimise the inter-category distance. The similarity is based on features. It is the
nature of those features that is of particular relevance to this thesis. Although these
theories are well known, they are described again here with a particular view to
highlighting the type of features that have been assumed to form an appropriate basis
for conceptual organisation. Itwill be seen that these tend to be perceptual and
functional properties. There is little, if any, mention of the settings and situations in
which the objects appear. A consideration of more recent and possibly controversial
views of concepts will follow these traditional positions.
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The Classical View
The classical view argues that the features of an object are individually necessary and
jointly sufficient to guarantee membership of the category defined by those co-
occurring features. For example, the concept of square may be defined by possession
of the following four properties, (1) it is a closed figure, (2) it has four sides, (3) its
sides are equal in length, and (4) its internal angles are equal. These properties jointly
describe all items falling under this concept and any item under this concept will
exhibit all these properties. While it has been pointed out that few psychologists have
supported this view in its baldest form (Komatsu, 1992), early experimental work was
at least partially based on the assumption that category membership can be defined by
rules and that these rules can be cashed out in terms of features. The most famous
example of this approach is Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956). In this study,
participants were shown a range of geometrical shapes that could be grouped in
various ways, i.e. by the number of shapes on the stimulus (1, 2 or 3) or by the nature
of the shapes (cross, circle, square etc.). Participants were presented with one
instance of a category which the experimenter had in mind and then had to identify
the category (rule) by asking if other stimuli were also in that category and receiving
feedback. Participants adopted strategies for learning the category that were in line
with a defining feature approach. The 'features' in this paradigm were purely
perceptual.
By the 1960s, models of conceptual knowledge were still heavily based on feature-
lists but admitted of members that did not share all features with all other members.
For example, Collins and Quillian (1969) proposed a model of the organisation of the
type of memory required to verify sentences such as "A canary can fly". In their
model, categories are arranged in a hierarchy as shown in Figure 1.1.
Properties which are true of all category members are stored only once at the highest
level of category to which it applies, e.g., 'has wings' and 'can fly' are associated not
with canary but with its superset, bird. In order to decide whether 'A canary can fly'
is true, it would be necessary to establish first that canary is a bird and then to infer
that it can fly from the fact that birds can fly. This proposed organisation could claim
advantages in terms of economy of storage (it is not necessary to store all properties
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with all members of any given category) and led to testable hypotheses about the
length of time it would take participants to verify the sentence 'a canary can fly'
compared to the sentence 'a canary is yellow', where yellow would be a property
stored with canary and not at the higher level of bird since it is not true of all birds.
Of course, it is also not true of all birds that they can fly but notable exceptions, such
as ostrich and penguin would have this fact stored at the level of ostrich and penguin
to block the inference from the higher category.
Figure 1.1 Hierarchical model of concept knowledge (Collins and Quillian, 1969).
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In summary, the important features of the model were:
1) It is hierarchical
2) Features (or attributes) are associated with the concept at different levels of
the hierarchy
3) Subordinate nodes inherit features from superordinate nodes
4) A departure from the classical view is marked by the recognition of members
which fail to share a feature with all other members e.g. ostriches can't fly
5) The distance shown diagrammatically in the model is also intended to
represent psychological distance
6) The features mentioned in the model are a mixture of perceptual ('is yellow")
and what have become to be known as 'functional' (e.g. "can fly").
Collins and Quillian used two types of statements in sentence verification tasks to test
different aspects of the model. They referred to these as 'superset relations' sentences,
e.g. 'A canary is a bird' and property relations sentences, e.g. 'A canary can fly'. Data
from sentence verification tasks using statements like these lent support to claim (5)
above and in general to the organisation depicted by the model. That is to say
participants were able to assert the veracity of the sentence 'Is a canary a bird?' more
quickly than they could the sentence 'Is a canary an animal?' With regard to
properties, participants took longer to verify the sentence 'a canary can fly' than they
did 'a canary is yellow'. In a further test of the Collins and Quillian model, Conrad
(1972) found that when participants were asked to describe named categories, certain
properties were mentioned more frequently than others. Moreover, the properties
mentioned most frequently tended to be those associated with level 1 superordinates
and those mentioned least frequently were those associated with level 3 subordinates.
This suggested that the trend of increased reaction times on the property relation
sentences (from level I to level3) could have been due not to the need for inferences
to be drawn from the higher level but to the comparative difficulty of retrieval of
these properties. In other words, the fact that it takes longer to verify that a canary can
fly than it does to verify that a canary is yellow is because the property fly is less
frequently associated with canary than the property yellow. Conrad (1972) ran two
experiments that showed reaction time to be a function of property frequency that was
not controlled for in the Collins and Quillian study. Conrad claimed support was
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found for the hierarchical nature of the model but not for the storage economy
hypothesis. Conrad (1972) concluded by suggesting that "properties are stored in
memory with every word which they define and can be retrieved directly rather than
through a process of inference." (p.l54). In as much as the Conrad work suggested
that not all properties are equally salient to people in describing categories, this also
challenged the notion inherent in classical theories that all features weigh equally in
the concept.
Two further problems for the classical view arose during the 1970s. Firstly, if being a
member of a category is just a matter of possessing the appropriate set of features,
then all members of any given category should be equally representative of that
category. Rosch (1973) found that participants reliably rated some category members
as "better" (more typical) than other members. Rosch and Mervis (1975) asked
subjects both to generate features to common category members and to rate the
typicality of the category member. They found that the typicality rating of any given
category member was a function of the number of overlapping features between that
item and other members.
Secondly, McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) found evidence of inconsistency in
participants' judgements of category membership for given items. Participants were
presented with pairs of members and categories, e.g., fly -insect, strawberry:fruit,
fork-kitchen utensil etc. Their task was simply to indicate (yes or no) whether they
thought the item (named first) was a member of the category (named second).
Participants performed the same task with the same materials again after one month.
Both between subjects at session one and within subjects across the two sessions, a
high degree of consensus in response was found for items which had been
independently rated as highly typical or highly atypical. However, there was far less
consistency for items which received intermediate ratings of typicality, with the
highest level of disagreement occurring for items rated at typicality level 4 on a 10
point scale where 10 was highly typical. These results suggested that boundaries
between common categories were not clear and distinct, as implied by classical
theory, but were "fuzzy".
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Perhaps most importantly, it transpired that it simply was not possible to identify a set
of defining features for most everyday categories.
The Probabilistic View and Prototypes
The theories that largely superseded classical views retained an important role for
shared features in explaining the constitution and coherence of concepts but discarded
the idea that a certain set of features was necessary and sufficient to guarantee
membership. Instead a notion of/amity resemblance was invoked. Under this view,
members of categories shared some overlapping, characteristic features but there were
no features that were necessarily common to all members. Most notably these ideas
were expounded by Eleanor Rosch, following the famous observations from
Wittgenstein (1953) concerning the absence of defining features for the category
'games'.
To explain the mental representation of a category based on family resemblance,
prototype theories were invoked. The notion underlying prototype theories was that as
one encounters category exemplars in the world, certain repeating features are
recognised and a representation of the group, which captures the 'average' or modal
features of its instances, is abstracted from these experiences. The representation may
include non-necessary features and the features are weighted to reflect their salience
and the conditional probability of their association with the concept. This
representation is called a prototype and category decisions about new instances of
entities are a function of the degree of similarity between the instance and the
prototype. Under this theory, category membership is not "all or none" but is more or
less probable - for this reason the theory falls within the group of probabilistic
theories of categorisation. The family resemblance approach predicted the
"fuzziness" of category boundaries as found by McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978).
A further prediction of the theory was that some members of a category would be
considered to be "better" members by virtue of being closer to the prototype than
other members. As mentioned above, that some category members are perceived by
subjects to be better examples (more typical) of the category than others was found to
be the case by a number of researchers (Labov, 1973; Rosch, 1973, 1975; Rosch and
Mervis, 1975). The phenomenon whereby members of a category are seen as varying
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in "typicality" relative to that category gives rise to 'typicality effects', i.e., typical
members have a privileged status across a range of tasks. Typical members are
generated to the category label more easily and are identified as category instances
more quickly in comparison to less typical members. The fact that a category has
members that vary in terms of their perceived typicality is referred to as the category
having "graded structure". It should be noted that the discovery by Armstrong,
Gleitman and Gleitman (1983) that well-defined categories such as even numbers also
exhibit graded structure cast some doubt on the assumption that typicality effects
demand explanation by prototype.
Hampton (1998) asserted that the similarity involved in assessing candidates for
category membership against a category prototype is not restricted to a comparison of
perceptual features. He stresses that even in Rosch's (1975) seminal work on
prototypes, categorisation was envisaged to involve an evaluation of a number of
different types of feature including functional features, origins and common ways of
interacting with the item. Hampton's paper was inspired by the studies conducted by
Rips (1989) which purported to demonstrate a dissociation between similarity and
categorisation. That is to say that items could be judged to be more similar to one
category and yet considered be more likely to be a member of a different category.
Using previously published data of typicality and likelihood of category membership
(McCloskey and Glucksberg, 1978), Hampton showed that a high proportion of
variance in category membership judgements could be accounted for by typicality
(similarity to prototype). There were deviations from the monotonic relationship
between typicality and categorisation and Hampton undertook a further study to test
post hoc explanations for these deviations. He found that for biological kinds, there
was sometimes a conflict between typicality and what participants felt may be
technical reasons for including or excluding an item in a category. For artifacts, a
highly typical item within one category might nonetheless receive a low
categorisation score as participants were aware of other categories where it may be
classified more appropriately (e.g., a hammer may be fairly typical as a weapon,
holding many appropriate features, but be felt to be better classified as a tool.
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Hence, prototype theories do not always predict category membership as a simple
function of similarity to the prototype but Hampton would argue that they need not
lose credibility as models for categorisation for all that.
Prototype theories can deal with some of the empirical data which classical theories
struggle to explain (typicality effects, fuzzy category boundaries), but these theories
are also subject to criticism. The main thrust of the attack on prototypes as a
comprehensive theory of concepts is on their inadequacy in conceptual combination.
Fodor and Lepore (1996) maintain that not only do many complex concepts fail to
give rise to a prototype altogether (e.g., new species) but even in cases where they do,
the prototypes of the constituent concepts do not combine to produce the prototype of
the complex concept. For example, the prototype of pet fish would probably resemble
a goldfish, but a goldfish is likely to be far removed from the prototype of either pet
or fish. One option for prototype advocates is to adopt a Dual Theory. A dual theory
proposes that concepts comprise both a conceptual core, which is classical in nature,
and a prototype component that supports identification procedures. Whilst this allows
the retention of prototypes, alternative views to prototype theories have been
proffered.
Exemplar-Based Theories
Prototype theory proposes that the representation of a category abstracts and captures
the most frequently appearing features and characteristics of its members. In contrast,
some theorists have seen no need to posit a stored, central representation of a
category.
Exemplar theories, in their most extreme form such as that of Reed (1972), propose
that information concerning all encountered instances of a category is retained. The
mental representation of the category coheres through the similarity of the
accumulated instances. This approach does not rule out the possibility of the
construction of an abstracted central representation but suggests that this would occur
at point of use (i.e., when identifying a potentially new member, judging typicality
etc.) and therefore need not form part of one's stored concept. However, the effect of
typicality on speed of classification need not be explained by construction of a central
representation at all. When confronted with a new instance for classification, the
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exemplar(s) that come to mind will be the ones encountered most frequently (these
are likely to be the most typical, e.g., apple for fruit), so if the instance to be classified
is also typical (e.g. orange), the verification response will be fast but if the instance is
atypical (e.g. kumquat) then the response will be slowed by its dissimilarity to the
apple exemplar. Brooks (1987) argued for the influence of the processing of prior
episodes on classification and identification tasks. Brooks wished to distinguish
between analytic and non-analytic knowledge and processing. By nonanalytic, he
refers to a reliance on analogy "...everyday analogizing is ...nonanalytic in that a
great deal of information is inherited in a flood and little effort is made in the current
processing to selectively process categorically relevant information. Relative
emphasis on attributes is dictated more by what had been important for accomplishing
the prior purposes rather than what is important for the category as a whole." (p.142)
Brooks (1987) argues that models that prioritise the role of specific experiences in
handling exemplars can offer a more natural account of the demonstrable flexibility of
typicality ratings than can theories which propose that typicality is tied to more stable,
abstracted representations.
A further advantage of exemplar theories is that they preserve information about the
correlation of features within categories. Prototypes, in abstracting "average" features
from a range of exemplars, lose this type of information. Consider the following
example from Reisberg (1997, p.320). Two softball teams, Red and Blue, have
members who vary in their height and weight (seeFig.l.2.).
Blue Team Red team
Height Weight Height Weight
(lbs.) (lbs.)
George 6'3" 120 Fred 6'4" 250
Tina 4'1" 240 Sam 4'1" 110
Lee 6'4" 250 Susan 6'3" 240
Alyson 4'2" 110 Jane 4'3" 90
Tom 4'3" 160 Chris 6'2" 240
Mary 6'2" 170 Jeff 4'2" 120
Average 5'2.5 " 175 Average 5'2.5 " 175
Figurel.2 Using correlated features in categorisation (from Reisberg, 1997).
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The average weight and height of red and blue team members are equal. On the Red
team however, there is a positive correlation between weight and height (tall members
are heavy and short members are light). This correlation does not hold in the Blue
Team. A new player arrives on the field who is tall and thin - to which team is this
player most likely to belong? Consulting a representation of each team which
captures the average value of the salient characteristics, weight and height, would
make membership of the Blue and Red teams equally probable. Comparison of the
mystery player to individual exemplars of each team would incline one to opt for the
Blue team since this team has at least one individual who is both tall and light-
whereas in the Red team all the tall players are heavy. Medin, Altom, Edelson and
Freko (1982) provided an empirical demonstration of this sensitivity to feature
correlation in the context of diagnosing fictional diseases from symptoms.
Exemplar models over prototype theories also capture information about the
variability of members in a way that prototype models fail to do. One of the
explanations invoked for the earliest demonstration of a dissociation between
similarity and categorisation (Rips, 1989) was subjects' knowledge of intra category
variability. In the Rips study subjects were asked (for example) whether a 3-inch
round object was more similar to a pizza or a quarter, and whether it should be
categorised as a pizza or a quarter. Subjects judged the object to be more similar to a
quarter but categorised it as a pizza. Subjects' knowledge that pizzas are more
variable in their size than are quarters was cited as the reason for the preferred
categorisation.
Exemplar models can also account for a phenomenon that prototype models cannot,
i.e., the research findings that the perceived typicality of category members may vary
with context (Barsalou, 1985; Roth and Shoben, 1983) and with points of view
(Barsalou, 1987). If the prototype of a category is a relatively static representation of
the category, then how can comparison of the same item with the prototype yield
different decisions on different occasions? The exemplar view, however, can account
for this by proposing that different exemplars can be retrieved from memory against
which to compare the new instance, depending on the circumstances in which you are
making the comparison.
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It should be noted that exemplar models vary in the degree of abstraction that they
incorporate. As mentioned, the most extreme views propose the storage of every
experienced instance. Such a position is best encapsulated by Reed's Proximity model
(1972). However, in other models exemplars are subsets of larger categories (e.g. a
robin is an exemplar of bird). In these models, a degree of abstraction must have
already taken place across all instances of robin to reach the exemplar for this subset.
It is not the case then that exemplar models necessarily offer no role for abstraction
but as Medin and Smith (1981) express it " our safest conclusion is that exemplar-
based representations show a substantially greater lack of abstraction than
representations based on classical or the probabilistic view" (p.146).
It appears then that the exemplar view can explain the same data (typicality effects
etc.) as can the prototype view but it can additionally account for phenomena (such as
knowledge of variability, awareness of feature correlation, flexibility of typicality
judgements) which pose a problem for prototype theory. However, it is clear that
people do have knowledge of prototypes and that their performance on certain tasks is
influenced by representation of central tendencies rather than by individual exemplars
(Posner and Keele, 1968; Franks and Bransford, 1971). Though as previously stated,
since exemplar theory protagonists do not deny subjects' ability to form prototypes
"on-line", these data do not necessarily speak against their position. People's
knowledge of both central tendency information for categories and detail of individual
instances has led some to claim that conceptual knowledge is comprised of both these
types of information which can be used as the task demands (Anderson, Kline and
Beasley, 1979). Yet again, a combination of theoretical positions is invoked to offer a
more comprehensive account of the data. It should be noted that these theories offer
no particular view as to what type of features would enter into comparisons between
newly encountered items and stored exemplars. It is also important to note, for the
purpose of the argument to be made later, that although exemplar models do not
explicitly claim that the exemplars are stored without contextual information this is,
certainly implied.
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Schema Views
Rumelhart (1980) claimed that" a schema ...is data structure for representing the
generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge
about all concepts" (p.34). It is easy to see why this theoretical form of conceptual
structure would be a candidate for describing conceptual representation. By aligning
the variables posited in schema theory (slots) with concept features or attributes, it
can be seen how the schema view of concepts can capture both information abstracted
from repeated experiences (default values) and information pertaining to specific
experiences (exemplars). Schema models can therefore be considered exemplar
hybrid models that allow for information of central tendency and individual instances
to be stored simultaneously (Komatsu, 1992). The key advantage of schema over
both prototype and exemplar models is that they permit the representation of
knowledge about relationships between concepts and of relationships between the
constituent attributes of concepts. The need to include such information was at least
partially demanded by the realisation that a simple feature matching form of similarity
could not fully account for category membership decisions. Reisberg (1997)
illustrates this with the following examples. A lemon which has been painted with red
and white stripes, injected with sugar to make it sweet and squashed flat is still
categorised as a lemon despite not sharing any superficial features with either a
prototype of lemon or any experienced exemplar. Contrarily, a counterfeit paper note
($10 bill) shares a full set of superficial features with a real currency but would not be
classified as such.
It seems in such cases that category membership is determined by knowledge not only
of superficial features but also of" deep" properties (genetic constitution in the case
of the lemon and the relevant printing history of the counterfeit bill) which somehow
reveal the "essence" of the item. Keil (1989) offered evidence of these types of
judgements in children. Pre-school children could not be persuaded to reclassify a
skunk as a racoon simply because it had been treated in such a way as to superficially
resemble a racoon. These data do not rule out the role of similarity in categorisation
but if it is to be claimed that categorisation is still a function of similarity to a
prototype or an exemplar, then it must be similarity based on shared "deep and
essential " properties rather than surface features. The question remains as to how
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these important characteristics come to be known as the ones most salient to category
decisions. This is explained in terms of "a widespread fabric of beliefs" (Reisberg,
1997, p.335). It is knowledge of functional and causal relationships between concepts
- a relevant theory of interconnections - which supports the weighting of some
features as being more important to categorisation than others. Schema theory can
encompass the representation of this form of knowledge as well as of features and
attributes. In this respect, schema theory can be seen as a form of "explanation based
theory".
Explanation Based Theories or Theory- Theories
In 1985, a highly influential article was published by Greg Murphy and Doug Medin
in Psychological Review. The authors argued that theories relying heavily on
similarity to explain the coherence of mental categories, such as the prototype and
exemplar views, were too simplistic in that they failed to account for the knowledge
we have of the relationship between features of entities (e.g. things fly because they
have wings) and of the relationship between those entities in the world. Their
proposal was that concepts are organised by people's theories (explanations rather
than scientific theories) about the world and are not just collections of features or
attributes. Murphy and Medin use the example of seeing a man at a party jump into a
swimming pool fully clothed. They argue that ''jumps into a swimming pool fully
clothed" is not a feature of the category "drunk" which can be compared to a
prototype or previous exemplars (you may categorise this man as drunk without ever
before having seen a drunk behave in that particular manner). The category decision
is guided by a theory about inebriation and behaviour that explains the man's actions.
Empirical evidence for the theory view of categorisation arises from work with young
children. For example, as previously mentioned, Keil (1989) reported an experiment
in which children were told a story of an animal that looks exactly like a racoon but it
has the internal organs of a skunk, it has skunk parents and gives birth to baby skunks.
The older the children, the more likely they were to say that the animal is a skunk and
not a racoon. Younger children seemed to be more influenced by perceptual
similarity. These results were interpreted in terms of the older children having
developed more sophisticated theories about the world which guide them to pay
attention to the biological and genetic features of the animal when making their
category decision and to disregard the shared superficial features.
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Studies with adults concerning the effect of background knowledge have also lent
empirical support to the idea that theories relating features to one another may
account for category coherence better than notions of similarity between members
based on shared features. For example, Kaplan and Murphy (2000) examined the
effect of learning novel categories that consisted of differing sets of 5 real
characteristic features with each set having one idiosyncratic feature that was related
to a theme or 'consistent knowledge structure'. For example, one exemplar for a
hypothetical vehicle category could be described as having vinyl seat covers, an
airbag, a front licence plate, two doors and manual transmission (characteristic
features). Itwould additionally be described as having one of a set of idiosyncratic
features that linked it either to tropical use or arctic use (e.g. is made in Africa or is
made in Norway). Participants saw six exemplars from each category to be learned.
The exemplars from any given category either included idiosyncratic features from
the same theme or from one of two different themes. It was found that where the
idiosyncratic features all related to the same theme the categories were learned faster
than where the category members had idiosyncratic features from two different
themes. Post experimental questionnaires showed that those who had noticed the
themes learned faster than those participants who did not report having noticed the
themes. Furthermore, the participants who saw consistent themes were better at
learning the idiosyncratic features than the characteristic features. Kaplan and Murphy
suggest that normal models of categorisation based on numbers of shared features
would not predict these effects as all exemplars shared 5/6 of the same values. The
authors argue that it was the background knowledge, linked to the thematic features
that facilitated learning in the single theme conditions. Importantly the idiosyncratic
features themselves varied and had to be noticed in relation to each other during
learning in order for a theme to be constructed and used. These findings, that defy
explanations of category learning based on similarity of features between exemplars
and illustrate the role of theories in such tasks, lend weight to theory-theories of
categorisation.
It should be noted that this theory does not claim that features/properties are
unimportant to the categorisation judgement but that the way features are weighted in
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category decisions depends upon one's background knowledge and theories about
how the world works.
Alternative views
It was claimed on page 3 that Medin's (1989) notion of concept included "all that is
characteristically associated with it". However, it can be seen from the review so far
that the favoured candidates for "associations" are features and possibly relations
between features. Other "associated" knowledge is either not mentioned at all or is
accommodated by 'joining it on' to the concept in some manner. Barsalou (1991)
proposed that world models are constructed around entities (standard object
categories) and that the models are people's knowledge of locations in the
environment, together with the knowledge of entities and activities that exist currently
in those locations" (p.53). So although this body of extra conceptual knowledge was
acknowledged it was not treated as part of the concept itself. Features and featural
relations have been accorded a special status in this respect. Theories of concepts
have been based on the "theoretical assumption of descriptionism" (Millikan 1998,
p.55). There are, however, two theories that have a radically different view of the
role of features altogether - essentialism and conceptual atomism.
Essentialism
The term 'psychological essentialism' was coined by Medin and Ortony (1989) to
capture the observation that people seem to reason about category membership, not on
the basis of observable, external properties but on the assumption of category
members sharing some unobservable, underlying essence. Moreover, they seem to
believe that it is the nature of that essence that gives rise to those observable, external
features that are commonly used for identification. Under this view, being a member
of a category is a matter of possessing the right kind of essence of that category,
rather than a matter of sharing superficial features. The theory-theory of concepts
discussed earlier can be seen as linking to this view by suggesting that theories can
account for the relationship between features and thus explain the coherence of the
category. A body of evidence from conceptual developmentalists has suggested that
even young children demonstrate beliefs in such essences. Gelman and Wellman
(1991) presented 4-year aids with stories such as that of a newborn cow that was
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taken to a farm to be raised with pigs and was never allowed to see another cow. The
children at both the lower and upper limit of the age group expressed beliefs that the
newborn cow would exhibit cow-like properties when it was grown, rather than
features of pigs. Gelman and Wellman describe the children as having beliefs about
the 'innate potential' (p.364) of different kinds of species. Gelman and Wellman
(1991) showed that children as young as 3 years old could identify two members of a
superordinate category as having the same 'insides' (e.g. a pig and a cow). This can
be seen as laying the foundations of beliefs about internal essences as they relate to
category membership. It has been argued that belief in essences is not necessary to
account for the empirical findings in the developmental literature. Strevens (2000)
suggested that beliefs in what he terms K-Iaws will equally explain the observed
effects. K-Iaws are "causal laws that connect kind membership with observable
properties" (Abn, Kalish, Gelman,Medin,Luhman,Atran, Coley and Shafto, 2001,
p.59). Under this 'minimalist' position, Strevens claims that it is sufficient for people
to believe that it is something about being a cat that causes it to purr but it is not
necessary to hold any particular view of what that 'something'; might be. Ahn et al.
(2001) refute this view and claim that the Strevens position fails to fully explain the
theoretical and empirical evidence.
Much of the empirical evidence related to arguments around essentialism seems to
arise from studies with children. This may be because adults' understanding of
biological domains is assumed and the question has therefore been - how early are
these beliefs acquired? As mentioned earlier (Reisberg, 1997), adults are not
expected to be fooled by storied of item transformation into believing that a member
of a biological category has changed category by virtue of undergoing superficial
changes (e.g. the red, striped lemon.). However, Hampton (1995) reported that when
adult participants were told of an offspring from two zebras that was provided with a
special diet grew to look, and behave, just like a horse (having no stripes and being of
a uniform brown colour), two thirds of the participants did not agree that this animal
was really a zebra.
It should be noted that these views deal with the way people seem to reason about
concepts rather than addressing what concepts might actually be (in contrast to the
project of Fodor's conceptual atomism - to be discussed shortly). However,
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essentialism clearly sees features or properties as effects of whatever it is that
consitutes the concept (author's italics) rather than the playing the key role in
determining category membership in the way that classical or prototype theories posit.
This means that arguments, such as that made in this thesis, concerning the role of
situational features in theories of categories and concepts would not impact on a
theoretical positions of essentialism at all.
Conceptual Atomism
Classical, prototype and exemplar theories differ in their view of which features are
constitutive of a given concept and which are 'collateral' (Laurence and Margolis,
1999) - but they all allow that features play some role in our concepts. Conceptual
atomism is distinguished by its assertion that the content of a concept is "constituted,
exhaustively by symbol-world relations" (Fodor, 1998). Fodor maintains when the
proponents of most of the well-established theories in psychology posit features as the
concept, they are working under an assumption of Inferential Semantics. This is to say
that concepts are what they are (at least partly) by virtue of their inferential relations
to other concepts. For example, holding the concept apple infers the holding of other
concepts such es fruit, round, skin, pips etc. One of Fodor's principle reasons for
rejecting this as a plausible theory of concepts is that it has not been possible to
produce a principled way of identifying precisely which inferences should be included
in order to individuate the concept. Fodor (1998) dismisses classical defining feature
theory, prototypes and theory-theories as possible candidates for what concepts might
be as follows;
1) Concepts can not be definitions as "there are practically no defensible
examples of definitions" (p.4S.)
Furthermore, the concepts in the definition - even if it existed, would be held
in an inferential conceptual network of the type that he rejects.
2) Prototypes can not be concepts because concepts must be productive and
systematic. That is to say that we must be able to compose new concepts from
the concepts that we possess and that believing a proposition composed of
concepts such as Jane loves John automatically entails being able to entertain
the proposition John loves Jane. It is the property of compositionality that
allows both these facilities. As previously mentioned in this chapter (p.2S)
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Fodor maintains that prototypes do not compose and therefore they can not be
concepts. Ifprototypes composed then the new prototype of a complex
concept such as PET FISH would include all the most typical features of the
prototypes of each of its constituents, PET and FISH. Since a goldfish is a
typical pet fish but is neither a typical pet or fish then prototypes fails to meet
the demands of compositionality.
3) Fodor asserts that theory -theories fail to offer any coherent response to the
question ''what's a concept" at aU (p.117). He concedes that supporters of
theory-theories seem unconcerned with addressing this question (unlike Fodor,
himself) but are rather attempting an explanation of what causes the features
to cohere within a concept.
All three of these theories are, in any case, fatally flawed in Fodor's view as they all
presume that the majority of concepts have a structure - this is an assumption that that
Fodor does not accept. Fodor's alternative proposal is that concepts are atomic- that
is to say that they have no component features and therefore no structure. It is not
possible to do justice to his detailed arguments for this view here but his controversial
position is that what it is to be the concept of x is to express "the property that our
kinds of minds lock on to from experience with good examples of instantiated" x
(p.137). Ultimately, Fodor feels that there should be no difference in explaining how
we come to have the concept doorknob from experiences of doorknobs from the
explanation of how we come to have the concept red from our experience of things
that prompt redness.
There have been a number of critical responses to Fodor's arguments (e.g., Laurence
and Margolis, 1999) and these are not necessarily germane to this summary.
However, if Fodor is right, then discussions of whether situational features need to be
accorded a larger role in concepts will become moot.
MUltiple categorisation procedures ?
With the exception of conceptual atomism, the different theories of categorisation
suggest that deciding whether or not x is a member of category y could be a matter of
a) seeing whether a rule that determines membership ofY is met by x
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b) Evaluating similarity between x and numerous exemplars of Y
c) Evaluating similarity between x and a protoype of category y
d) seeing whether the features of x can be best explained by an underlying theory
of what it is to be aY
Smith, Patalano and Jonides (1998) reviewed evidence from various types of study
that, when taken together, suggest that more than one of these procedures may be
applied when making decisions about the same category; specifically they examined
the rule -based and the exemplar-similarity based procedures. Given that the
application of rules to decisions about category membership may reasonably be
expected to relate to defining feature models of categorisation - and given that the
plausibility of defining feature models had been placed under considerable doubt, one
might be surprised that rule based procedures were given such attention and
consideration. However, many studies of the acquisition and use of artificial
categories continued to suppose the application of rules by creating novel categories
that varied on a limited number of dimensions and supplying participants with
specific criteria for identifying members from this limited pool of features. For
example, Allen and Brooks (1991) gave participants two new categories to learn. The
potential members were presented pictorially as bird-like creatures but only three
visual features were presented as being salient to their category membership as either
builders or diggers - body shape, leg-length and body markings. One group of
participants was given the rule that if a item had 2 out of the three following attributes
then it was a builder- otherwise it was a digger - long legs, angular body, spotted
markings. The second group was simply exposed to a number of exemplars from both
categories. Both groups were trained with a number of exemplars from both
categories until they could correctly classify ten animals. In the test phase they had to
classify a subset of exemplars that they had already seen plus some new exemplars.
The two groups showed a different pattern of response on the new test items (in
particular the negative matches) - demonstrating two different categorisation
procedures with the same materials. However, the results suggested that the rule-
based group had also based their decisions on exemplar similarity. Furthermore, the
response time date indicated that both procedures had been utilised on the same trial.
The finding that the group instructed with a rule spontaneously made use of exemplar
learning suggested to Smith et aI. that assessing category membership through
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similarity to learned exemplars is a relatively automatic process that may take some
time to 'kick in' but that once activated it is quicker than applying a rule. Smith et al.
also point out that requiring participants to perform a secondary task concurrently
with the categorisation task results in greater interference with rule based
categorisation than with similarity based categorisation (Smith and Kemler, 1984;
Smith and Shapiro, 1989). The review then considered comparable evidence for the
two procedures from the 'natural' category literature. The type of categories involved
in the studies that Smith et al. considered were those where partial textual descriptions
of putative members were provided to participants. As Smith at al. point out "the
relevant attributes are denoted by distinct words in the description, they are readily
separable and salient, just as in the case with artificial materials" p. 179. It should be
noted that this situation differs considerably from the category decisions that one may
make under everyday conditions where the decisions about which features will be
relevant to the classification or identification of the item will be key to the subsequent
categorisation. Nevertheless, Smith et al. found that studies with a restricted notion of
natural categories also suggest the parallel adoption of similarity and rule based
procedures. In a set of influential studies mentioned earlier in this chapter, Rips
(1989) demonstrated dissociation between judgements of similarity to a category and
judgements of category membership. Rips' participants were presented with limited
(sparse) descriptions of36 items such as this object has a 3-inch diameter and then
asked to decide whether the item is more typical of a pizza or a quarter, whether it is
more similar to pizzas or quarters and whether it is a pizza or a quarter. The value of
the key variable (in this case, size) was predetermined asking the same participant in
advance to think of the largest quarter that they could remember and the size of the
smallest pizza. The hypothetical object was then described as being of a size half-way
between these two values. The decisions varied depending upon the question asked.
That is to say, responses to the category membership question tended to result in a
decision in favour of the category with most variability around the key variable (e.g.
pizza) whereas the similarity question tended to result in a decision that the item was
most similar to the category where the key variable was fixed (e.g. the quarter).
Typicality judgments seemed to fall roughly equally between the two options. This
result was interpreted by Smith et al. as a further demonstration of participants using a
rule based procedure to make their category membership decisions instead of
similarity; something along the lines of 'quarters can never be 3 inches in diameter so
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it can not be a quarter'. Smith and Sloman (1994) extended the Rips' method to
investigate the effect of providing richer descriptions of the item under consideration,
and in particular to include in its description a feature of the non-variable category
e.g. an object that is three inches in diameter and silver in colour. This description has
a feature that virtually rules out its membership of the fixed category (quarter) but
includes a feature that is characteristic of the same category (quarters are usually
silver, pizzas are not). Participants answered similar questions to those posed by Rips
for either sparse or rich descriptions. The results of this first experiment failed to
replicate Rips' reported dissociation and instead found that the category decisions
reflected the similarity judgements. This was the case for both sparse and rich
descriptions. However, in a second study, a condition in which the participants had to
think aloud whilst making their decisions was included. This was the method used in
the original Rips study. This time category/similarity dissociation was found for the
sparse items only - replicating Rips findings under the same conditions. This suggests
that providing think aloud protocols encourage participants to engage in a more rule-
based categorisation procedure than they would have done otherwise. This can be
seen as supporting Smith at al's contention that similarity assessments are relatively
automatic. The implications of this study for some of the work reported in this thesis
will be returned to in Chapter 5.
Recent Developments
"The only people who regularly consider categories like clothing, fruit and furniture
in their abstract, decontextualised senses may be categorisation researchers!"
Barsalou, 1991, p.45
More recently, researchers are being exhorted to take a fresh look at the area and to
allow for the possibility that a radically new perspective is required if the field of
enquiry is to expand in useful directions. Although the ideas come from several
different areas of research within cognition (Funnell, 2001; Barsalou, 1999; Smith and
Samuelson, 1997; Whittlesea, 1997), the focus of attack is the same, that is the notion
that concepts can be adequately studied and understood as isolated entities. The
recent work of two proponents of these ideas (Funnell, 2001; Barsalou, 1999,2003)
will be presented. Barsalou and Funnell are not the only authors who have challenged
a 'decontextualised' view of conceptual knowledge (e.g.Whittlesea, 1997; Smith and
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Samuelson, 1997; Glenberg, 1997) but they are presented in some detail since they
offer specific new theoretical frameworks within which the empirical findings can
later be discussed. It should be noted that neither of these theories drove the
formulation of this programme of work since most of their development took place
relatively recently- nonetheless it may be considered that they provide theoretical
support for the investigation of 'contextualised' concepts.
Perceptual Symbols and Situated Concepts
Barsalou has been developing a theory of concepts as situated simulations through
various publications over a number of years. Barsalou (1999) proposes that many of
the problems associated with traditional models of concepts can be overcome by
thinking of conceptual knowledge as being stored not amodally and propositionally
but as being constructed from a store of perceptual symbols, extracted from
experience (see also Barsalou, Weh, Luka, Olseth, Mix and Wu, 1993). Given that the
symbols are drawn directly from experience and are memorised in the same form in
which they are initially experienced, i.e., as perceptual memories, Barsalou maintains
there is no longer a problem in explaining the relationship between the representation
and what it is purported to represent in the world (frequently referred to in the
philosophical literature as the problem of intentionality and one which has been dealt
with by psychologists by ignoring it or denying its importance for psychology). The
perceptual symbols are alleged to capture not only sensory information but also a
record of internal states that accompanied the original experience, e.g., emotional
reactions. Under this view, the feature lists associated with objects (which participants
can provide on demand) reflect not a list of propositions stored in memory but a
"sequential description of an experiential image". They are descriptions people give,
not of objects, but of the manner in which they have constructed a schematic image.
The degree of consensus in these descriptions between a range of people can
presumably be explained by the similarity of their perceptual apparatus and their
shared experience within a culture. Barsalou uses his earlier metaphor of a world
model (Barsalou, 1991) to describe the new theory, " A world model is a person's
beliefs about the current state of the world. It is not beliefs about the types of things in
the world, such as taxonomic knowledge about birds and tools; instead it is beliefs
about particular individuals in the world, along with their current states and locations"
(pp. 30-31). Within the world model, individuals, as ontological entities, are
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represented as frames that capture both the enduring aspects of the individual entity
over time as well as the variability. All information (in the form of perceptual
symbols) appertaining to an individual is integrated into a single frame. Over time, the
frame for any given concept comes to contain" extensive multimodal information of
what it is like to experience this type of thing" (p.12). The frame may be
subsequently partially activated in order to simulate a particular experience. In this
theory, the simulator carries much of the explanatory force. Since the simulator is
equivalent to a concept, the simulator must be able to fulfil all the putative functions
of concepts, for example, permitting categorisation, re-identification procedures and
supporting categorical inferences. This new model of conceptual knowledge can be
seen as emerging from a move to re-unite perception and cognition (see Goldstone
and Barsalou, 1998).
An interesting aspect of this work for the interpretation of these studies, which will be
presented in the following chapters, is the emphasis on the multi-modal nature of the
perceptual symbols. The symbols capture, through attentional processes, any number
of aspects (not all aspects since they are inevitably partial records of an experience) of
experiences with entities or events. So all sensory modalities are deployed (not just
vision on which so much rests in traditional accounts of object recognition) including
proprioception and introspection. This opens up the possibility of conceptual
knowledge that extends far beyond the awareness of features and functions required
for re-identification playing an equal role in concept-based cognition.
More importantly for this thesis, Barsalou' s recent development of these ideas
(Barsalou, 2003) stresses the situated nature of the simulations that he posits. In fact,
the theory is now referred to as 'situated simulation theory'. It is proposed that the
simulation of an object, which supports thought about that object and is provoked by a
goal, is always situated. That is to say, the object or entity is not simulated as an
object, free of any background setting but is always integrated with information about
its external environment. The nature of that background will vary depending upon the
nature of the stimulus for the simulation. Barsalou claims that the primary purpose of
the conceptual system is to support 'situated action' and that it is therefore necessary
that it should be organised around the action/environment interface (see also Franks
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and Braisby [1997] for a view of concepts that prioritises the goal of guiding reliable
action in the environment).
Since developing his theoretical position, Barsalou has reviewed earlier experimental
evidence from this perspective and has additionally reported experimental evidence of
his own that lends support to the theory. For example, he has investigated whether
perceptual simulations are used by participants when they are asked to generate
properties of objects. Wu and Barsalou (in press) predicted that participants given no
instructions on how to achieve the task should perform similarly (in terms of the type
of properties generated) to participants who were explicitly told to use mental
imagery. This was found to be the case. Wu and Barsalou also demonstrated that the
participants given no instructions were affected by the manipulation of perceptual
variables that one would not expect to alter performance if amodal symbolic
representations (such as feature lists) were being accessed during the task. Perhaps the
most convincing demonstration was the increased degree of access to certain
properties when the noun was preceded by a modifier. For example, more internal
properties were generated when the noun was preceded by a modifier that would
make internal properties more "visible" in a perceptual simulation e.g. rolled-up lawn
compared to when the noun was presented alone e.g. lawn.
The theory makes a number of claims about the conceptual system that mark it out
from previous models. Firstly, perception and conception are not autonomous,
modular systems. Secondly, a concept should be thought of more as afacility for
producing representations (simulations) to meet particular immediate goals, rather
than as the retrieval of a stored, decontextualised representation. Thirdly, the
simulations include information about environments, likely goals and introspective
states. The Wu and Barsalou paper also provided support for the claim that when
concepts are simulated they are simulated within relevant settings or situations. In all
four experiments that involved property generation under differing manipulations,
participants produced physical settings and introspective states in their protocols as
well as properties. The amount of situational information generated during the tasks
ranged from 19% to 35%, The authors take this as being informative of conceptual
processing rather than dismissing it as 'error'. This offers a key role for the
43
relationship between items and their settings within cognition that contrasts with older
models of semantic memory that focus heavily on intrinsic features of objects.
The studies reported in the following chapters can therefore be viewed as support for
concepts being situated. Indeed, the published paper resulting from chapter 2 (see
Appendix A) has been cited by Barsalou as further evidence for his theory (Barsalou,
2003).
Levels of Meaning
Memory for events and situations has been the subject of a considerable body of
research, much of it under the auspices of autobiographical memory (see Conway,
1990b). It has been claimed that memory for events is organised by activities, that it
has multiple organisations (Lancaster and Barsalou, 1997) and has a basic level,
similar to that of object taxonomies (Morris and Murphy, 1990). When discussing
and researching event knowledge, one notion that remains very influential is that of
scripts (Shank and Abelson, 1977). Scripts have been proposed as organising
structures for information concerning events. These have been thought to form
hierarchies of increasingly abstract levels of information and incorporate knowledge
of the relevant agents, objects, activities, locations and goals most commonly
associated with the event. For example, the script for shopping at the supermarket
might include trolleys, store assistants, fruit, vegetables, frozen foods, tins, credit
cards, paying for goods, carrier bags etc. One might reasonably expect that that
retrieval of an event frame or script would activate the relevant objects, but it would
not necessarily be predicted that when one formed an intention to activate knowledge
of certain types of objects (e.g. fruit) that one would do so through an event frame or
script, since information regarding types of objects would be assumed to be more
readily available through a deconxtualised repository of facts about the world such as
'what types of things are called fruits?'. Physical scripts have been described by
Shank (1982) as providing a 'snapshot' ofa visual field that would include objects. A
review of the evidence for the involvement of scripts in studies of cognitive
breakdown in both Alzheimer's patients and semantic dementia patients led Funnell
(2001) to formulate the levels of meaning model of semantic memory, which is
intended to be descriptive of memory in the absence of pathology but that can explain
the patterns of performance and behaviour noted in dementia patients.
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Patients with semantic dementia typically show poor semantic knowledge in clinical
tests of word meaning and use, but retain comparatively good abilities at using
everyday objects. It is not unusual for such patients to be unable to specify the
function of an item when shown it under test conditions but to use the same type of
object appropriately in a variety of familiar, everyday activities. As the disease
progresses, the patients' ability to generalise knowledge about objects beyond the
most immediate context deteriorates. Funnell (1996) documents a severe case of a
semantic dementia patient who retrieved a ballpoint pen and calendar from her
kitchen in order to arrange the next appointment having only just failed to recognise
an identical pen when tested. Snowden, Griffiths and Neary (1994) also described the
way in which only items experienced in repeated, personal contexts were recognisable
to semantic dementia patient, KE. The function of precisely the same objects could
not be specified by KE if it was moved from its usual location to a different place in
her own home. It seems then that the condition involves a progressive dissociation
between the ability to show the researcher how an object can be used under formal
testing and the appropriate use of it in everyday, goal-based activities. New learning
has been shown to take place even in advanced cases of semantic dementia but
Funnell notes that it is only successful in a very narrow context and does not
generalise to new situations. Funnell concludes that' the effect of new learning on
conceptual representations might be explained more successfully within a model that
includes both abstract, generalisable knowledge and knowledge tied to a specific
context rather than the traditional approach that isolates semantic memory entirely
from contextually based information." (p.333).
She consequently suggests that meaning, in the absence of pathology, is represented
by a 'continuum of processing levels'. The model proposed by Funnell consists of
three levels of meaning for concepts - the specific event level at which knowledge of
an object is tied to specific encounters with it; the general event level, at which
knowledge of an object is linked to repeated and varied experiences of the situations
in which the object plays a role and the conceptual level at which knowledge of the
object is abstracted from the other levels and forms a 'repository of facts' about the
item that more closely resembles the usual notion of semantic memory (see figure
1.3.). The extreme ends of the continuum are information that has, across time, been
4S
completely abstracted from the contexts in which it was originally experienced, and at
the other end, information that is embedded in a specific personal experience. In
between are differing levels of abstraction.
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Figure 1.3 Levels of Meaning Model (Funnell, 2001).
Funnell maintains that such a model of conceptual knowledge can account for the
apparent anomalies in dementia cases regarding their semantic knowledge and their
interactions with objects. Semantic dementia can be seen as the initial breakdown of
the highest level of abstraction (the 'encyclopaedic' knowledge of items), so that
meaning devoid of context becomes increasingly difficult to access. It is this level of
meaning that would be exercised by standard clinical tests of semantic knowledge.
The more general event knowledge in which objects are embedded in memories of
repeated experiences of similar settings may be preserved for longer, allowing
patients to make use of objects (for which they can no longer describe the function)
providing that the contexts in which they appear are familiar. Eventually, any new
learning may take place only at the level of specific episodes and may not generalise
even to other similar events.
The model also has developmental support in that the initial interface between infants
and objects will be in the context of specific episodes but repeated episodes allow the
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formation of structures that retain knowledge of the principal components but lose the
phenomenology of specific episodes. This would be represented in the model by the
general event knowledge. The level of abstracted features and function-based
categorical knowledge would be the last to develop. There is evidence that initial
groupings of objects by children tend to be around shared scripts for commonly
occurring events (Lucariello and Nelson, 1985) and that groupings made by young
infants often cohere through shared events and situations (Markman, 1989).
Funnell proposes that loss of access to abstract knowledge of the item is compensated
by knowledge of how to interact with the object in well-rehearsed situations, thus
allowing them a facility for object use that would not be predicted by the patients'
performance on tests of their 'factual' knowledge about that same object. The same
inference has been drawn by Snowden, Griffiths and Neary (1994) based on similar
observations of semantic dementia patients.
Given the slippery notion of 'meaning' and its complicated relationship with concepts
(see p. 16), it may be preferable to think of this model in terms of levels of abstraction
as opposed to meaning. Initial encounters would be experienced as specific episodes
from which can be abstracted the nature of regularly repeated episodes which in tum
provide the 'database' from which repeating features of frequently occurring objects
can be drawn.
It can be seen that this model, arising from work in cognitive neurospychology, also
moves away from the notion of conceptual knowledge as solely de-contextualised
feature lists that characterised earlier theories of concepts. However, it concerns itself
principally with the possible relationships between different types of memories and
unlike the theoretical framework developed by Barsalou, it is silent about the way in
which the components of the memories are represented in memory, i.e., as amodal
propositions or in units that are analogues of experience.
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Summary of Theories of Organisation
The literature appertaining to categories and concepts is immense. The preceding
review does not claim to be exhaustive, but seeks to convey something of the
development of theories of conceptual structure. It is notable that, with the possible
exception of classical defining-feature views, the other theories described continue to
co-exist and compete. It can be seen that the earlier theories envisaged concepts as
repositories of facts about entities and that those facts were, almost exclusively,
descriptive of their physical features and their function. Context, in the sense of
differing environments and differing actions, was seen as something to be 'added' to
core representations. In fairness to theories that attempt to present mental concepts as
relatively stable, abstracted structures- this perspective is not an arbitrary one but has
been driven by the non-trivial observation that people have the ability to repeatedly
recognise and perform appropriately towards an object despite "varying local
circumstances" (Smith and Samuelson, 1997. p 161). That an object can be
recognised as a member of a particular category across a wide range of different
environmental contexts implies that what is known about that object must be
abstracted from the environments in which it has been encountered and that
regularities, rather than contingent variations, constitute the stable base of the
representation of that object. The focus on isolating the aspects of an entity that
would permit this reliable identification (i.e. its features) has perhaps been responsible
for the implication that this body of knowledge is itself necessarily isolated from other
information.
Both essentialism and conceptual atomism deny features or properties of the type of
role afforded by other theories. For an essentialist the features usually discussed as
being included in definitions, exemplars or prototypes would be causally linked to the
essence of the concept rather than serving to individuate it and proponents of
conceptual atomism would claim that features, whilst clearly related to the atomic
concept, in no way form part of it.
The later theories (Funnell, 2001; Barsalou, 1999, 2003) both propose that
information about situations and events play a more important role in thinking about
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entities than has been implied by previous theories. One of the primary differences
between the two models is that Barsalou's does not rely on stipulating types of
organisation in memory. Under his theory, knowledge of objects is stored as
perceptual symbols that are accessed to simulate a wide range of perceptual
information regarding an object for the purposes of thought. Funnel proposes a more
standard 'storage structure'.
Features
The focus of this review has been the different ways in which 'features' of entities
have been supposed, or not supposed, to enter into the organisation of conceptual
knowledge. Before detailing the aims of this programme of work, It is worth spending
a little time to consider what this important term may be considered to include.
What may count as afeature?
One may be forgiven for assuming that identifying features of entities would be non-
problematic. However, using abstract figures, Medin, Goldstone and Gentner (1993)
have demonstrated that what counts as a feature when, for example, assessing
similarity between items, may change depending upon the items under comparison.
As shown by the review provided in this chapter, the term 'feature' is key to virtually
any discussion of concepts in the psychological literature. But what is covered by the
term 'feature' is by no means a non-controversial issue. As Murphy (2002) "Any
object can be conceived of in many different ways, and it would be impossible to
encode each one and store it as part of a concept" (p.174). Implicit in this quote is the
notion that not all attributes or characteristics of an item can be considered to be a
feature of the item as concept. The large groupings of features that are most
frequently referred to are perceptual (sensory), functional and encyclopaedic.
Perceptual properties or features are those that can be perceived directly through the
senses (such as size, colour, shape, texture, sounds) whilst functional features are
usually thought of as those that pertain to how the item acts or is used. The
documentation of cases of individuals who show selective deficits in their conceptual
knowledge has led to speculation that the relative importance of these different types
of feature is differentially weighted for living and non-living things and that category
specific impairment may result from damage to either type of feature. This has
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become known as the sensory/functional hypothesis (Farah and McClelland,
1991;Warrington and Shallice, 1984). Much of the impetus for thinking of semantic
knowledge as a distributed network of overlapping discrete featural units arose from
the investigation of category specific impairments and the collection of normative
data concerning features has therefore often been undertaken by researcher in this
area.
McRae, De Sa and Seidenberg (1997) obtained normative data from a feature
generation task and classified the resulting features as 'aspects' (to include perceptual
features); functional (relating to use); classification (indication membership of some
other category); information related to a situation in which it takes part (e.g. grows on
trees) and people's related cognitions. The situational features represented only 9.9%
of the features coded compared to 56 % aspects and 22.5 % functional. Hence
situational features are indeed considered here as features but appear to be far less
salient than other types of feature in a feature-listing task.
Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Hodges and Patterson (2001) collected normative 'feature'
information for 64 items from 8 superordinate categories. Their method differed from
a simple 'list the attributes' instruction. Participants had to complete sentences
referring to the items such as 'X is , X has and X can ' . The resultant
attributes were coded as sensory, functional, encyclopaedic or categorising
information. Functional examples were an owl can fly, a suitcase can be carried, a
cat can catch a mouse. Encyclopaedic examples included a tiger isfound in India and
a toaster is kept in a kitchen. Overall, 50.5 % of the features generated were
classified as sensory, 27.6% as functional, 14.7% as encyclopaedic and 7.2% as
categorising. The authors were surprised to find that when examining the distinctive
features (as distinct from the shared features) it was only the encyclopaedic features
that showed a higher proportion of distinct features for the living compared to non-
living domain. They note that patients exhibiting a deficit for non-living things
should, according to their results, also show a relative deficit in their knowledge of
encyclopaedic knowledge.
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The type of knowledge about items that is highlighted in this thesis is referred to t as
situational knowledge and it is may cover some of the features that have been
previously identified in cognitive neuropsychology as functional (can be caught as a
functional feature of a mouse would link it to a mousetrap as something that can catch
mice) or encyclopaedic (is found in cold climate may link penguin to igloo).
Locations and situations are often difficult to disentangle. It could therefore be argued
that this type of information has long been recognised and included amongst
'features'. However, situational features have not attracted the same degree of
interest in cognition literature (although see Wu and Barsalou, in press).
It will be seen in Chapter 3 that these situational features ( e.g., is taken to weddings
for camera) can be used as a basis of similarity. Ifone is content to extend one's
usual notion of features to include these situational features then situational
knowledge can be represented within a distributed model of semantic memory (e.g.,
Moss, Hare, Day and Tyler, 1994). One may argue then that when people make use
of thematic relations to judge similarity between items or to form the basis of
categorisations (Lin and Murphy, 2001) then they are simply making judgements
based on these features rather than other types of feature (e.g., perceptual). However,
it will be argued in the final chapter that this approach cannot account for the type of
thematic similarity that seems to arise from items 'featuring' in the same event or
situation (e.g., between jelly and balloons). A feature of Jelly could be thought of as
'eaten at children's parties' and of balloons as 'decorating children's parties' but this
is not the same feature- yet this co-occurrence in an event seems to account for some
measure of similarity between items and may lead to their shared categorisation.
Itmay be therefore that rather than thinking of situational knowledge as a different
type of feature, situational knowledge may be more usefully thought of as arising
from an additional, script-like organisation of object information revolving around
events and situations.
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AIMS
The purpose of this research programme was to investigate the influence of situational
information in two specific cognitive tasks. The first task comprised the generation of
members of a given category in a restricted time. People were also asked to explain
the rationale for their choice of items. The second task comprised the rating of
similarity between category members. The categories included both those with
members that share perceptual and/or functional features and categories (taxonomic)
with members that share few, if any, perceptual and/or functional features (ad hoc).
These tasks were chosen precisely because they have traditionally been explained in
terms of traditional notions of "semantic memory" unaffected by situational
knowledge.
The Empirical Tasks
It is clear that we have, for any given entity, a wide range of information that may
assist us in predicting its usefulness in a particular context, that is the manner in
which we can interact with it to fulfil specified goals and where in our environment it
is to be found if needed. However, this introduction has suggested that the range of
non-featural knowledge has, in older theories of conceptual structure, been implicitly
accorded a role of secondary importance as background knowledge or 'associated
ideas' . In this thesis, the two chosen tasks required extensive preliminary
investigation to generate appropriate stimuli. Furthermore, both tasks led to different
kinds of analyses on qualitative and quantitative aspects of the data. This approach led
to inferences concerning several related theoretical issues. A brief background to the
two tasks will be given in the following sections, with a fuller introduction preceding
the relevant studies.
Category Member Generation
This task was chosen as an elementary cognitive operation that demands, one
assumes, access to conceptual knowledge, and has been traditionally thought of as
tapping semantic memory. Participants are provided with a series of category
headings and asked to list as many members of that category as they can. This is
known as a free emission procedure. The output of such tasks has been examined for
evidence or organisational dimensions (Henley, 1969; Rips, Shoben and Smith,
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1973). However, there have been relatively few studies that deployed the free
emission procedure with a view to examining the nature of participants' retrieval
strategies, namely, Gruenewald and Lockhead, 1980; Williams and Hollan, 1981;
Walker and Kintsch, 1985. Of these, only the last two collected protocols from their
participants as to how they completed the task. Williams and Hollan's participants
were asked to recall names of people they attended school with. Only Walker and
Kintsch (1985) used a natural and an object category as the original stimuli.
There is an extensive literature that investigates the clustered output from learned
word lists. Clusters have been found to take advantage of categorical connections
between items in the original to-be-Iearned list, and to represent the imposition of an
organisation on lists of unrelated words. Since this has been taken to be informative as
to the organisation of semantic memory, one might reasonably argue that output from
free emission tasks should also reflect organisational themes. For this reason, the
older, list-learning literature is also reviewed in the introduction to the free emission
study. The thesis study departs from the previous literature by requiring protocols of
retrieval strategies for an extended range of both taxonomic and ad hoc categories.
Similarity Judgements
Similarity is believed to underlie a number of vital cognitive activities, such as
categorisation, reasoning by analogy and inductive reasoning and as such it has been
the subject of much theoretical debate (Goldstone, 1994; Goodman, 1970) and
empirical investigation.
In everyday situations, it is rare that one would make a judgement of similarity
between two items for no express purpose. The comparison might be made in the
course of problem solving or reasoning; or there may be a practical goal that one is
trying to meet. Certain laboratory tasks infer similarity from the achievement of other
goals, such as sorting tasks or perceptual confusability tasks. A number of studies,
however, have made use of direct assessments of similarity between items using
scaled ratings (e.g. Barsalou, 1982). Following on from the category generation task,
it was decided to examine these direct judgements of similarity for the influence of
situational knowledge for the following reasons. Firstly, the degree of similarity
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between two items has long been believed to be a function of the number of properties
that they share and the number of properties on which they differ (Tversky, 1977).
There have been many debates about the nature of the constraints that may operate
upon the properties involved in the comparison. The focus of investigation into
similarity has been principally one of identifying the factors that affect ratings of
similarity, presumably by altering the range of properties under consideration such as
context (Tversky, 1977; Medin & Shoben, 1988) and expertise (Sjoberg, 1972;
Suzuki, Ohnishi & Shigemasu 1992). Until quite recently, there was never any doubt
that the process was one of feature comparison and that the features were
perceptuaVfunctional. If situational information were found to be influential within
such a process, it could therefore be argued that theories of similarity should be
amended to include a role for this other type of shared 'attribute'.
Methodological considerations
Taxonomic and Ad Hoc Categories
The "standard" taxonomic categories such as birds, furniture, vehicles, vegetables
etc. exercised a stranglehold on research for a number of years. It is useful to remind
ourselves of their origins as appropriate concepts for research. Rosch's seminal
experiments reported in 1975 commenced with an experiment in which reliability of
subjects' ratings ofintemal structure was verified, and norms were collected for
ratings of the goodness of example of 50-60 members of 10 "systematically chosen
categories" (p.196). The ten categories were the only ones remaining at the end of the
following procedure. Firstly, all concrete nouns with a word frequency of greater than
10 were identified from Kucera and Francis (1967). From these, categories were
eliminated if, a) they bore a part-whole relationship to the superordinate, b) if there
was linguistic ambiguity in the superordinate, and c) if the superordinate cut across a
number of other taxonomic structures. The final 10 categories were the familiar, fruit,
bird, vehicle, vegetable, sport, tool, toy, furniture, weapon and clothing. In 1983,
Lawrence Barsalou drew the attention of concepts researchers to the existence of a
very different kind of category that is prevalent in everyday use. These categories are
used to describe collections of items which are not normally thought of as being in the
same category (indeed, the members are drawn from other existing standard
categories) but often are grouped together for a specific purpose. Barsalou's earliest
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examples of these categories included things to take from one's home during afire,
things to eat on a diet, things to take on a camping trip. Barsalou refers to these
categories as ad hoc or goal-derived categories.
Barsalou (1985) found that these categories, like standard categories, also had typical
and atypical members (i.e., exhibited graded structure). He proceeded to investigate
the basis of that typicality. Since these members are perceptually very different from
each other it seemed clear that typicality could not be assessed by an enumeration of
perceptual features shared between them and some abstracted representation of the
most frequently occurring features of the category. What would the prototype of
Things dogs chase be like? These category members do not share many properties-
sometimes they appear to have in common only the goal for which they have been
grouped together to serve (usually made explicit in the category name). Barsalou
(1985) found that the typicality of these ad hoc categories was determined by two
factors. Firstly, 'frequency of instantiation' which is a measure of how often the item
has been encountered 'as a member of that particular category'. Note that this is
different from a measure of pure frequency; the typicality of torch as a member of
Things you take on a camping trip depends not on frequency of experience of a torch
per se but upon frequency of experience of torch in the context of things you take on a
camping trip. A second factor that determines the structure of these categories is the
extent to which the member exhibits the characteristics of an "ideal" member of that
category. For example things to eat on diet could contain both lettuce and yoghurt,
but since an ideal food to eat on diet has few calories, the member that comes nearest
to that ideal will be seen as a more typical member, i.e., lettuce.
The significance of ad hoc categories has yet to be fully explored. They are frequently
cited as illustrating the flexibility of the conceptual processes but are rarely included
in theoretical arguments about knowledge organisation. They can be seen as a distinct
type of category altogether from standard categories in that being developed" on
line" to meet a temporary goal, they do not demand accounts of conceptual structure.
However, Barsalou has suggested that these categories, given sufficient reason for
use, can evolve into more standard categories (things to give to someone on their
birthday becomes birthday presents). This implies a continuum between ad hoc and
standard categories. Lucariello and Nelson (1985) found that ad hoc categories tend
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to be developmentally prior to standard taxonomic categories. Ross and Murphy
(1999), whilst not referring to them as Ad hoc categories, found that participants were
willing to sort foods into categories such as snack foods (foods which can be eaten
between meals and eaten on the move) and to use these categories to support
particular inferences. Itmay well be that in everyday contexts, categories such as
things to take to work with me feature in thinking and planning more frequently than
do categories of vegetable or toys. This is one reason for including ad hoc categories
in the materials for the studies to be presented here, in addition to the more standard
representatives of 'category'. There has been a considerable focus on the differences
between these types of categories. In his seminal paper on ad hoc categories, Barsalou
(1983) showed that taxonomic categories have stronger concept-to-instance
associations than do ad hoc category members leading the taxonomic categories to be
more firmly entrenched in memory. Ad hoc categories have been said to have a heavy
reliance on goals in a way that is rarely associated with taxonomic categories. Ad hoc
category members tend to share fewer perceptual features than do taxonomic category
members. By using both category types within the same framework in this thesis, it
was possible to investigate whether the role of situational information also differs for
categories that have been believed to differ in a number of other respects.
The term 'taxonomic' will be used in this thesis to describe both natural kind and
artifact categories that admit of a hierarchical organisation, exhibit a graded structure
based on shared properties and are presumably well established in memory. This may
extend beyond the somewhat limited range of' Roschian' categories. Barsalou (1983)
uses the term 'common' category rather than taxonomic and elsewhere the term
'common taxonomic categories' has been used (e.g. Medin, Lynch and Solomon,
2000). The term 'taxonomic' will be used here throughout for the sake of
consistency. The phrase 'ad hoc' will be used in preference to 'goal derived' to
describe those categories whose members cut across taxonomic categories, share few
perceptual features and are often depicted as being created 'on-line' to meet a specific
aim.
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The Use of Protocols
For both the category generation tasks and the first of the similarity studies, it was
decided to make use of written protocols to provide information concerning the
strategies used by participants to complete the experimental tasks.
There has been a long history of debate concerning the extent to which protocols can
be relied upon to represent a window into cognitive processes. Nisbett and Wilson
(1977) and Ericsson and Simon (1980) most famously debated the value of verbal
reports as data. This argument focused around verbal protocols recorded concurrently
or retrospectively, as opposed to written protocols as obtained in the present studies.
However, substantially the same objections (and defence) can be made in both cases.
Nisbett and Wilson, in reviewing a wide range of studies in which verbal reports were
treated as data, concluded that "when people attempt to report on the processes
mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of
any true introspection" (p.231). They propose that in the absence of availability of
genuine introspection, people give reports of their cognitive processes that are based
on their existing knowledge of plausible relationships between stimuli and responses.
Ericsson and Simon countered that verbal reports, collected carefully under particular
conditions, could be treated as valid data. They drew attention to the fact that the
studies reviewed by Nisbett and Wilson were "neither designed for nor primarily
concerned with determining subjects' memories of their cognitive processes" (p.246).
Nisbett and Wilson, from the outset of the article dismiss the possibility of
participants being able to report on perceptual or memorial processes. The data
considered by Nisbett and Wilson were collected under a wide range of experimental
conditions for differing purposes but for the main part involve asking participants to
give an account of their behaviour under particular conditions. For example, in the
"insufficient justification studies" examined by Nisbett and Wilson, participants
required to undergo a second series of electric shocks (while performing a learning
task) with no real justification showed lower galvanic skin responses and better
learning than subjects who were provided with a justification for the second series of
shocks. However, the former group did not report the shock to be any less painful
than did the latter group. In reviewing other similar studies, Nisbett and Wilson report
that in the majority of studies of this type, behavioural differences between groups of
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participants were not matched by differences in their verbal reports. Nisbett and
Wilson also make reference to studies in which attitudinal shifts are identified in
participants as result of discussion but participants' protocols showed little or no
awareness of these changes (e.g. Goethals and Reckman, 1973). Nisbett and
Schachter (1966) subjected their participants to a series of increasingly painful
electric shocks. Experimental participants were administered a placebo and were told
that the pill would produce physical symptoms which were actually those which
would resulting naturally from the shocks. These participants, attributing their
physical experience to the pill rather than to the shocks took approximately four times
as much shock as the control subjects. The participants were subsequently asked
about their ability to withstand shock. For example, "I noticed you took more shock
than average. Why do you suppose you did?". Only 3 of the 12 subjects in this
condition explained this in terms of their attribution of the unpleasant effects to the
pill rather than to the shock. Typically they looked to an explanation from somewhere
in their past which could account for their stoicism. Ericsson and Simon, however,
pointed out that the form of the probe question made it not only possible for subjects
to account for their responses without consulting their memories on how they did so,
but highly likely that this would be the case. Subjects were not asked, for example,
what they were thinking about when they experienced the symptoms or what they had
believed to be their source. Furthermore, in some of the work critiqued by Nisbett
and Wilson, the interval between completing the task and providing the protocol was,
in the view of Ericsson and Simon, so long as to cast doubt on whether the subjects'
memory for how they undertook the task was still available to them with any degree
of accuracy. Ericsson and Simon are also wary of studies in which the protocol is
recorded at the end of a number of trials, obliging the participant to abstract a general
strategy across several occasions or to generalise the last strategy used to all trials.
Clearly the informativeness of such a protocol is possibly limited and
unrepresentative. In the current studies, participants were probed after each trial. This
approach reduces the time lapse between task and protocol and leaves any
identification of general, repeated strategies to the experimenter during protocol
analysis. This should increase the accuracy and the specificity of the protocols.
Additionally, the instructions given to participants in these were entirely open and
offered no example of what might constitute "the correct answer", thus it should not
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have been possible for participants to divine any requirement on the part of the
experimenter
Thesis Structure
Generating Category Members
Chapter 2 reports on category member generation and protocols of participants'
explanations of their item generation strategies. If semantic memory acts as a
repository for category information that has been extracted across numerous
experiences and stored in a manner that will serve the demands of categorisation and
identification regardless of context, then one would predict non-strategic generation
of category members. That is, one would predict that accessing one category member
would activate other close members of the category in a relatively automatic manner.
Furthermore, one would predict that participants would be unable to report the nature
of the retrieval, or at most would report semantic groupings within the category. If, on
the other hand, knowledge of category members were contextual, then one would
predict that familiar contexts would act as useful retrieval strategies.
Judgements of Similarity
Chapter 3 reports the quantitative and qualitative results of direct judgements of
similarity between category members. Pairs of items, varying in typicality, from both
common and ad hoc categories were presented with or without context. Participants
gave judgements of similarity by means of scaled ratings. A subset of participants
also provided written protocols explaining their ratings. A primarily feature-based
account of concepts would predict that judgements would be based on a computation
of shared and unshared properties. However, if situational knowledge is utilised in
such judgements, one would predict that perceptually dissimilar items could still be
found to be similar if they both feature in the same type of situation or event.
Evidence of this would be predicted in both ratings and protocols.
Predictors of Thematic Similarity
Chapter 4 details empirical work that set out to further investigate the type of
similarity that arises from participants linking items together, thematically, in a
situation. When perceptually related items are viewed as being more or less similar to
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each other, it can be explained as a function of their number of shared properties.
Hence a sparrow and a robin are likely to be rated as more similar to each other than
an eagle and a robin. What could account for variations in ratings of similarity for
items that are thematically linked? If these items are seen as sharing a situation or
script then one might predict that one factor affecting the ratings could be the
likelihood of each item appearing in that situation. Chapter 4 describes an
investigation based on this prediction. The relationship between ratings of thematic
similarity and the relationship of the items, not directly to each other, but to a
common event was examined. The manipulation was based only on data of frequency
of generation from the event to the item and the item to the event.
Theoretical Conclusions
In the concluding chapter, a summary of the main empirical findings is presented for
each study. Each set of results is discussed with reference to the two recent theories
of conceptual knowledge, Barsalou (1999, 2003) and Funnell (2001), described earlier
in this chapter. The direction of future studies arising from this work follows and the
chapter concludes with an assessment of the contribution made by the thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
Accessing conceptual knowledge: Retrieval Strategies in Free
Emission Tasks
"Memory, as measured by free recall, has a certain organization, and that organization
is related to previously acquired conceptualisations"
Kendler (1966, p. 198)
Overview
This chapter reports two studies. In study J, participants generated category members
for 2 taxonomic categories and 8 ad hoc categories under a time constraint (90
seconds). After each category, the participants provided written protocols in answer to
the question "how did you go about thinking of items for this category? H. Data
concerningjluency and item dominance are reported. However, the data of principal
interest is the classification of retrieval strategies arisingfrom the protocols. Study 2
remedied two possible artefacts in the first study by rephrasing the titles of the ad hoc
categories and by increasing the number of taxonomic categories within the materials.
The studies aim to identify the strategies that participants report using whilst listing
members of both taxonomic and ad hoc categories and to consider these in the light of
predictions from standard theories of semantic memory organisation (also published
as Vallee-Tourangeau, F., Anthony, S. H., & Austin N. G., 1998).
Background
During the 1940s, 50s and 60s, there was substantial interest in verbal learning
experiments in which participants typically had to study, and subsequently recall,
word lists. It was consistently found that the recall output consisted of temporal
clusters or "bursts" of words (Bousfield, 1953; Pollio, Richards and Lucas, 1969;
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Puff, 1970). Furthermore, examination of the cluster contents suggested that
participants made use of semantic organisation afforded by the content of the lists to
organise their recall. Even in the absence of any organisation of the stimuli in the mind
of the experimenter, participants imposed their own (Tulving, 1962). The
methodology deployed was predominantly the learning/recall of predetermined words
but some of this work included a paradigm in which the subject was simply asked to
list as many members of a given category as possible. This procedure is referred to as
a "free emission task" and resulted in an output which was similarly characterised by
clusters of apparently related words produced with relatively short inter-item pauses,
separated by longer pauses (Bousfield, 1944). For both these tasks it has been
posited that the nature of the organisation demonstrated in the output is likely to
reflect organisational principles in memory (Tulving, 1962, 1964,1966; Tulving and
Pearlstone, 1966; Kendler, 1966). This is a key assumption in the conclusions that
will be drawn from the two free emission studies reported in this chapter. The focus
of the present studies will therefore be traced back through part of the list learning
literature, which has historically been closely intertwined with studies on free recall
from semantic memory. Studies making specific use of free emission tasks, which
resemble the focus of the current work more closely, did not appear until the 1980s.
These will be dealt with towards the end of the introduction.
Previous Work
Amongst the earliest experimenters to make use of a free emission procedure were
Bousfield and Sedgewick (1944). In this early study participants were simply asked
to name as many quadruped animals or US cities as they could in 18minutes. The
characteristics of the responses most relevant here were a) the output did not emerge
as a string of items separated by equal temporal intervals but in bursts, or clusters, of
items separated by relatively longer pauses, and b} participants appeared to make use
of relationships between words to organise the material in recall. That is to say, the
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constitution of the response clusters was not arbitrary but demonstrated "various
types of contiguity" (p. 153). This feature of the data was noted by the authors but
was not pursued since the stated purpose of the study was to examine the temporal
characteristics of sequences of responses. Bousfield (1953) went on to extend this line
of work to recall of learned word-lists which consisted of 15 instances from each of 4
categories, animals, names, professions and vegetables. It was found that category
members tended to be recalled together even though they had been presented in a
random order.
The Relationship between Clustered Items
The clustering or grouping of items in the recall output seemed to reflect relationships
between the to-be-remembered items. An obvious question to be addressed was the
nature of those relationships. Lists organised by the experimenter to fall into a
number of superordinate categories seemed to result in clusters of categorically related
items as found by Bousfield (1953), but Jenkins and Russell (1952) reported
'associative clustering' in the responses of participants who were asked to recall pairs
of highly associated items (chosen from word association norms) which did not
necessarily share category membership, e.g., Black-White, High-Low. Although the
word pairs were separated and randomised for the learning phase of the experiment,
members of the same associated pair tended to be produced together in the recall
outputs. Overall mean recall was 24 words from a total of 48 and approximately half
of these appeared in their associated pairs. Marshall (1967) and Cofer (1965)
attempted to tease these factors apart to try and offer a definitive answer to which
type of association between items formed the basis of organisation in recall. Marshall
(1967) used pair lists, similar to the Jenkins and Russell study; these were chosen
such that the components of each pair were associated with each other but half the
pairs were categorically related (e.g. Table-Chair) whilst the remainder did not share
category membership (e.g. Sit-Chair). Six different levels of 'associatedness' between
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the paired items were presented to six different groups of subjects. Marshall found
that the higher the degree of association between paired items, the more likely they
were to be recalled together. However, there was an even stronger tendency for this to
be the case when the pairs were drawn from the same category. There was
additionally an interaction such that the category effect was stronger with low
association strength pairs than for highly related pairs. Both category associations and
non-category based links seemed to be used as the basis of organisation. Cofer
suggested that this implied an active search for ways of organising the material in as
much as use would be made of any perceived relationship between list items with
non- categorical association being utilised in the absence of a categorical link; the latter
being favoured. The importance of this line of research was that it was viewed as a
means of garnering evidence for competing models of semantic organisation in long-
term memory.
Subjective Organisation
Tulving (1962) looked at what occurred in recall if subjects were asked to learn lists of
unrelated words and tested over repeated trials of the same stimuli. He reasoned that if
two items from the list are recalled adjacently on a number of different trials then they
had probably been organised by the subjects in some manner. His means of measuring
this was referred to as a measure of subjective-organisation (SO). Sixteen words were
presented on different orders for 16 trials. There was a steady increase in the number
of words recalled on each trial plus an increase in SO scores. This lent strength to
Tulving's growing conviction that the improvement which was witnessed in recall
over trials with the same materials was not due to repetition per se but was due the
opportunity that repetition afforded for the subject to organise the stimuli in a
meaningful manner which aided recall. The difficulty with studying subjective
organisation is that it is not easy to identify the particular basis for organisation used
by anyone subject and for this reason Tulving and others depended more heavily on
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methods using pre-determined organisations decided by the experimenter. Pollio,
Richards and Lucas (1969) found that in recall ofa list of25 words, comprised of five
members from five categories, participants produced clusters of category members
irrespective of whether or not their attention was drawn to the categorical nature of
the word-list.
Gronlund and Shiffrin (1986) examined the effect of various enforced retrieval
strategies on recall from natural categories. The authors concluded that free recall
probably involved" use of idiosyncratic strategies that provide a roughly ordered
sequence of cues somewhat superior to alphabetic or size cues" (pp. 555). Three
strategies were compared, size (recall to begin with the smallest physical category
member, increasing in size) alphabetic (recall to begin with members starting with the
letter 'a' and cycling through the alphabet) or free (no strategy enforced). Superior
recall in terms of total items generated was found for the free recall condition. In one
experiment (Gronlund and Shiffrin, 1986, exp.3) participants had to learn lists of 25
words from each category. This time there was no effect of strategy. The authors
conjectured that this may reflect a change in the nature of the free recall strategy used
when a list is to be recalled as compared to free recall strategies used when the task
involves drawing on long-term semantic memory. This distinction is worthy of note,
as it will be returned to later (see Discussion). The method of testing recall of word
lists presented in experimental settings was believed to be tapping episodic memory.
The existence of episodic memory as a distinct memory system was famously
espoused by Tulving (1972). In its weakest form, the distinction represents "a hunch
that there is something different about the way people remember their own past and
how they store and retrieve general information about the world" (Tulving, 1986,
p.308). However, in its strongest form, episodic information "stores information
about temporally dated episodes or events and temporal-spatial relations among these
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events" (Tulving, 1972) and constitutes a separate memory system to semantic
knowledge which "involves general, abstract, timeless knowledge that a person shares
with others" (Tulving, 1986, p. 307). The learning of word lists, despite being
comprised of words the meaning of which would be presumably the bailiwick of the
semantic memory system, was considered an episodic task because it is the
experimenter's particular choice of the subset of words presented in the task which
has to be learned and recalled. This methodology was the primary manner in which the
characteristics of episodic memory could be examined. Free emission tasks, on the
other hand, were seen as drawing on semantic memory, since the knowledge base
supporting the task is the participants' knowledge of the world that predates the
laboratory experiment. The following group of studies specifically made use of free
emission procedures.
Free Emission Studies
Gruenewald and Lockhead (1980) suggested that one of the reasons for any similarity
of the output from both list learning and free emission tasks is that in both cases the
participants must continue over time to produce new items from a pool of possible
responses which decreases in size with each response. Gruenewald and Lockhead
sought to establish whether the parametric characteristics of recall from list-learning
data (e.g., exponential decay) would apply equally to data from a free emission task.
The second aim of their paper was to determine a way of establishing the presence of
clusters of related items in an output which extrudes from a wide knowledge base and
not from a carefully chosen list of words where potential clusters can be determined a
priori. The 4 categories used were animals, birds, foods and cold foods. A period of 15
minutes was allowed for each category. Clusters of contiguous items were noted in the
output. The authors were, once again, concerned with producing an algorithm that
characterised the temporal clustering of the data. In line with previous researchers
(e.g., Graesser &Mandler, 1978; Pollio, Kasschau and DeNise, 1968), they assumed
that the free recall process was comprised of two stages and appealed to the readers to
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introspect on how the task might be performed. "Consider recalling food words.
Perhaps you would consider that supermarkets have foods and attempt to search the
store aisles in your imagination; then you might recall foods on the dining room table;
perhaps next to vegetables, then to fruits, to foods which are disliked, and so on ...."
(p. 229). Gruenewald and Lockhead suggested that participants search a "semantic
field" in order to retrieve clusters of semantically related items. One or two clusters
from their participants are itemised anecdotally but yet again, no inquiry was made
into whether participants actually made use of the strategies suggested above in
completing the task.
Unlike the studies discussed so far, Williams and Hollan (1980) were interested in the
think-aloud protocols provided by the participants and in the strategies deployed in
fulfilling the demands of a free emission task. Williams and Hollan conducted a
detailed observational study in which four subjects over periods of between 4 and 10
hours had to recall names of high school peers. For one participant this meant recalling
names from 19 years ago. Williams and Hollan conceived the recall task as a "complex
problem-solving activity" (p.87). Their data was strongly suggestive of what the
authors called a "retrieval cycle" which consisted of three recursive stages. First
participants have to establish a retrieval context that is "designed to focus on a
relevant subset of the initial information provided". Having found this context, it is
used to guide the search of an indefinitely large database. Having retrieved items using
this context as a cue, the item is verified as meeting the requirements of the original
instruction. The process is strategic, effortful and reconstructive. The notion of a
mediating cue in facilitating the memory search is consistent with some of the other
suggestions considered here such as Gruenewald and Lockhead's 'semantic fields' and
Graesser and Mandler's (1978) 'conceptual dimensions'. Williams and Hollan noted
that two of the most extensively used contexts were locations and activities, such as
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where classmates lived or the sorts of activities the recaller took part in with the
target, "people I played tennis with".
Walker and Kintsch (1985) also collected protocols (both concurrent and
retrospective) from their participants who verbally listed members of two categories,
animals andfurniture over a time period of 12minutes per category. Walker and
Kintsch looked to model retrieval of 'real world knowledge' using a model by
Raaijmakers and Shiffrin (1981) which had been developed to account for data from
list-learning experiments. The protocols showed that category name was not the only
cue utilised by participants; rather participants generated their own retrieval cues and
produced items to those particular cues. For example, for the category Soup, one
subject reported thinking of 'Soups I eat most often' and" I am trying to think of
different vegetables that might be in soups". This led Walker and Kintsch to propose a
two-stage model of retrieval under these conditions. Participants must first produce
appropriate cues and then use these to search for retrieval of appropriate category
members. The authors' comments on the nature of their findings presage the results of
the present study. The category that is generated in response to the task is not" in
any sense a memory unit that can simply be retrieved. Furthermore, these
intermediary memory nodes that are involved in retrieval are typically not abstract,
context-free and general, but can be very personal and idiosyncratic" (p. 280).
However, frustratingly they did not investigate, or even document in any detail, the
actual strategies reported by their 12 subjects.
What is the Value of the Free Emission procedure?
The importance of studying the output response and reported strategies in free-
emission tasks is the possibility of drawing inferences from these data to the
organisation of the knowledge base in memory. There is a good precedent for the
assumption that the clustering seen in the output obtained through free recall tasks
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provided an insight onto the underlying memory organisation (Barsalou & Sewell,
1985; Chase & Ericsson, 1981; Graesser and Mandler, 1975; Mandler, 1967; Reitman,
1976; Tulving, 1962,1964, 1966; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Lancaster and Barsalou
(1997) in examining the organisation of people's memories of events, suggest that
when participants are asked to learn lists in laboratory conditions "the most
parsimonious and simple approach is to adopt existing organisational systems"
(p.597). Under this view one would expect similar patterns of organisation to appear
in both list learning experiments and free emission studies. This has been found to be
the case in some studies (e.g. Rubin and Olson, 1980) but note Gronlund and Shiffrin
(1986, Experiment 3), in which there was no advantage for a free recall compared to an
alphabetic strategy in recalling word lists whereas such an enhancement of recall had
been found in the previous two experiments using a free emission procedure. This
suggests an interaction of strategy and task in as much as the strategy most effective
in generating items from one's conceptual knowledge might not be useful in assisting
recall of a predetermined word list. Gronlund and Shiffrin did not investigate the
'idiosyncratic' strategies used by participants in the free recall condition and were
therefore not able to say with any certainty that the nature of these had changed
between the two different task types. It seems that the nature of these strategies,
referred to briefly in the studies discussed above and examined more closely by
Walker and Kintsch (1985) and Williams and Hollan (1980) for a very limited range
and type of category, bear closer examination for a wider range of categories.
The new studies described in this chapter investigate the extent to which subjects
report the use of search strategies in retrieving members of a diverse range of
categories. Furthermore, the intention is to document and attempt to classify the
strategies reported and to consider whether they can shed any light on the organisation
of conceptual knowledge. Bear in mind that many of the studies discussed above point
to a hierarchical, taxonomic organisation of semantic memory. But what of the
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organisation within categories? Henley (1969) reported that dimension of size and
ferocity characterised the output of free recall from the category "animals". It should
be noted, however, that these dimensions were the author's interpretation of the
patterns produced through multi-dimensional scaling. A dimension showing tiger, bear
and lion at one end and sheep, deer and donkey at the other could well be indicative of
a perception of similarity in terms of ferocity but cat and dog (both household pets)
were nearer to the top of this dimension than the bottom. An equally valid
interpretation might be one of perceived intelligence in the animals. Rips, Shoben
and Smith (1973) found similar dimensions relating to birds, as well as sub-domains of
predators, domestic birds, domestic edible ot farm birds. One might therefore
reasonably expect that participants will report strategies involving searching for
different 'types' of animals and that the same may be true of other well established,
well structured taxonomic categories such as fruit, furniture and vehicle.
Taxonomic categories are not the only sort of categories of which we have knowledge.
Barsalou (1983) pointed out that we are able to construct a wide range of ad hoc
categories such as things to save from your house in afire, things to pack for a holiday
etc. These are categories that can be contrasted with well-rehearsed taxonomic
categories and the two category-types have been differentiated in various ways.
Although both exhibit graded structure (certain members are viewed as more typical of
the category than others), typicality is determined largely by similarity to a central
tendency in the case of taxonomic categories but the typicality of a member of an ad
hoc category will depend upon how often that member has been encountered as a
member of that category (frequency of instantiation) and whether it exhibits
characteristics which make it ideal in meeting the goal expressed by the category title .
Taxonomic category members have been said to share context independent properties
whilst ad hoc category members share properties rendered salient only by context.
Taxonomic categories are generally named by a single lexeme whereas ad hoc categories
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are labelled with a "complex phrasal construction" (Barsalou, 1991). Barsalou (1991)
has also hypothesised that the means of acquisition for these two categories may
vary; "The acquisition of common taxonomic categories, such as apple, bird, shirt and
chair, relies heavily on experiences with exemplars" (p.2) but he goes on to claim that
acquisition of a category like things to pack in a suitcase does not rely on such
experiences. Furthermore, these different types of category are alleged to play
different roles in the cognitive system. Barsalou (1991) talked of taxonomic categories
as providing "building blocks for world models" while goal derived categories "provide
interfaces between world models and event frames for achieving goals" (p.53). Given
these structural and role differences between taxonomic and ad hoc categories, it would
be reasonable to expect that participants would draw on different strategies if asked to
generate instances of each of these types of category.
If 'strategies' of retrieval are required at all for generating members from taxonomic
categories, then access through semantically related subgroups, such as those
witnessed by Henley (1969) and Rips et al. (1973), would be anticipated. In contrast,
performing the same task with ad hoc categories may be a matter of 'constructing'
members by considering the ideal characteristics defined by the category title. This
would particularly be expected to be the case for categories of which participants
would have little experience. Barsalou (1997) has proposed that "ad hoc categories
construe entities as playing roles in events" (p. 30) .For example, things to stand on to
change a lightbulb may access chair, stool, and table, through recreating experiences of
the event, changing a lightbulb. Therefore, one might expect access to more familiar ad
hoc categories to be mediated by consideration of those events. Alternatively, it may
also be possible to access members of this category by deciding upon the
characteristics needed to meet the goal of the category, i.e. objects of a particular
height, which will bear your weight, which may be nearby in locations where you are
likely to be changing a bulb etc. Having generated suitable items, these may be then
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tested for suitability as a response. There are reasons then to anticipate differences in
strategies that will be used by participants to complete a free emission task for
taxonomic as compared to ad hoc categories.
Study 1
The participants in this study generated instances for each category for a 90s period.
After each category the participants wrote down the strategies that they had used in
the process. One of the aims was to assess the extent of the prevalence of experiential
strategies documented in Walker and Kintsch (1985) across a more representative
range of categories, and in particular to assess their usage for taxonomic categories.
Previous research has established a close connection between autobiographical
memories and ad hoc categories (Conway, 1990a) and it was therefore expected that
instance retrieval from 'familiar' ad hoc categories would be mediated to a greater
extent by experiential strategies. Instance retrieval for categories that are better
established in long-term memory, for example, the taxonomic category fruit, might not
be mediated by experiential cues to the same degree as familiar ad hoc categories: for
example, as suggested in Barsalou (1983), the strong category-instance associations
might render such mediations superfluous. In addition, if experiential cues are used
spontaneously for familiar ad hoc categories, it is of interest to investigate what cues
subjects employ when they have had little or no experience with a category (e.g.,
animals found on the Galapagos).
Method
Participants
Fifty undergraduates from the University of Hertfordshire volunteered for this study.
The modal age of participants was 19yrs.
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Categories and Design
Ten categories were selected, two taxonomic categories taken from Rosch and Mervis
(1975), namely vehicle ziui fruit, and eight ad hoc categories. These eight ad hoc
categories were made up of three subgroups of categories. The first group was one for
which the category instances were concrete objects whose grouping was likely to be
familiar to the participants, namely things people keep in their pockets, things dogs
chase, things people take to a wedding, things made mostly of plastic. For ease of
exposition we will refer to these four categories as pockets, dogs chase, wedding, and
plastic, respectively. The second group of ad hoc categories was one for which the
category instances would cover a different ontological range including, for example,
moods, feelings, life events, causal explanations, although participants were unlikely
to think the groupings odd. These were reasons for going on a holiday, and excuses
for arriving somewhere late. For convenience these will be referred to as holiday and
late. The final group of ad hoc categories was made up of concrete entities whose
groupings were unlikely to be familiar to the participants. These were animals found
on the Galapagos, and things sold on the black market in Russia (these two categories
will be referred to as Galapagos and black market).
Procedure
All participants received all ten category names in one of ten randomised orders. The
participants were then asked to answer in writing the question "how did you go about
thinking of items for this category?". Answers to this question provided the data on
the nature of the retrieval strategies. Participants were also requested to rate how
difficult they found it to produce items for that category on a scale of 1 - 10 where 1
indicated not difficult at all and 10 indicated very difficult. Test materials were
assembled in a booklet. Single category names were printed on the top of separate
lined sheets. After each category sheet, a sheet with the three questions was inserted.
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The front page of the booklet informed the participants about the nature of the task
and that for each category they would be given 90s to list the names of as many items
they could think of (see Appendix B for full instructions and sample page of
materials).
Participants were run in groups ranging in size from five to ten. Once the experimenter
had answered any queries, participants were instructed to turn over the cover page
and start listing items for the first category. After 90s had elapsed, participants were
instructed to turn over the page; they were given another 90s to answer the question
concerning retrieval strategy. This procedure was repeated for the remaining nine
categories. We chose to segment the experimental procedure into those time intervals
in order that test booklets would take no longer than 30 minutes to complete.
Measures
Three measures are reported. These are: 1) the number of items produced for each
category (output fluency) 2) the difficulty ratings provided for each category 3) the
proportion of participants who generated each of the ten most generated items for
each category, a measure of consensus termed item dominance and 4) The
segmentation and classification of participants' answers to the question "how did you
go about thinking of items for this category?". The answers to this question were first
segmented into parts, where each segment appeared to correspond to a distinct idea or
approach to item generation. (In many cases the answers were naturally segmented by
the participants with the use of terms such as "and" and "then".) Two investigators
independently segmented all protocols and met to compare their resulting
segmentations and resolve disagreements. The number of protocol segments ranged
from 93 (holiday) to 117 (pockets), with a mean of 102 segments per category (s.d. =
9.5). All protocol segments were then transcribed onto index cards labelled with a
subject number and the category name. Triplicates of the cards were produced and a
set given to the experimenter and two colleagues. The cards were independently sorted
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into groups. In a first classificatory stage, segments were sorted largely on the basis of
their surface form, i.e., on a minimal interpretation of their meaning. For example, for
fruit, protocol segments like "fruit I eat" and "fruit I like" were sorted initially in
different groups. In a second phase, groupings of protocol segments were identified
that appeared to reflect similar approaches to item generation. The final classification
of the segments was agreed by all three judges. Three broad classes of strategies were
identified: 1) experiential mediation, 2) semantic mediation, and 3) unmediated
retrieval. Eighty-eight percent of the protocol segments could be classified under these
headings (8% resisted such groupings and 4% were uninterpretable).
Results
Output Fluency
The mean number of items generated for each category and each category type are
reported in Table 2.1 and illustrated by category in Figure 2.1. Participants generated
most items for the taxonomic categories (mean of 12.98) and fewest for concrete
unfamiliar ad hoc categories (mean of 5.87). To illustrate the differences and
similarities both between and within category types, a number of pairwise
comparisons were carried out. Thus, within the taxonomic categories, fluency for fruit
was significantly greater than for vehicle, t (49) = 4.86, P <.0001 (all tests at 95%
significance level two-tailed). Means for vehicle and pockets were not significantly
different, but fluency for plastic was significantly smaller than for pockets, t (49) =-
10.3, p < .0001. Across ad hoc category type the mean for plastic was smaller than for
holiday, t (49) = -3.44, p < .001. Finally, the fluency for Galapagos was significantly
smaller than the fluency for black market, t (49) = 2.23, P < .03
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Table 2.1
Mean output fluency (standard error in parentheses) for the 10 categories in Study 1
Taxonomic Categories
Fruit Vehicle Overall mean
14.80 11.14 12.98
(0.63) (0.61) (0.48)
Concrete Familiar Ad hoc categories
Pockets Dogs Chase Wedding Plastic
11.14 9.10 8.04 6.78 8.77
(0.40) (0.30) (0.41) (0.35) (0.21)
Abstract Familiar Ad hoc categories
Holiday Late
8.20
(0.36)
8.18
(0.36)
8.19
(0.26)
Unfamiliar Ad hoc categories
Galapagos
5.00
(0.37)
Black Market
6.74
(0.53)
5.87
(0.34)
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Figure 2.1 Rank order of mean output fluency for each of the 10 categories.
Difficulty Ratings
After generating members for each category, participants were asked to indicate how
difficult they had found the task on a scale of 1 - 10 that was anchored at each end by
not difficult at all (1) and very difficult (10). Mean ratings were calculated for each
individual category and for each category type (Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2
Mean Difficulty Ratings (standard deviation in parentheses) for the 10 categories in
Study 1. The higher the rating, the more difficulty is indicated.
Taxonomic categories
Fruit Vehicle Overall mean
1.75 2.49 2.13
(1.36) (1.66) (1.25)
Concrete Familiar Ad hoc categories
Pockets Dogs Chase Wedding Plastic
2.93 3.86 5.29 6.25 4.58
(1.72) (1.88) (2.48) (2.4) (1.41)
Abstract familiar Ad hoc categories
Holiday Late 3.92
4.27 3.59 (1.81)
(2.4) (1.94)
Unfamiliar Ad hoc categories
Galapagos Black Market
7.94 6.73 7.34
(3.31) (2.71) (2.06)
A one-way repeated measures ANOV A showed a significant difference in the ratings
for the four category types, Wilks Lambda F(3,46) = 80.606, p<O.OOl, eta squared =
0.84. Participants rated the unfamiliar abstract categories as most difficult (M = 7.34)
and pairwise contrasts showed this to be significantly more difficult than the next
most difficult category type which was concrete familiar (M = 4.58) Wilks Lambda F
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(1,48) = 83.99, p<O.OOl, eta squared = 0.636. (The largest range within a category
type occurred in this group - between pockets and plastic, 3.32) This mean in tum was
significantly higher than that of the abstract familiar categories (M = 3,92) Wilks
Lambda F(1 ,48) = 6.96, p= 0.01, eta squared = 0.127. The lowest difficulty ratings
were found for the taxonomic categories (2.13) and this was significantly lower than
the mean for the abstract familiar categories Wilks Lambda F(l,48) = 39.622, p<
0.001, eta squared = 0.693.
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Figure 2.2 Mean difficulty ratings for the 10 categories in Study 1 arranged in
ascending order.
It can seen that the individual category means are anchored by the taxonomic at one
end (easiest) and the unfamiliar categories at the other (most difficult) but the two
familiar ad hoc category types are somewhat interleaved with Wedding rated as more
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difficult than holiday F (1,47) = 4.973, P = 0.031, eta squared = 0.096. Pairwise
contrasts showed no significant difference between vehicle vs. pockets (p=0.194), Late
vs. dogs (p = 0.387), dogs vs. holiday (p=0.255) and plastic vs. black market
(p=0.199). The difficulty ratings correlated significantly and negatively with fluency
for every individual category except dogs and holiday and overall mean difficulty
rating for each category correlated significantly and negatively with overall mean
fluency r = -0.909, p< 0.001.
The participants' perceptions of how difficult they found it to generate members for
the different categories seemed to be reflected in the number of items they actually
generated with the most difficult categories resulting in the lowest fluency. This
supports the notion that taxonomic categories are better established in memory than
ad hoc categories and are therefore easier to access, however these findings suggest
that there are also significant differences in the ease with which people may generate
members of differing types of ad hoc categories. It should be noted that each question
on difficult followed each generation task so the difficulty ratings can be seen as a post
hoc justification of performance and would therefore expect to be correlated with the
number of items generated. The difficulty ratings predicted a significant amount of
variance in all categories except for dogs and holidays. Figure 2.3 shows regression
lines for all four category types.
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Figure 2.3 Regression slopes for difficulty ratings as a predictor of fluency for
taxonomic, concrete familiar, abstract familiar and unfamiliar category types.
81
Table 2.3
Values of adjusted r2 for all categories and category types. All values are significant
unless so indicated by n.s.
Taxonomic categories
Fruit Vehicle Overall
0.073 0.163 0.177
(7.3%) (16.3%) 17.7%
Concrete Familiar Ad hoc categories
Pockets Dogs Chase Wedding Plastic
0.105 0.049 n.s. 0.081 0.328 0.028
(10.5%) (8.1%) (32.8) 2.8%
Abstract familiar Ad hoc categories
Holiday Late
0.046 n.s. 0.200 0.109
(20%) (10.9%)
Unfamiliar Ad hoc categories
Galapagos Black Market
0.293 0.427 0.406
(29.3%) (42.7%) 40.6%
The relationship between difficulty ratings and fluency is strongest for the unfamiliar
ad hoc categories where participants tended to produce few items and give high
difficulty ratings. In the taxonomic categories participants were most fluent and
tended to give low difficulty ratings.
82
An ANCOV A using difficulty as a covariate showed that difficulty accounted for a
significant amount of variance in fluency rating F(l,480) =129.9, p<O.OOI, eta squared
= 0.213. There was a significant main effect of category type F(3,480) = 23,758,
p<O.OOI, eta squared = 0.129. There was also an interaction between difficulty and
category types F(3,480) = 4.01 p = 0.008, eta squared = 0.024, showing that the
slopes shown for each category type in Figure 2.3 were not the same.
Item Dominance
Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of participants who generated the ith most generated
items (i ranged from I to 10) for each category (right panel) as well as the average by
category type (left panel). The picture conveyed by the left panel is clearer. Item
dominance distributions for taxonomic categories showed the most consensus while
the least consensus was observed for the unfamiliar ad hoc categories. The right panel
portrays a fuzzier picture where the item dominance distributions for each category
overlap a great deal. On the basis of Kolmogorov-Smimov analyses (Wilkinson, 1990),
the item dominance distribution for fruit, which reflected the highest consensus, was
significantly different from the distributions for all other categories (p<O.OOOl)
categories. . In turn, the item dominance distribution for plastic, which reflected the
least consensus, was significantly different from all categories except Galapagos
(p=O.749) and black market (p=O.271). For the categories between these two
extremes, the item dominance distributions did not differ significantly.
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Figure 2.4 Proportion of participants generating each of the 10 most generated items
for the 10 categories (right panel); average proportions for each category type shown
in left panel.
Retrieval Strategies
Table 2.4 reports all the subgroups that were identified in each of the three categories
for fruit from the protocol segments of Study 1. Protocol segments classified within
the experiential mediation category indicated that the generation of category instances
was based on autobiographical facts or mediated by the recreation of specific or
generic personal experiences during which these instances are encountered. This latter
distinction is based on the one made in Conway (1990c) between specifically dateable
experienced events and "experienced events (...) which subjects could only date to a
lifetime period and which were abstracted from specific experiences." (p. 134).
Barsalou, Yeh, Luka, Osleth, Mix and Wu (1993) similarly argue that "(...) an episodic
situation represents a single event that occurred at a specific time, [and that] a generic
situation generalised over related episodic situations." (p. 38). Thus, the participants
reported using specific personal experiences to aid retrieval, such as, for wedding, "the
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last wedding I attended" or more generic experiences, such as for dogs chase, "dogs
I've seen in the park". Finally, strategies that described second hand personal
information, that is, being told directly of the experience (e.g., by friends, via the
television) were also included in the experiential mediation category. Segments
classified within the semantic mediation category suggested that instance retrieval was
mediated by access to subtaxonomic groupings, or by the consideration of the abstract
characteristics of the category, or by analogy to related indices ("I just thought of the
type of things which are black market in other places"); or by using a distinctive
reasoning strategy, like a recipe for a fruit salad (or thinking of the contents of yoghurt
pots). The unmediated retrieval category grouped together protocols that implied that
instances were not retrieved via an intermediate cue of which subjects were aware at
the time of report or which implied an appreciation of the graded structure of the
category (i.e., that some instances were "common"). Segments classified in that
category specified that instances "popped into my mind", or "came unbidden" or
were "common knowledge".
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Table 2.4
Subgroups of Protocol Segments forfruit within each of the three classes of retrieval
strategy.
Experiential Semantic
1. Fruit I eat 1. Consideration of
2. Fruit I like or don't like subcategories: citrus fruits,
3. Fruit I buy exotic fruits, garden fruits
4. Fruit I've seen 2. Reasoning about features
5. Fruit seen in supermarkets (sweet vs. Bitter).
6. Fruit bowl at home 3. Recipe
7. Specific memories of eating 4. Cued by other products,
a fruit
8. Fruits I've heard of
e.g., types of yoghurt, fruit
9. Media
juices.
5. Linguistic cues like
10.What I know other
people eat
"b "erry .
Unmediated
1. Popped into head
2. General knowledge ("I just
knew them")
3. Notion of typicality
4. Inter-item cueing
Table 2.5 reports representative examples of actual protocol segments for fruit.
The protocol segments classified in the experiential mediation category ranged from
autobiographical facts (e.g., "what I hate"), reflections on specific life episodes where
fruits were encountered (e.g., "the fruit salad my friend made the other day"), to
generic episodes (e.g., "fruits I see in the supermarket"), to experiences of others (e.g.,
"fruits my children like"). The protocol segments classified in the semantic mediation
category indicated that instances were generated on the basis of strategies that made
no reference to personal experience, such as a reflection on taxonomic organisation
(e.g., "summer fruits"); a consideration of where they grow (e.g., "garden") or how
they are utilised (e.g., "yoghurt pots"). The unmediated retrieval category was more
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liberally constructed, including any protocol segments that did not refer to a deliberate
strategy and/or that indicated that the category instances were retrieved automatically.
As it will become apparent below, because the proportion of protocol segments fitting
this category was quite small, adopting such a liberal classification criterion did not
artificially inflate the importance of these protocol segments.
Table 2.5
Protocol Segments that described Instance Retrieval Strategies for fruit in Study 1.
Experiential Mediation
"What I hate"
"What I eat."
"First thinking of all my favourite fruits."
"Thought about the fruits I bought."
"I though of the fruit salad my friend made the other day"
"My auntie's fruit bowl"
"What I have growing in my garden."
"I took the easy way out and wrote what I see in the supermarket."
"Fruits that my children like or dislike."
"Visualised media adverts."
Semantic Mediation
"I though of categories, e.g. summer fruits."
"Tropics, orchard, garden."
"I thought of fruit which you can grow in the garden."
"Fruits to make fruit salad."
fly oghurt pots."
Unmediated Retrieval
"Fruits -all different kinds are common knowledge."
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"General knowledge."
"By the word association, i.e., one fruit brought back recollection of the next."
"Whatever came to mind."
"I listed the fruit I knew of."
The percentages of experiential, semantic and unmediated protocol segments for each
category as well as averages for each category type are reported in Table 2.6. Since
most subjects reported more than one strategy, protocol segments were not
independently produced. Consequently, no inferential statistics are reported.
However, clear patterns in the segment distributions can be observed. For seven of the
eight categories, experiential strategies greatly outnumbered both semantic strategies
and reports of unmediated retrieval. In terms of individual categories, the percentage of
experiential protocols outnumbered semantic protocols for fruit, pockets, dogs chase,
wedding, plastic, holiday, and late; for vehicle the percentages were nearly even.
Striking reversals of this pattern were observed for black market and Galapagos, as
illustrated in Figure 2.5.
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Table 2.6.
Percentage of Protocol Segments classified as indicating Experiential Mediation,
Semantic Mediation and unmediated retrieval for each category and each category
type.
Taxonomic Categories
Experiential Semantic Unmediated
Fruit 67 16 17
Vehicle 36 40 25
Mean 52 28 21
Concrete Familiar Ad Hoc Categories
Experiential Semantic Unmediated
Pockets 83 10 7
Dogs chase 54 31 15
Wedding 62 25 14
Plastic 74 12 14
Mean 68 19 13
Abstract Familiar Ad Hoc Categories
Holiday 60 27 13
Late 69 10 22
Mean 65 19 18
Unfamiliar Ad Hoc Categories
Galapagos 24 67 9
Black market 32 65 4
Mean 28 66 7
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Figure 2.5 Percentage of Protocol Segments classified as indicating Experiential
Mediation, Semantic Mediation and unmediated retrieval for each category.
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Discussion
The data on output fluency, difficulty and retrieval consensus will be discussed first,
followed by a discussion of the data on retrieval strategies. Both the difficulty ratings
and the output fluency indicated that participants found it easier to generate items for
the taxonomic than for the ad hoc categories, and within ad hoc categories, they found
it easier to generate items for the familiar types. Since the difficulty ratings were made
on completion of the output for each category and participants would be aware of
how few or how many members they had managed to recall, it is unsurprising that the
ratings accounted for such a large amount of variance overall in the fluency. This does
suggest that participants were generally reporting the difficulty with a high degree of
honesty and also gives one some confidence that they took the task seriously when
responding to the questions asked. The results concerning output fluency are also
unsurprising and are in general agreement with those reported by Barsalou (1983)
where the average output fluency for his nine taxonomic categories and the average for
nine ad hoc categories differed reliably. These statistical differences may suggest a
clear dichotomy between taxonomic and ad hoc categories. However, if the mean
output fluency for each category is plotted in rank order, as in Figure 2.1, a more
subtle picture emerges: While fruit and Galapagos anchor the two extremes of the
graph, the smooth transition within these two poles suggests no important
discontinuities corresponding to a processing boundary between taxonomic and ad hoc
categories (nor between the different types of ad hoc category). In this respect, it is
interesting to note that our item dominance distributions overlapped considerably (see
right panel of Figure 2.4).
The data on the reported strategies (see Table 2.6) suggests that the mediators that
participants often used were more closely related to personal experiences that
establish the meanings of everyday concepts than to the decontextualised semantics in
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which theories of everyday concepts are generally framed. The percentage of
protocols indicating unmediated retrieval was lower than 20% in eight of the ten
categories. For seven out of the ten categories in this study, the proportion of
protocol segments indicating an experiential strategy was much greater than those
indicating a semantic strategy. This pattern was noticeably reversed for Galapagos
and black market. In these two categories, less than a third of the protocol segments
indicated an experiential strategy; where these did occur they tended to describe
memories of watching television programmes or other media sources. Participants
were more obliged to reason explicitly about the membership criteria for these two
unfamiliar categories. Furthermore, the distribution of experiential/semantic strategies
for these two categories indicate that the question "how did you go about thinking of
items for this category" did not bias the retrospective description of the strategies in a
way that would artificially favour experiential over semantic strategies.
Semantic strategies were about as frequent as experiential strategies for vehicle. It
appears that despite the taxonomic usage of this category label, in both everyday
discourse and in concept research, a number of participants experienced some
uncertainty in defining the scope of category membership. For example, one
participant wrote: "Thinking that vehicle includes a moving means of transport on
four wheels. Is it true? I'm not sure." and another wrote: "I think I may have got a bit
carried away and put things which would come under transport rather than
vehicles .....". This uncertainty over category membership seemed to result in some
participants seeking to establish a definition of the category in terms of properties, for
example "Transportation over distance for one or more human beings which requires
a source of power". Protocols such as these were classified as semantic. This was the
only category which appeared to cause widespread 'boundary disputes'.
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Certain considerations might have led us to expect a greater proportion of semantic
strategies for both taxonomic and ad hoc categories. In some traditional accounts, the
long-term memory representation of categories is characterised as being structured
along conceptual dimensions (e.g., Henley, 1969; Rips, Shoben, and Smith, 1973;
Rubin and Olson, 1980; Lund and Burgess, 1996). These dimensions are uncovered
through analyses of item proximity in subjects' free recall output; or on the basis of
pairwise similarity ratings; or on the basis of lexical co-occurrence in text. Matrices of
item proximity are cluster analysed (e.g., Friendly, 1977) or subjected to a
multidimensional scaling analysis that yields 'interpretable' dimensions along which
items vary. For example, Rubin and Olson (1980) report that size and ferocity are
dimensions that underlie mammals. Given that participants' output for a taxonomic
category can be characterised by a small set of semantic dimensions, it is perhaps
surprising that participants referred to them so rarely when generating instances. It
was decided that a proximity analysis of the items generated by participants in this
study would not bear on the issue of interest here (i.e. the strategies that they claim to
be using to complete the task) for the following reasons. As mentioned above, these
analyses have been used to infer underlying conceptual dimensions in the output. A
similar procedure here may have resulted in some clusters of items that could, post
hoc, be interpreted as representing some dimension such as citrus fruits or exotic
fruits. Ifso, it could have been argued that these are the dimensions that characterise
the representation of the category in memory and that the strategies claimed in the
protocols are a) either not a valid account of how the task was actually achieved or b)
are indicative only of retrieval strategy and do not imply anything in particular about
the nature of the category representation. Both of these possibilities will be discussed
later in this chapter and the reader will be given reasons to discount them. It would
also not be possible to use the results of a proximity analysis to validate the reported
strategies since the same strategy may lead to different items being reported - e.g.
fruits I buy, fruits I like etc. It has been generally assumed that the nature of the cues
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which provide the most successful access to category exemplars shares important
similarities with the way these exemplars are represented in memory (e.g., Barsalou
and Sewell, 1985, p. 651; Morris, Bransford, and Franks, 1977; Tulving and
Thompson, 1973). A proximity analysis would neither support nor rule out the
possibility that the situational, self-generated cues identified in this study are
successful because experiential aspects of the context in which objects as instances of
a category are encountered are an intrinsic part of the category representation.
As Barsalou (1991) has demonstrated, an explicit consideration of the ideals defining
an ad hoc category often guides the generation of instances during planning. For
example, in planning a holiday, people need to consider the category vacation location.
Barsalou reported data that indicated that people tailor the candidate instances of
vacation locations along certain ideals, reflecting their current goals and constraints.
Furthermore, the graded structure of an ad hoc category is determined in part by the
extent to which its instances satisfy the ideal or goal associated with the category
(Barsalou, 1985). In this respect, one might surmise that ad hoc categories are to some
extent perhaps even more amenable to a conscious consideration of the semantic
dimensions that define them than are taxonomic categories. Thus, in the case of
pockets, it may not have been unreasonable to expect participants' protocols to
display an appreciation of the practical nature of the objects carried in pockets in
terms of quotidian needs and goals. Yet such considerations very rarely surfaced in the
participants' protocols, in stark contrast with the panoply of personal experience
descriptions.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 suggested that the retrieval of category members from semantic
memory is mediated to a large extent by personal experience, for both ad hoc and
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taxonomic categories. However, two possible artefacts were identified. The first
concerns the way in which ad hoc categories were defined to the participants. For
example, the formulation of things people keep in their pockets might be interpreted to
mean "things people I know -myself included- keep in their pockets". Instead of
focusing on the nature of the instances that belong to the category, participants might
have been encouraged to retrieve personally relevant memories of things kept in
pockets. It is possible to rephrase ad hoc categories in a way that focuses more clearly
on the nature of the instances; e.g., things that may conveniently be kept in pockets
instead of things people keep in their pockets. This formulation not only eliminates
reference to "people" but also emphasises the nature (and perhaps even the function)
of the category instances. Itwas therefore decided in this study to include a condition
in which the titles of the ad hoc categories were rephrased in this way. One might
consequently expect to see reports of participants thinking of items that fulfil the
requirements of the category, i.e. small, light, needed on a daily basis.
The second potential artifact concerns the relative proportion of ad hoc and taxonomic
categories, namely 4 to 1, and their order of presentation. On average, across all the
randomised orders of presentation, participants were much more likely to have
generated instances for ad hoc categories before generating items for the taxonomic
categories. If the wording of the ad hoc categories encouraged an experiential retrieval
strategy or otherwise did not sufficiently stress the conceptual dimensions that
characterise the category members, the participants might have simply continued
using experiential strategies for taxonomic categories. To address that concern, this
study made use of four taxonomic and five ad hoc categories and additionally fixed the
order of presentation such that some participants generated items for taxonomic
categories before they were presented with the ad hoc categories.
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If genuine differences in strategies exist for this task depending on category type,
these alterations to the design should afford the opportunity for this to become
apparent. Other than these changes, the methodology replicated study 1.
Method
Participants
Ninety-two undergraduates from the University of Hertfordshire volunteered for this
study. There were 31 participants in Condition A, 31 in Condition B, and 30 in
Condition C. The modal age of the participants was 18 yrs.
Materials
Nine categories were used, four taxonomic and five ad hoc. The taxonomic categories,
taken from Rosch and Mervis (1975), werejruit, vehicle, bird, andfurniture. Three of
the five ad hoc categories were of the concrete familiar type, namely things people
keep in their pockets (or the alternative wording, things that may conveniently be kept
in pockets), things dogs chase (or things that might be chased by dogs), and a new
category things people put on walls (or things that can be put on walls). The fourth one
was a new abstract familiar ad hoc category, namely things people hate when they are
ill (or things people would hate when they are ii/), and the fifth one was the unfamiliar
things sold on the black market in Russia (or things that could be sold on the black
market in Russia). For convenience the five ad hoc categories will be referred to as
pockets, dogs chase, walls, ill, and black market.
Design
The order of presentation of the categories and the wordings of the ad hoc categories
were manipulated in three conditions. In all three conditions, the categories were
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blocked such that the participants were presented with the four taxonomic or the five
ad hoc categories in consecutive order. Four different randomised orders of
presentation were created within each block of categories.
Condition A. The four taxonomic categories were presented first followed by the
five ad hoc categories defined with the original wording of Study 1.
Condition B. The five ad hoc categories, defined with the original wording, were
presented first, followed by the four taxonomic categories.
Condition C. The same presentation order as in B was used. However, the ad hoc
categories were now defined with an alternative wording that might encourage the
participants to consider the nature and/or the function of the category members, for
example things people keep in their pockets was presented as things that may
conveniently be kept in pockets.
Full instructions and sample pages of the materials can be seen at Appendix C.
Procedure
The same experimental procedure as in Study 1 was employed.
Results
Output Fluency and Item Dominance
The mean output fluency for each category and the average output fluency by
category type in the three conditions of Study 2 are reported in Table 2.7. Highest
fluency was observed for some of the taxonomic categories (e.g.,/ruit). For the
taxonomic categories, fluency seemed relatively stable across conditions. In contrast,
for the three types of ad hoc categories, output fluency seemed to differ across the
conditions. A 4 (category type)" 3 (condition) ANOVA showed a main effect of
category type F(3,86) = 62.83, p< 0.001 eta squared = 0.687. There was a main effect
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of condition F(1,88) = 3.65 p = 0.03 eta squared = 0.77 and a significant interaction
F(6, 172) = 4.9, p<O.O1 eta squared = 0.146.
Overall fluency was highest for taxonomic categories (M = 11.33) and lowest for
abstract unfamiliar (M = 8.01). Overall there was no difference in fluency for the two
abstract ad hoc categories (p = 0.366). Across category types, the highest fluency
was seen in condition A and lowest in condition C (Sheffe post hoc comparison p =
0.031). The only significant simple effects of condition occurred for the abstract
familiar, F (2, 90) = 8.52, p < .0004, and concrete familiar ad hoc category types, F (2,
176) = 6.86, P < .002. This gave rise to the interaction seen in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6 Output Fluency for taxonomic, concrete familiar, abstract familiar and
unfamiliar category types across all three conditions of presentation.
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The experimental manipulations had little effect on the item dominance distributions:
within each category, item dominance distributions did not differ significantly (on the
basis ofKolmogorov-Smimov analyses); production frequencies for the categories
used in Study 2 are reported in Appendix A of Vallee-Tourangeau, Anthony and
Austin (1998). As in Study 1, there were few salient differences between categories.
Thus fruit showed the highest consensus and ill the lowest. Among the taxonomic
categories, consensus for bird and vehicle were the lowest and the item dominance
distributions for bird differed significantly from the ones for fruit in all three
conditions (Condition A p< 0.0001; Condition B p = 0.006; Condition C p = 0.006)
The three familiar concrete ad hoc categories showed very similar distributions across
conditions which, generally, did not differ significantly from the distributions for the
taxonomic categories. Finally, the item dominance distributions for ill differed
significantly from the item dominance distributions from all other categories with the
exception of bird (p = 0.112) black market (p = 0.309) and walls (p = 0.12) in
Condition A, and black market (p=0.112) in Condition C.
Table 2.7
Mean output fluency (standard error in parenthesis) for the 9 categories in each of the
three conditions of presentation.
A B C
Taxonomic categones
13.65 13.97 14.39
Fruit (0.52) (0.43) (0.64)
Vehicle 8.23 8.40 10.04
(0.82) (0.93) (0.57)
Bird 9.19 10.83 12.52
(1.05) (0.97) (1.00)
Furniture 11.74 12.57 10.75
(0.54) (0.57) (0.40)
Overall 10.70 (0.43) 11.44 (0.42) 11.9 (0.37)
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Table 2.7 contd.
Concrete Familiar Ad hoc categories
11.97 11.43 9.03
Pockets (0.59) (0.71) (0.64)
Dogs Chase 11.43 10.50 9.77
(0.58) (0.61) (0.48)
Walls 11.94 11.07 9.40
(0.53) (0.57) (0.31)
Overall 11.79 (0.32) 11.00 (0.36) 9.40 (0.31)
Abstract Familiar Ad hoc categories
9.71 7.67 6.60
III (0.66) (0.52) (0.41)
Unfamiliar Ad hoc categories
9.39 8.03 7.50
Black Market (0.68) (0.78) (0.45)
Difficulty Ratings
As in Study I, participants recorded the degree of difficulty attached to the generation
of members for each category by means of a scaled rating. The mean ratings for all
categories in all conditions can be seen in Table 2.8. High ratings indicate a greater
degree of difficulty.
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Table 2.8
Mean Difficulty Ratings (standard deviation in parentheses) for the 9 categories in
Study 2
Taxonomic cate~Qries
Fruit Vehicle Bird Furniture Overall
Condition
A 2.03 (1.96) 3.67 (2.41) 2.9 (1.86) 3.53 (2.01)
B 1.71 (1.18) 2.69 (1.83) 2.9 (2.11) 3.0 (2.16)
C 2.45 (1.67) 3.86 (2.34) 3.13 (2.32) 3.49 (l.73)
Overall mean 2.08 (1.65) 3.41 (2.25) 2.98 (2.08) 3.34 (1.97) 2.94 (1.46)
Concrete Familiar Ad hoc cate~ories
Pockets Dogs Chase Walls
A 3.57 (1.99) 4.10 (2.02) 4.37 (1.81)
B 3.03 (1.94) 3.90 (2.00) 3.77 (2.16)
C 3.90 (2.41) 3.32 (2.39) 3.52 (2.29)
Overall mean 3.50 (2.13) 3.77 (2.16) 3.88 (2.11) 3.72 (1.71)
Abstract familiar Ad hoc cate&ories
III
A 4.73 (1.98)
B 5.83 (2.08)
C 4.13 (2.60)
Overall mean 4.89 (2.33) 4.89 (2.33)
Unfamilim:Ag hoc cate~ories
Black
Market
A 5.97 (2.59)
B 6.43 (2.79)
C 5.74 (2.84)
Overall 6.04 (2.73) 6.04 (2.73)
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A 3*4 mixed ANOV A showed a significant main effect of category type Wilks
Lambda F (3,86) = 54.48, p< 0.001 eta squared = 0.65. The unfamiliar Ad hoc
category received the highest difficulty ratings (M = 6.04) which was significantly
higher than the ratings for the abstract familiar ad hoc category (M = 4.89) FC 1,88) =
1l.46, p = 0.001 eta squared = 0.115. This in tum was significantly higher than for the
concrete familiar categories CM = 3.72) F(I,88) =3l.43, p< 0.001 eta squared = 0.263
and the taxonomic categories received the lowest difficulty ratings (M = 2.94) which
were significantly lower than the concrete familiar categories F (1,88) = 27.5, p< 0.001
eta squared = 0.238. There was no main effect of condition (p=0.506) but a significant
interaction of category-type and condition was found Wilks Lambda F(6,172) =3.4, p
= 0.003, eta squared = 0.103. This seemed to be due to the ratings for the abstract
familiar and the unfamiliar categories rising more steeply in condition B than they did
in the other 2 conditions as can be seen in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2. 7 Difficulty ratings for all four category types in all conditions of
presentation.
The difficulty ratings for the individual categories collapsed across condition can be
seen in Figure 2.8 displayed in ascending order.
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Figure 2.8 Mean difficulty ratings for all 9 categories in study 2 shown in ascending
order.
A 3*9 mixed ANOYA showed a main effect of category Wilks Lambda F (8,76) =
25.02 p<O.OOl eta squared = 0.725. Participants found black market the most
difficult in tenns of generating category members and/ruit the least difficult. However,
the only significant contrasts between categories werefruit vs. bird F(1,83) = 28.71
p< 0.001 eta squared = 0.257, walls vs. ill F(1,83) = 18.27, p< 0.001 eta squared =
0.0.18 and ill vs. black market F(l ,83) = 12.03 P =0.001 eta squared = 0.127.
Three was no effect of condition on the ratings (p = 0.859) but there was a small
interaction between category and condition F(16,152) = 1.99, p = 0.016 eta squared =
0.174. This appeared to be due to the rating for ill increasing in condition B to a
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greater extent than in condition A or C. No particular reason can be found for this
finding.
Difficulty ratings correlated negatively and significantly with fluency for all categories
regression lines for each category type
except Fruit and Vehicle ( p = 0.463 and p=0.127 respectively). Figure 2.9 shows the
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Figure 2.9 Regression slopes for difficulty ratings as a predictor of fluency for
taxonomic, concrete familiar, abstract familiar and unfamiliar category types.
105
Table2.9
Values of adjusted r2 for individual categories and category types. Percentage of
variance in fluency accounted for by difficulty shown in parentheses.
Fruit
Taxonomic categories
Vehicle Bird Furniture Overall mean
0.005 n.s. 0.017 n.s. 0.123
(12.3%)
0.106
(10.6%)
0.096
(9.6%)
Concrete Familiar Ad hoc categories
Pockets Dogs Chase Walls
0.088
(8.8%)
0.302
(30.2%)
0.266
(26.6%)
0.207
(20.7%)
Abstract familiar Ad hoc categories
TIl
0.234
(23.4%)
0.234
(23.4%)
Unfamiliar Ad hoc categories
Black
Market
0.357
(35.7%)
0.357
(35.7%)
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As in the first study, the relationship between difficulty ratings and fluency is
strongest for the unfamiliar ad hoc category where participants tended to produce few
items and give high difficulty ratings.
An ANCOV A, using difficulty as a covariate, showed a significant main effect of
difficulty F(I,787) = 142.6, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.153 and a very small main
effect of category type F(3, 794) = 11.286, p< 0.001 eta squared = 0.041. There was
no significant interaction between difficulty and category type (p = 0.648).
A broadly similar pattern of difficulty ratings is seen here as in study 1. The difficulty
ratings are clearly related to fluency as one would expect. The difficulty also varies
with category type with participants finding taxonomic easiest in this task and
unfamiliar categories the hardest.
Retrieval Strategies
Across all three conditions, 83% of the protocol segments were classified within one
of the three retrieval strategy categories (Le. experiential, semantic, or unmediated),
9% resisted the classification scheme and 8% were uninterpretable. The average
number of classified protocol segments, across categories, varied little within each
condition: means of 41.2, 41.0, and 40.7 were observed for Conditions A, B, and C
respectively.
The percentage of protocol segments coded as reflecting an experiential strategy, a
semantic strategy, or no strategy (unmediated retrieval) is shown in Figure 2.10 for
each category in all three conditions. To facilitate the comparison with the percentages
observed for the categories that were also used in Study 1 (i.e., fruit, vehicle, dogs
chase, pockets, and black market) they are plotted alongside the percentages observed
in Study 2. The experimental manipulations appeared to have had no systematic effect
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on the relative distribution of the protocol segments: As in Study 1, for all but the
unfamiliar ad hoc category black market, experiential strategies outnumbered semantic
strategies in all conditions, including the two new ad hoc categories, ill and walls, and,
importantly, the two new taxonomic categories, bird andfurniture. The sole exception
to this pattern was for vehicle in Condition A. As in Study 1, retrieving instances for
black market was done mostly on the basis of semantic strategies.
The influence of the prior presentation of the ad hoc categories (using the wording of
Study 1) on the percentage of experiential strategies in taxonomic categories can be
assessed by examining the data for the four taxonomic categories between Condition
A, in which they were presented first and Condition B in which they followed the ad
hoc categories. Vehicle registered an important difference in that experiential strategies
were used much more after the presentation of the ad hoc categories (Condition Band
also in Condition C) than when the taxonomic categories preceded the ad hoc ones
(Condition A). For the remaining three taxonomic categories,jruit, bird, andJurniture,
the presentation order seemed to have little influence on the extent to which
experiential strategies were employed.
A comparison of Conditions B and C for the ad hoc categories assesses the effect of
rewording the ad hoc concepts in a way that emphasised object-centred properties. As
can be seen in both Figure 2.10 and Table 2.10, the preponderance of experiential
strategies did not vary across Conditions B and C for walls and ill; it increased slightly
for pockets, but decreased slightly for dogs chase.
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Figure 2.10 Percentage of experiential, semantic and unmediated protocol segments in
conditions A, Band C in Study 2. For the categories,jruit, vehicle, pockets, dogs
chase and black market, the percentages of each segment type from study 1 are also
shown.
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Table 2.10
Percentage of each protocol type by category and condition for Study 2 and from
Study 1 where available. These are the frequencies depicted graphically in figure 2.10
A B C Study 1
BIRD
Experiential 44 37 50
Semantic 31 30 15
Unrnediated 25 33 35
FURNITURE
Experiential 53 72 61
Semantic 24 11 17
Unrnediated 24 17 22
FRUIT
Experiential 73 76 79 67
Semantic 10 11 11 16
Unrnediated 17 13 9 17
VEHICLE
Experiential 11 43 52 36
Semantic 63 39 34 40
Unrnediated 26 18 14 21
DOGS CHASE
Experiential 60 85 63 54
Semantic 23 11 20 31
Unrnediated 16 4 17 15
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Table 2.10 contd.
POCKETS
Experiential 75 72 93 83
Semantic 19 11 8 10
Unmediated 6 17 0 7
WALLS
Experiential 72 80 78
Semantic 17 15 15
Unmediated 11 5 8
ILL
Experiential 63 83 81
Semantic 37 17 14
Unmediated 0 0 5
BLACK MARKET
Experiential 14 23 24 32
Semantic 80 74 76 65
Unmediated 6 3 0 9
Since these classifications are post hoc and violate assumptions of independence,
analysis by Chi-Square would not be appropriate. It is possible that the data are
unduly influenced by individual participants who gave many more examples of certain
types of strategy than other participants. An analysis that included participants as a
factor would be appropriate but this would require data collected for each participant
indicating the number of each type of strategy deployed for each category. The data
were not, unfortunately, originally collected in this form and are therefore not
available. In the absence of appropriate inferential statistics, the results must be
viewed cautiously. It should be noted, however, that there is only one reversal of the
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ratio of experiential strategies to semantic or unmediated strategies shown in the
categories that were also presented in study 1. For the category vehicle, the semantic
strategies seem to outweigh the experiential strategies in condition A but this reverses
in conditions Band C. It should be recalled that the purpose of study 2 was to see
whether the high proportion of experiential strategies for all but the unfamiliar
categories were an artifact of the high ratio of ad hoc categories to taxonomic categories
in study 1. Even in the absence of inferential analysis, these strategies do not seem to
have been eradicated for the taxonomic categories in this study, most importantly they
still feature in the reports for the taxonomic categories in Condition A where these
categories were seen in a block before the ad hoc categories and the participants'
reported strategies could therefore not have been influenced having performed the task
for ad hoc categories first. It also seems that the experiential strategies for the ad hoc
categories did not dramatically disappear when the wording was altered to defuse any
implication that the participants should refer to their own personal experience
(Condition C).
Clusters in Output
Since the output for each category was written and not recorded verbally, it was not
possible to identify the items that may have been produced in short bursts together or
where any intervals between groups of items occurred. It was therefore not possible
to assess the direct correspondence between clusters of items and reported strategies.
Having said that, when the reported strategies were based on norms or knowledge
shared by both participants and experimenters (e.g., arrangement of bedroom
furniture) analysis of the protocols revealed some striking correspondences. Table
2.11 shows items generated by three participants (from Study 2), shown in the left
portion of each column, along with their retrospective protocols, shown in the right
portion of each column (the back slashes indicate how these were segmented).
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Table 2.11
Protocols and output from 3 participants in Study 2.
65c bird 82a vehicle 62c furniture
eagle I thought of car The modes of table My own
owl big birds / lorry transport chair house - going
------ then of birds J bus seen on the dresser room to room
bluetit would see in train road. / piano
robin the garden / coach Followed by sofa
chaffinch then in a zoo. ------ two wheeled easy chair
sparrow I When ! motorbike variety / and coffee table
blackbird thought of bicycle then the wardrobe
thrush pigeon the ------ building bed
swift next two came tractor trade. My dressing table
house martin automatically Land Rover husbands hi-fi unit
------ to mind. JeB works in this stool
ostrich crane field. ottoman
------ van desk
pigeon ------
dove furniture van
seagull ------
scooter
The protocol from 65c accounts for all the items generated, although the series from
bluetit to housemartin could have included smaller clusters produced by local
strategies or processes. The protocol from 82a matches the clusters only to some
extent: presumably furniture van was triggered by van, and scooter is a member of a
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previous category. Finally, the protocol from 62c, while perfectly interpretable, is not
specific enough to suggest clusters, and without knowing the arrangement of this
participant's house, it is hard to be confident that he was being quite as systematic as
he claimed.
General Discussion - Studies 1 and 2
The alterations to the wording of the ad hoc category titles and the increase in the
proportion of taxonomic categories amongst the stimuli in Study 2 did not result in
any notable change of reported strategy.
To my knowledge, this was the first study to investigate the way in which people
produce lists of items belonging to a wide range of both taxonomic and ad hoc
categories. This task clearly requires the tapping of one's conceptual knowledge. Post
hoc, the reliance on the situations and contexts in which the participants customarily
encountered the exemplars of the categories as a retrieval strategy may seem perfectly
reasonable and unsurprising. However, given the complete absence of this type of
information in most theories of the way in which conceptual knowledge is structured
and represented, it can be argued that these theories would not have predicted these
findings. Indeed, traditional theories would have predicted greater use of semantic
strategies, in particular for taxonomic categories.
The issue of the validity of protocols in offering a genuine window on cognitive
processes was discussed in Chapter 1. It was pointed out that the short time delay
between generation and protocol on each trial in these studies should at least alleviate
concerns about any difficulty that participants may have experienced in accessing
their strategy over an extended period of time. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) suggested
that "when reporting on the effects of stimuli, people may not interrogate a memory
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of the cognitive processes that operated on stimuli; instead, they may base their
reports on implicit Iipriori theories about the causal connection between stimulus and
response" (p.233). However, the specificity of some of the protocols collected here,
as discussed shortly, speaks against the application of an it priori theory.
Despite the measures that were taken to increase the informativeness of the protocols,
there remains the possibility that the protocols are the result of a constructive process
at the time of writing, rather than a reconstructive memory process of what happened
when the category members were generated. There are however, several points that
argue against this view of the data. Firstly, the specificity of some of the protocol
segments. Secondly, the presence of identifiable clusters in the outputs which appear
to correspond to the reported strategies. Thirdly, the documented tendency of
subjects to group items into semantic, not experiential, categories when engaged in a
sorting task (Walker and Kintsch, 1985) and finally, the similarities found by Walker
and Kintsch between strategies reported in concurrent and retrospective protocols.
Protocol Specificity
If one assumes that the participants truly had no access to the means by which they
had generated items for each category, then they would be obliged to produce an
explanation that would seem "acceptable" to both themselves and the experimenter.
Consider the following protocols for fruit and bird respectively:
"If you go to Tesco's in Royston you meet the fruit and vegetable section first of all.
I imagined I was shopping and can remember the layout and most of the fruit"
" I do a lot of sailing and many boats in the type of sailing boats I sail in are named
after birds; so I went through my memory of the opposition's boat names"
It seems unlikely that such specific and personal accounts would present themselves
to participants as suitable self-explanations to lay claim to if they were not indeed
what the participant had actually done.
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Clusters in Output
Unlike the early studies of output performance discussed in the introduction to
Chapter 2, these studies were not designed to allow a systematic cluster analysis.
Even if clusters had been identified temporally, it would have been clearly much
harder to establish that their intra- cluster similarity is based on an idiosyncratic
strategy such as ' what I see at the supermarket' than it was in earlier studies to
ascertain that the clusters were based on shared category membership or word-
association. That said, some of the protocols did imply a series of different strategies
that seemed to be reflected in the output (see Table 2.11).
Sorting versus Generating
Itmay be thought that participants were not able to explain their own output from
memory and were looking at their own items, seeking to account for meaningful
groupings in their own output. However, if this had been the case, it could be argued
from Walker and Kintsch (1985) that they would be most likely choose to report
semantic strategies and not experiential. Walker and Kintsch (1985) presented
participants with slips of paper showing the names of items that they had themselves
generated in an earlier free emission task. They were asked to sort the slips into
"natural categories" as they saw fit. The groupings formed in this task were compared
to the clusters identified in the same participants' verbal generation output; the
groupings in the sorting task overlapped only 19% of the clusters from the generation
task. Furthermore, the basis for the groupings was different for each task. While the
majority of the clusters (86%) in the sorting task were described as semantic (e.g.,
small cars, foreign cars, luxury cars for car), most of the clusters produced in the
generation task (77%) were related to 'episodic cues' such as friends' cars, my cars,
cars I have wrecked etc. Indeed, the similarities between what Walker and Kintsch
refer to as episodic cues and what I refer to as experiential strategies are striking. This
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suggests that the experiential nature of the protocols collected here were not imposed
post hoc by participants but do genuinely reflect the strategies deployed.
Concurrent versus Retrospective Protocols
Although the protocols were collected retrospectively, it is likely that concurrent
protocols would have shown similar reports. Walker and Kintsch (1985) collected
both concurrent and retrospective protocols in a between subjects design and found
that the relative distribution of semantic and 'episodic' retrieval cues was similar for
both conditions. This suggests that the occurrence of the situational strategies found
here was not an artifact of the retrospective (and possibly reconstructive) nature of
the protocols. Interestingly, Walker and Kintsch did note that participants producing
concurrent protocols produced far more non-category retrieval cues than did the
retrospective protocol participants. They suggest that this was due to the
retrospective participants having less access to their strategies as a result of the time
lag in reporting them. The retrospective protocols then are likely to be incomplete, but
not necessarily inaccurate.
Experiential Contexts as Effective Access to Abstract Knowledge Structures
The studies reported here confirm the hints from the studies of Gruenewald and
Lockhead (1980) and Walker and Kintsch (1985) that subjects make use of personal
experiences to set contexts inwhich the names of semantic category members may be
retrieved. The careful protocol analysis across a much wider range of categories than
studied by Walker and Kintsch (1985) has established that, in completing free
emission tasks, people tend to instantiate personal experiences to recreate the contexts
(situations) in which they may come across the category in question. The names of
items are retrieved through this context. The studies here are unique in revealing the
extent of this strategy. If one accepts that retrieval from semantic categories informs
us of the mental organisation of this knowledge, then the import of this work lies in
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the challenge that it could cast to the notion of conceptual knowledge as de-
contextualised, as discussed in Chapter 1. To launch such a challenge on the strength
of these findings alone would seem premature. Even if one accepts the arguments,
outlined above and accepts the protocols as an accurate account of how the task was
undertaken, they need not necessarily be indicative of underlying conceptual structure
- they need be no more than effective retrieval mechanisms. If this were to be the case,
one might wonder as to why widespread, successful retrieval cues should be
unconnected to the organisation of the information being retrieved. Using an
organisation to retrieve information that differs from the organisation of the to-be-
recalled- information itself is unlikely to be successful. As many undergraduates are
encouraged to demonstrate for themselves, reciting the months of the year in
alphabetical order is more difficult than reciting them in the order in which they occur
throughout the year. Successful retrieval cues are likely to be those that have been
encoded with the target information (Tulving and Thompson, 1973). However, the
simultaneous encoding of common situational information alongside a category
member (e.g., apples are bought in supermarkets) need not necessitate that
supermarket form part of the conceptual structure of apple. Hewitt (1973) first made
an interesting distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic context. Under this
distinction the intrinsic context was seen as a subset of features encoded about an item
that form part of the item itself and the extrinsic context included features that may be
present when the item is encountered but do not form an integral part of the item.
This would allow supermarket to be an extrinsic contextual feature of apple that
would act as an efficient cue to retrieve apple in the same way that recreating an odour
at recall has been shown to enhance recall of material encoded in the presence of the
same odour (Herz, 1997; Pointer & Bond, 1998). In other words, the participants in
this study are engaging in self-generated, state-dependent recall.
If this is the case, then the situations used as strategies by the participants are
extrinsic contexts and not intrinsic features of the categories. This is indeed a plausible
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explanation for the strategies found here but it begs the question as to why the
situational features (or extrinsic) should be distinguished from the intrinsic features
and considered to be extrinsic in the first place. As previously discussed in Chapter 1,
there may be good reasons for not wishing to include features that do not individuate
concepts in the concept itself (supermarket will equally form a part of newspaper
and shampoo) but this position has to be argued for and one's view of this debate will
naturally lead to a greater or lesser inclination to accept the finding of this study as
suggesting anything at all about conceptual organisation. Of course, one need not
make a strong claim about the status of this information as a conceptual 'feature' of an
object. These results could equally point to an alternative, additional, organisation of
knowledge about objects that revolves around events and situations and that provides
an easier access to the names of category members than the organisation based on
intrinsic features. The remaining chapters of this thesis will build upon an argument
for taking both of these possibilities seriously when studying how people draw on
their conceptual knowledge to complete simple tasks and the author finds herself in
good company in accepting that successful retrieval paths for category members are
successful because of their overlap with the nature of the category representation (e.g.,
Barsalou and Sewell, 1985).
The remainder of this discussion will continue this line of argument by presenting
different sources of empirical data that, taken together, can be seen as offering support
for this position.
Barsalou and his colleagues have offered empirical evidence supporting the idea that
aspects of the situations in which objects are encountered become integrated in the
knowledge of objects and categories. In a concept learning experiment, Yeh and
Barsalou (1996) presented their participants with instances from the same category
but in different situations. Each situation was correlated with a different set of
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relevant properties. If the category representation that develops as participants
experience different instances across situations is principally decontextualised,
reflecting an abstraction of properties across contexts, then the recognition of
situation-relevant properties should not be faster when it takes place in that situation.
Yet, situations primed the recognition of situation-relevant properties. Such results
suggest that aspects of the situations in which category instances are encountered
form an integral part of their representation.
The fact that participants are able to produce apparently context-free knowledge of
categories has possibly misled us into believing that this reflects the nature of their
mental representations of these categories. In a second experiment, Walker and
Kintsch (1985) examined retrieval from script-like memory structures. That is to say
participants were asked to say what typically happens in certain taxonomic situations
such as going to a restaurant for a meal, going to a grocery store to buy groceries and
going to a doctor's officefor a check-up. In Shank and Abelson's (1977) notion of
scripts, this knowledge of various culturally specific situations is developed across a
number of experiences and, not unlike the notion of natural categories, is abstracted
until it serves well to represent any similar situation but does not equate to anyone
specific event or episode. However, Walker and Kintsch's analysis of retrospective
verbal protocols, in which participants explained how they had met the requirements
of the task, revealed that a) participants reported using more than one strategy and b)
"Only 10% of the retrieval strategies reported were normative, abstract, context-free
retrieval cues i.e., the classical notion of scheme or script - whereas the great majority
of strategies that were reported were clearly of an episodic nature" (pp.277).
Participants reported either recalling a particular visit (especially to a restaurant or
doctor) or a particular place in the case of the grocery store script. Walker and
Kintsch, however, noted a discrepancy between the strategies reported and the actual
descriptions given. The descriptions did not describe particular locales or give
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evidence of the personal nature of the alleged strategy that gave rise to them. Walker
and Kintsch suggest that this does not undermine the validity of the protocols but that
participants are drawing on one or more specific memories which are then edited to
produce a suitable generalisation to meet the demands of the instructions. One could
extrapolate from this to suggest that subjects engage in a similar process when
performing 'semantic' tasks. It is possible that conceptual representations are
entwined with memories for events and situations and the abstraction takes place at
retrieval rather than storage level, if this is necessary to meet the demands of a
particular task. Several recent lines of theoretical and empirical work speak to this
possibility.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Barsalou, Yeh, Luka, Osleth, Mix, and Wu (1993) sketch
the outlines of a broad ranging theory of conceptualisation and meaning in which "the
fundamental conceptual representations in the human cognitive system are schematic
perceptual images extracted from all modes of experience" (p. 26) (see also Barsalou,
1997). More relevant to understanding why experiential context frequently mediates
retrieval in our experiments is their equally radical proposal that "concepts are neither
context independent nor universal but are situated and local" (p. 38). Mental concepts,
of both particular individuals and generic types of individual, are always established
within and include the perspective of the experiential scenarios in which they are
encountered or imagined. Rather than having an essential meaning, or even a univocal
core, they are "collections of all specialised models for a particular type of individual
together with their associated generic situations" (p. 47). Context and context effects
are not an optional extra to context free theories of concepts and categorisation but are
intrinsic to the mental representations constituting concepts. Since the publication of
the data reported here, Wu and Barsalou (in press) have demonstrated that
participants performing property generation tasks unexpectedly generate situational
properties, albeit to a lesser degree than entity properties.
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Lancaster and Barsalou (1997) investigated the organisation of memory for events.
The background to their studies was the view that event memories are organised by
knowledge of activity ( e.g., memories of eating at a restaurant are stored together with
abstract knowledge about eating at restaurants etc.), that is to say, the cue used to
access event knowledge is activity. Barsalou (1988) proposed an alternative
conception which assumed that event memories are "cross classified simultaneously
in a variety of global organisations, including organisations for locations, participant,
time and objects - as well as for activity" (emphasis added). This type of
organisation would permit retrieval to an event memory through a number of different
cues aside from activity. Thus an event memory could be accessed through an object
cue ( e.g., beach ball for summer vacation memory). The corollary of this is that an
object may be accessed through an event memory (or a location, or activity etc.). In
Lancaster and Barsalou' s studies, the participants had to learn and then recall a list of
sentences that described fictional events incorporating a well-known person and an
activity. The clustering of the participants' recall outputs suggested that participants
formed clusters around locations, times, agents and activities, with the latter two being
the dominating tendency. Lancaster and Barsalou concluded that people's memories
for events are cross-classified in a variety of ways giving rise to multiple organisations
that can be accessed flexibly during retrieval. There is no reason to believe that object
representation is not equally dynamic and flexible.
Further support for the interleaved nature of 'different' memory systems has come
from the autobiographical memory literature. Conway's research has also pointed to a
close interdependence between autobiographical memory and semantics. Conway
(1987) asked participants to verify true or false semantic facts and autobiographical
facts. Semantic verifications were of the form "is an apple a fruit?", while
autobiographical verifications took the form "are apples your favourite fruit?". These
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questions were preceded either by a neutral word or a by a category-name prime, for
example, "fruit". Semantic verifications were, as expected, faster when preceded by
the presentations of the relevant category-name primes. Importantly, autobiographical
verifications were also primed by the presentation of a relevant category name, e.g.,
"fruit" speeded responses to "are apples your favourite fruit?". Conway (1990b)
suggested that "frequent and current autobiographical knowledge might be stored in
memory with semantic knowledge and so help 'customize' the semantic system." (p.
176).
Conway (1990c) provides evidence that memories of specific and generic personal
experiences are closely connected to representation of taxonomic and ad hoc
categories. The general procedure employed in that study involved giving participants
names of categories and asking them to "bring to mind an image of whatever [you
take] the word or phrase to refer" (p. 134). Conway supplied participants with three
predetermined categories in which to classify their images: (1) specifically dateable
autobiographical memory images; (2) loosely dateable generic images derived from
specific experiences; and (3) images not based on specific or generic experiences,
which Conway labelled "semantic" images. The majority of images elicited by ad hoc
categories (e.g., things to take on holiday) were dateable autobiographical memories
(53%; Experiment 1) and 23.5% were generic images. In the classification of the
protocol segments in our studies, the specific and generic image categories were fused
into the experiential mediation category. On average, 72.6% of the strategies for the
(familiar) ad hoc categories were experiential, a figure that closely corresponds to the
sum of the two percentages above (76.5%). This convergence is important since,
unlike in Conway (1990c), we did not provide our participants with predetermined
categories that would help them identify their retrieval strategies. Furthermore, the
sum of the percentage of the specific (33.8%) and generic (36.8%) images generated by
taxonomic category labels summed to approximately the same value, namely 70.6%
123
(note the correspondence with the figure reported in Walker & Kintsch [1985] of77%
episodic retrieval strategies). Thus, Conway's studies provide further evidence of the
close connections between memory of personal life events and concepts.
Similar inferences can be drawn from work with neuropsychological patients with
semantic dementia reported in Snowden, Griffiths, and Neary (1994; see also 1995).
These researchers have shown that even if these patients' performance on general
tests of word comprehension is extremely poor, their understanding of objects, places,
and people that are encountered on a regular basis is relatively intact. Snowden et al.
argued that it is "the experiential input into the meaning system" (p. 287) that
sustains their meaning. The meaning of objects, places and people that were part of
the patients' lives some time in the past is lost. This difference "highlights the role of
autobiographical experience in the maintenance of meaning, and underlies the
interrelationship between episodic and semantic memory" (p. 265). Once again, the
emphasis is on memory systems that are, at the very least, closely related in a way
that has tended to be underestimated in the investigation of anyone particular 'type'
of memory.
A Developmental Perspective
Further support for the role of events/situations in supporting conceptual organisation
can be found in the developmental literature. Nelson and Gruendel (1981), in
investigating young children's knowledge structures posited a central role for events as
being the initial object of mental representation. In early studies, Nelson (1978)
examined the responses of pre-school children to questions like" what happens when
you go to McDonalds?" or "what happens when you have dinner?" in addition to
questions about events such as having a birthday party or getting dressed. Children as
young as 3 years old were able to reproduce component actions of events in the order
in which they genuinely occur. One of the other striking characteristics of the scripts
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they tended to produce as responses was the generality of the scripts. The children
tended not to personalise the report by use of the 1st person but rather to use the
pronoun "you" in its impersonal sense of "one". They additionally utilised the
tenseless forms of verbs ("you eat etc .."). When asked about specific personal
events, children were able to recall less material. Both 5 yr. and 3 yr. old children gave
good generalised accounts but they had more difficulty in producing accounts of
specific events, showing a tendency to slide into the more generalised form of the
script. The authors suggested that these scripts develop from the children's
"experiences in events and from observation" (p. 145). Nelson and Gruendel note that
the existing division of episodic (specific episodes) and semantic memory (general
knowledge) does not sit well with what they come to refer to as Generalised Event
Representations (GERs); by this term they mean "memory for events that is not
specific to a particular experience" (p. 147). Nelson and Gruendel propose that GERs
are derived from episodic memory although the process by which this takes place is
unspecified.
Nelson and Gruendel make the strong claim that GERs are the building blocks of
cognition. From these structures, which necessarily hold "slots" for objects as props
in the event scripts (e.g., food at a birthday party), object categories are abstracted in
due course. This process would involve a pattern-matching search that compares
elements within and across GERs. Under this view, the abstraction and construction
of object categories is a process that operates not on the world but on acquired
representations of repeated experienced events. Given this framework, it would not be
surprising that even as adults, one of the easiest ways to generate category members is
to reconstruct the generic episodes/events in which these items have been regularly
encountered. The situations instantiated by the participants in the present studies did
indeed tend be of a generalised nature (" being in Tesco's" - "bird I would see in the
garden") rather than of specific single episodes.
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Also adopting a developmental perspective, Lucariello and Nelson (1985) tested the
theory that event schemas provided the basis of categorical organisation for young
children. Using the same recall and clustering paradigm discussed in the introduction to
Chapter 2, it was shown that memory (list recall) and organisation (clustering in recall)
in 3- 4 yr. oids was better for slot-filler categories (e.g. foods eaten at lunch) than for
taxonomic categories (food) or complementary categories (items associated spatially
and or temporally such as milk and cup).
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Summary
The use of a simple procedure combined with a detailed protocol analysis in the
present studies has demonstrated the following:
• When participants are asked to generate members of categories, they report
conscious use of strategies as opposed to 'downloading' the contents of their
semantic memory in an effortless and automatic manner.
• The strategies documented by participants were, in the main experiential, based on
participants mentally consulting a range of situations and contexts in which they
come across the members of the category. This was found to be the case for both
taxonomic and ad hoc categories. This finding is interpreted as being inconsistent
with theories that posit conceptual knowledge as a decontextualised repository of
abstracted features.
• Participants are, on average, able to produce more members of taxonomic categories
than from ad hoc categories. This would be predicted by the view that ad hoc
categories are less well established in memory and have weaker concept-to-
instance links. However, the large degree of overlap in the output fluency between
the two category types speaks against a clear distinction on this measure.
The results of these studies would not, in themselves necessarily give cause to
question traditional models of conceptual knowledge. However, it has been argued that
in conjunction with both theoretical and empirical evidence from the autobiographical
memory, developmental and abnormal literature, they add weight to the claim that the
map of conceptual organisation may require to be redrawn. The notion of separate
knowledge structures (e.g., semantic, episodic) needs to be greatly reduced and
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replaced by a picture of multiple overlapping representations of events, objects and
activities which are largely generic in nature but are so arranged as to enable
abstraction if required by the perceived goal of the task. Knowledge need not be
abstract in storage and contextualised in use but could be richly contextual in storage
and only detached from its usual contexts at retrieval if the current goal so demands it.
However, further evidence is required of situational knowledge playing a role in the
performance of other tasks that one might have expected to be free from such
influences. Chapter 3 presents a study that was designed to see if any such evidence
could be found.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Role of Situational Knowledge in Judgements of Similarity
Overview
This chapter reports a study in which participants were asked to provide ratings of
similarity for pairs of items. The items were either presented in the context of their
category label or without any context. The category type (taxonomic or ad hoc) was
manipulated, as was the relative typicality of the item pairs. The ratings were
examined for effects of these factors. Associated protocols offering explanations of
the ratings were collected from a subset of participants. The protocols were analysed
with a view to offering an explanation of the ratings and to investigating the extent to
which the same type of situational knowledge illustrated in the category-member free-
recall task may influence the way in which people judge similarity between items
under experimental conditions.
Background
The results of the studies reported in Chapter 2 strongly suggest that when faced with
a particular cognitive task, namely the free generation of category members, people
draw on a range of personal, generic experiences that serve to situate their conceptual
knowledge. These types of memories are not episodic, in that they rarely refer to a
specific dateable experience; neither are they semantic in the sense in which that term
is usually applied to mean one's repository of facts about entities in the world. It
appears that in order to meet the goal of the task, the situations in which the
participants customarily encounter the categories of objects acted as the best self-
generated cue for producing the names of the items themselves. The data sit well
within recent perspectives on conceptual knowledge (see Chapter 1), suggesting a
greater role for situational knowledge of concepts.
Conceptual knowledge is believed to underlie a number of cognitive operations such
as the assessment of similarity between two items, inductive or inferential reasoning
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(Osherson. Smith, Wilkie, Lopez & Shafir, 1990) and reasoning by analogy (Gentner,
1988). All of these processes rely upon the support ofa knowledge base that links
entities to their properties and to each other. The category member free-recall task
used in study I seemed to elicit use of situational knowledge; The focus of the next
study is the extent to which that knowledge-base may playa role in the performance
of other cognitive operations, specifically judgements of similarity
Similarity has traditionally been thought to depend upon a comparison process
between two entities involving an assessment of matched and mismatched features
(Tversky, 1977). Questions have been raised as to what actually constitutes a feature
and it has been shown that the answer to this may be altered by the nature of the
comparison itself (Medin, Goldstone and Gentner, 1993). The process of comparison
has been further defined by Markman and Gentner (1993) as being initially one of
comparison along shared dimensions, which brings the entities into alignment. A
further comparison of values along these dimensions then takes place in addition to a
comparison of the extent to which the items share dimensions at all. This gives rise to
the notion of alignable and non-alignable differences which are weighted
differentially in the evaluation of similarity. For example, if comparing a lion and a
rabbit, the shape of their tails would be an alignable difference whereas the mane of
the lion would be a non-alignable difference since the rabbit does not have one at all.
Markman and Gentner (1993) found that the non-alignable features were more
detrimental to the perception of similarity between items than the alignable ones. This
formulation of the comparison process also gives rise to the somewhat counter-
intuitive result that the more similar two items are the more differences that can be
listed between them. This is because the more dimensions they share, the greater the
number of potentially alignable differences between them.
Throughout these interesting incursions into similarity, few researchers seem to have
doubted that when one makes a similarity judgement the features under consideration
are a) perceptual and/or b) functional. They are intrinsic properties of the object.
In the study reported here, a subset of participants were presented with pairs of
perceptually dissimilar items, such as clock and photo, with no context offered for the
comparison. The main question of interest was whether these participants would
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report drawing on their everyday experience of the way in which these items are
normally encountered and use this as a reason for finding them similar. Where the
items were both highly typical of the ad hoc category from which they had been
generated, (e.g., Money and Wallet from things that may be conveniently kept in
pockets), it was expected that the participants may refer to this very context as a basis
for similarity even when it was not made explicit. These expectations were
heightened by two papers that drew attention to the limitations of feature matching
models of similarity in explaining judgements of similarity made under experimental
conditions (Bassok and Medin, 1997; Wisniewski and Bassok, 1999).
Bassok and Medin (1997) set out to test whether the alignment model of similarity
(Gentner, 1983) could be extended from the comparison of objects to stimuli
consisting of semantically constrained combinations of interrelated objects i.e. simple
noun-verb-noun statements such as "The carpenter fixed the chair" and "the carpenter
sat on the chair". They found that the logic of structural alignment could be used to
predict the similarity ratings between sentences but to their surprise found that their
participants were making also use of processes other than comparison. "For certain
stimuli they systematically integrate the paired stimuli into a common thematic
scenario" (p. 312). These authors were the first published to observe and comment
upon this and the first to draw a distinction between comparison and what they call
thematic integration. As an example of thematic integration, the authors cite the
protocol of the participant who said of the sentences "The carpenter fixed the chair"
and "The carpenter sat on the chair" that they were "similar because he sat on the
chair to see whether he had fixed it well".
Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) started from the premise that objects are alignable if
they can be compared on many dimensions and non-alignable if they do not share
dimensions along which comparisons can be made. They claimed that alignable
entities evince comparisons by their very nature whilst non-alignable items will evoke
thematic integration. That this should be the case seems non-contentious to the
authors, but their empirical work set out to show that these processes are adopted even
if they are not task appropriate or consistent with instructions. Pairs of items were
systematically manipulated on the basis of whether they shared only taxonomic
relations, i.e., attributes (A+T-, e.g., milk-lemonade), taxonomic plus thematic
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relations (A+T+, e.g., milk- coffee), only thematic relations (A-T+, e.g., milk-cow)
and neither taxonomic nor thematic relations (A-T-, e.g., milk-horse). In experiment
1 it was found that the similarity ratings of the pairs in descending order were A+T+;
A+T-; A-T+; A-I-. Where items could be integrated into a common scenario,
participants in their studies reported taking this into account when making their
ratings, and the ratings reflected this influence. The study also included a protocol
(self-report) and no protocol condition and it was found that the ratings were very
similar in both of these conditions. Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) was published
after the inception of this study and involved a manipulation of the materials based on
prior assumptions concerning thematic relations between the stimulus pairs. Since
their notion of thematic similarity hinged on the linking of two items through a shared
scenario or situation, it is clearly related to the search in this study for the spontaneous
use of situational similarity in judging similarity.
A further reason to expect that similarity judgements may draw on thematic links
between the items, in addition to evaluating sharedlunshared properties, is a series of
experiments reported by Lin and Murphy (200 I). In these studies, adult participants
demonstrated a preference for thematic grouping over taxonomic groupings in a
variety of tasks. In experiment 1, participants were presented with a series of word
triads consisting of a target word and two other words, one of which was
taxonomically related to the target and the other thematically related. They were
asked on successive trials with different word groups to pick one of the options that
goes best with the target to form category. Across participants, the thematically
related word was chosen in 62% of the triads. In the second study the same materials
were used but no one word was identified as a target. Instead, participants were told to
decide which two out of the three items best formed a category. The average
percentage of thematic categorisation dropped to 49% but the authors noted that this
was still a high percentage when previous research had suggested that adult
participants show a strong preference for taxonomic groupings in similar tasks
(Smiley and Brown, 1979). Experiments 2 - 5 involved re-testing a subset of the
Smiley and Brown stimuli under differing modes of stimulus presentation. Thematic
categorisations still occurred at a much higher rate than that reported by Smiley and
Brown. Further manipulations designed to highlight the properties shared between
taxonomically related item pairs (listing commonalities) and thus to encourage
132
taxonomic pairings did increase the percentage of taxonomic groupings (by 33%).
Importantly, Lin and Murphy also demonstrated that the thematic relations between
items could support some kinds of inductive inference and could also prime
verification of a taxonomic category member. Once again, this work was published
after present study had been completed but Lin and Murphy's findings clearly speak
to the expectation that thematic or situational relationships between items may
influence other tasks that involve the manipulation of conceptual representations, such
as evaluating similarity.
A number of other factors have been shown experimentally to affect subjects'
assessments of similarity, including the co-presentation of different information
(Kelly and Keil, 1987; Medin and Shoben, 1988; Medin, Goldstone and Gentner,
1993; Tversky, 1977); expertise of the person making the judgement (Sjoberg, 1972;
Suzuki, Ohnishi and Shigemasu, 1992) and the time course of the judgement (Ward,
1983). It appears that such manipulations alter the focus of the participants'
comparisons and lead to systematic variation in similarity judgements.
Barsalou (1982) investigated the effect of presenting the items, with or without their
category label, on direct measures of similarity (scaled ratings). Barsalou reported
that ratings of similarity were higher for pairs of items from ad hoc categories when
the category label was present than when it was absent. No such effect was found for
taxonomic pairs. Barsalou explained this finding as the effect of context on the
properties of the items rendered salient in the comparison process. Barsalou claimed
that certain properties of entities were context-independent (Cl) in as much as they
would be automatically activated in the mind of the cogniser simply by presentation
of the concept name. Other properties, however, were proposed to be context-
dependent (CD) in that they would only be made salient in specific contexts. For
example, the property of flammable would only become activated for newspaper in
the context of using it to light a fire but not when considered as reading material for a
train journey. In a previous unpublished manuscript, Barsalou (1981) had argued that
properties associated with taxonomic category members were generally context-
independent whilst the properties shared by ad hoc category members tended to be
context-dependent. This was used then to explain the differential effect of context
upon similarity ratings for pairs of items from taxonomic and ad hoc categories.
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Barsalou claimed that similarity ratings of ad hoc category items were enhanced by
the presence of a category name because common properties have been activated and
rendered salient to the comparison. How does this particular operalisation of 'context'
relate to the type of situation instantiation that was seen in chapter I? The ad hoc
category labels in this study 'things you take to a wedding' 'things you find in an
attic' can be seen as offering a common situation in which largely perceptually linked
items may appear to be linked in a way that may not be easily apparent in the absence
of that label. Ifthe items are highly typical of that category then they may well
suggest this situation to the participants even if it is not made explicit. This may
particularly be the case in the protocol conditions where participants have longer to
seek out similarity. If participants make use of situational knowledge in this task then
these category members should afford them the opportunity to do so. However, the
same can not be said for taxonomic category items. The taxonomic category labels are
not suggestive of situations in the same way as the ad hoc category labels and under a
common understanding of 'context' may not be considered as contextual cues at all.
These labels relate more to the use of context that implies' think about orange and
banana in relation to all fruit' as opposed to having regard to a situation. A context
for fruit that would be more analogous to the ad hoc category names would be
something like 'eating fruit after a meal'. Even if certain pairs of fruits were linked
together in this way, whilst others were not, one would not expect this to be made
salient by a category heading of simply "Fruit". One might therefore predict that
'situational similarity' will be evident in the protocols for ad hoc category pairs but
less so for taxonomic item pairs.
It can be seen that much of the research on similarity has focused on identifying the
factors that affect similarity judgements. It should also be noted that outside of
experimental settings, people rarely make an assessment of similarity between two
items for its own sake. Assessment of similarity tends to be in the service of further
cognitive processes such as categorisation, the projection of properties onto new
category members, or problem solving. In everyday situations, there may be a need to
make practical judgements of similarity, such as when finding that one does not have
the correct tool for a particular job and looking around for something similar. In such
cases, it would be the goal of the assessment that drives the comparison process. In
contrast, when participants in experimental situations are presented with the names or
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pictures of two entities and asked to make a rating of similarity, some sense has to be
made of the task. This may require the instantiation of a plausible reason for making
the comparison (based on past experience) or an attempt to anticipate the aim of the
experimenter. Judgements of similarity may therefore be influenced by pragmatic
factors as well as purely cognitive ones.
The process of making similarity judgements in an experimental setting should be
seen then as an active, constructive one. Participants are not passively observing and
evaluating similarities but are engaged in an active search for similarity. Hassin
(1997), for example, reported that asking subjects for similarity judgements or
difference judgements of pairs of drawn figures led to differences in interpretation of
ambiguous features, and the subsequent weighting of those features in the
comparison.
There are various ways of attempting to measure similarity. It may be inferred from
the outcome of sorting tasks; participants can be asked to make same/different
judgements or may be presented with a range of items and asked which is most
similar to a target (Tversky, 1977). Alternatively, scaled ratings of similarity between
pairs of items may be requested. In the study reported here, a simple procedure of
requiring participants to provide judgements of similarity between two items as
ratings on a scale of I -9 was utilised (where I = not similar at all and 9 = highly
similar). It was decided to require participants to provide a written protocol explaining
their considerations in making the rating. The protocols would be subsequently
examined for evidence of the situational concept knowledge under interest.
The materials for the study followed from those used in studies reported in the
previous chapter. By using items from taxonomic and ad hoc categories, it would be
possible to make comparisons between the two category types: both in terms of the
explanations given for the ratings and the ratings themselves. It was decided to design
the study so as to allow a replication of the Barsalou (1982) results. It was noted,
however, that the Barsalou study had not commented on, nor reported, the typicality
of the items used as stimuli. Typicality has been characterised as a function of how
similar the exemplar is to a prototype of the category (Rosch and Mervis, 1975).
Barsalou (1985) showed that similarity to the central tendency of the category
135
correlated highly with the' goodness of exemplar' judgements given by participants
for taxonomic categories. He reported that ad hoc categories also exhibited graded
structure. However, this was not determined by similarity to a central tendency but
partly by a measure of how familiar the subject was with the item as a member of that
category ('frequency of instantiation') and partly by the degree to which the member
is felt to match the 'goal-ideal'. "Ideals .... are characteristics that exemplars should
have if they are to best serve a goal associated with their category" (p. 630). Since
members of both types of categories can vary in typicality, it was reasoned that their
perceived similarity could be influenced both by the context of the comparison and
the typicality of the items. Itwas therefore decided to include typicality as an
additional factor to see whether this in any way modified Barsalou's earlier findings
regarding the effect of context.
Requiring the production of protocols would necessarily affect the time course of the
judgements. Time allowed for similarity judgements has also been found to affect the
process. Goldstone and Medin (1994) demonstrated that abstract structural features
are weighted more heavily in similarity judgements than superficial features when
participants are given more time to respond. It has elsewhere been suggested (Smith
and Kemler Nelson, 1984; Ward, 1983) that a primitive, holistic assessment of
similarity is made by participants when cognitive resources are constrained by speed;
this is contrasted with comparisons along particular dimensions which appear to be
made when time is not a factor. These studies have involved indirect measures of
similarity such as sorting tasks or same/different judgements, rather than the scaled
ratings involved in this study and also utilised comparatively small time differences
between conditions. Nevertheless, it was decided to compare ratings from the protocol
conditions to those from a condition in which no protocol was requested, which
would result in a much smaller amount of time being spent on the task.
These considerations gave rise to a four-factor design that had two aims. The
principal aim was to assess the role (if any) of situational concept knowledge in direct
ratings of similarity - both the protocols and the ratings in relation to the protocols
would provide the necessary data. The secondary aim was to investigate whether
previously reported context effects would be modified by the consideration of
category member typicality - only the quantitative date would speak to this question.
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The factors investigated here were; (i) the presence or absence of an explicit context,
(ii) the type of category from which the entities under comparison were drawn
(taxonomic vs. ad hoc) and (iii) the relative typicality of the items being rated. Self-
reports were collected from a subset of participants, with type of self-report
constituting a fourth factor. It was predicted (following Barsalou, 1982) that the
ratings of similarity for pairs of ad hoc category items would be higher in the presence
of the category label (with context) than when presented without context. It was
further predicted that this effect would be mediated by typicality. Most importantly, it
was predicted that the protocols provided by those participants who were asked to
explain their rating would show that their considerations had included knowledge of
the situations in which the items are often encountered and not solely feature matches
and/or mismatches. Since the protocol analysis was a substantial activity in its own
right, it is intended to report the method for the study overall and then the results and
a brief discussion of the quantitative data followed by the protocol analysis.
Method
Participants
Seventy-two undergraduates from the University of Hertfordshire and 58 sixth form
school students volunteered for this study. Additionally, 40 sixth form students from
local colleges volunteered to provide typicality ratings to assist with the compilation
of the materials. The modal age of the sixth form students was 17 years.
Design
Four factors were manipulated in this study. The first was category (taxonomic or ad
hoc). This was a within-subject factor. The second within-subject factor was pair
type. There were three levels of this factor, TT, where both items in the pair were
typical of the category; AA, where both items in the pair were of low typicality
(atypical) within the category and TA where one item in the pair was typical of the
category and the other was of low typicality. The third factor was context, a between-
subject factor which referred to whether the pair of items were presented in the
presence of the category label (with context) or not (no context). The fourth factor
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was self report, this was a between-subject factor with three levels; participants
provided a protocol at the time of making the rating (concurrent SR), provided a
protocol after making the rating (retrospective SR) or did not provide a protocol at all
(NSR).
Materials
Ten categories were used; 4 taxonomic categories drawn from Rosch and Mervis
(1975) namely, bird, fruit, vehicle and furniture, and 6 ad hoc categories namely,
things you find in an attic, things you find on a shelf, things people take to a wedding,
things that may be conveniently kept in pockets, things dogs chase and things sold on
the black market in Russia. A range of members of these categories had been
generated by undergraduates in the two previous studies. Forty sixth-form college
students rated a set of these items from each category for typicality ('goodness of
example'). See Appendices D, E and F for details of instructions and stimuli.
Appendix G shows the mean typicality ratings and standard deviations for all stimuli
in all ten categories. On the basis of these ratings, three of the items rated as most
typical and three of the items receiving the lowest typicality ratings were selected
from each category. Superordinates (such as food) were avoided. The classification
of the items as typical and atypical was not based on a median split. Typicality is
often judged relatively within categories and so there was no attempt to match
typicality across categories. The classification could be viewed as fairly crude. The
items were combined in pairs to give rise to a pool of 3 typical/typical (TT) pairings,
3 atypical/atypical (AA) pairings, and 9 typical/atypical (TA) pairings for each
category. (See Appendix H) The ordering of the items within any given pair was kept
constant.
Test booklets were constructed. These consisted of 30 pairs of items, one of each type
of pairing for each of the 10 categories. Individual booklets were compiled by
drawing pairs of items from the pool in such a manner that maximum variation in
materials between participants was ensured. The order of the pairs within each
booklet was separately randomised. Participants were asked to rate each pair of items
for similarity "to each other" on a scale of 1 to 9 where 1 represented a judgement of
"not similar at all" and 9 indicated "highly similar". At the top of each page appeared
the names of the two items under comparison. The names of the items were on the
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same line but separated by a short space. For half the booklets, the items appeared
just below the name of the category from which they had been drawn (the Context
condition) while for the remaining booklets, the names of the two items stood alone
(the No Context condition). These materials were then used for three different groups
of participants. For the participants in the No Self Report (NSR) condition,
participants were required only to rate the similarity of the items to each other in
response to the written question "How similar are an X and a Y?" which appeared on
the page just below the names of the items and was followed by the scale described.
Participants worked through the materials at their own pace, having been told to give
each judgement some thought but not to dwell over it for too long. In the Concurrent
SR condition, participants saw the names of the items, X and Y, which were followed
by the same question, " How similar are an X and a Y?" and the instruction "write
down the things you are considering in making your judgement of similarity" then
appeared. A space was provided for the self-report and below that was the instruction
to make their rating on the scale at the bottom of the page. This format was repeated
for every pairing. In the Retrospective SR Condition, the instruction to make the
rating and the scale appeared before the written instruction to "Write down the things
you considered in making your judgement of similarity". This format was the same
for each pair of items (see Appendix I for sample materials).
Protocol analysis
The classification was initially made independently by two judges on a sample of 100
protocols. For protocols with no context the classification was:
Instantiated - protocol made direct reference to the category label from which the
items had been originally generated and which was presented with the item pair in the
context condition.
Close - protocol made an indirect or close reference to the category label from which
the items had been originally generated and which was presented with the item pair in
the context condition.
Not instantiated - protocol made no reference at all to the category label from which
the items had been originally generated and which was presented with the item pair in
the context condition.
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For the protocols with context the classification was:
Mentioned - protocol made direct reference to the category label that was presented
with the item pair
Close - protocol made an indirect or close reference to the category label that was
presented with the item pair
Not mentioned- protocol made no reference at all to the category label that was
presented with the item pair
The level of agreement between the two judges was 98% - the disputed protocols
were resolved by agreement. This classification was not a highly controversial one
and so one judge classified the remainder of the protocols.
The above classifications were subsequently further divided on the basis of whether
the protocols made reference only to similarities between the items in the pair or to
only differences between the items or to a mixture of both similarities and differences.
Protocols that did not fall into one of these three categories were classified as 'other'.
Once again, a trial classification was initially made independently by two judges on a
sample of 100 protocols (these were the same judges and the same protocols as
mentioned above). The level of agreement between the two judges was again 98%;
consequently one judge classified the remainder of the protocols on the same basis.
Procedure
Most participants were run in groups ranging in size from four to ten, a small number
were run individually. Participants were asked to read the instructions on the front of
the test booklet - these were also read aloud to them. Participants were allowed the
opportunity to ask questions before starting the task. In the two self-report conditions,
a period of 90 seconds was allocated for the completion of each page of the test
materials; subjects were told when the 90 seconds had elapsed and were instructed to
turn over the page. The whole procedure for the self-report conditions thereby taking
45 minutes per participant to complete compared with about 10 minutes for the self-
paced, NSR condition in which protocols were not collected.
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Results
The results of the quantitative data analyses will be reported first to address the
hypotheses concerning the effects of context and typicality upon similarity ratings.
The analysis of the protocols collected in the self-report conditions will then be
reported. As explained earlier (see materials), the typicality ratings given by a
previous set of participants were used to classify the items as typical or atypical. This
classification was then used to create the different pair types. Although typicality was
originally collected as a continuous variable, it was very far from normally distributed
and is therefore not suitable for use as a covariate in the quantitative analyses. The
category classification of pairtype was used instead.
Firstly, overall mean similarity ratings in the two different kinds of self-report
conditions, concurrent (4.34, sd = 0.96) and retrospective (4.45 sd = 0.77), were
compared. They were very similar and did not differ reliably (F 1.24, P = 0.3). Neither
of these conditions entered differentially into any significant interactions with the
other three factors, and they were therefore combined into one Self-Report condition,
and contrasted with the ratings in the No Self-Report condition. Table 3.1 and Figure
3.1 show the mean similarity ratings for the different pairs of items varying in
typicality for both categories in the presence and absence of context. It should be
noted that where there was no self-report, the variability in the ratings, as indicated by
the standard deviations, seems to be both objectively small and relatively far less in
the absence of context compared to in the presence of context and compared to all
conditions with self-report. This was the case for both taxonomic and ad hoc
categories. This suggests that for all category types, participants have the greatest
consensus around the similarity when a) their judgements are made fairly quickly and
with no need to justify them ratings and b) the items are presented without any other
information (Le. the category label). When more time is given and a protocol
required, or when the additional information of the category label is provided,
participants may then vary in the extent to which they attempt to make some use of
that information and may use it in different ways, leading to greater variability in the
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ratings. This point will be returned to in the discussion when the pragmatics of the
task facing the participants are considered.
Table 3.1.
Mean similarity ratings for taxonomic and ad hoc pairs of items, for all three
kinds of pair types in the No Self-Report and With Self-Report conditions,
(standard deviations in brackets).
No Self Report
Context Taxonomic Ad hoc
TT AA TA TT AA TA
Present 6.69 4.SS 4.55 4.49 3.33 3.14
(1.37) (1.47) (1.4S) (2.02) (1.21) (1.47)
Absent 6.43 4.44 4.91 2.74 2.21 2.0S
(0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
With Self Report
Present 6.59 4.53 5.01 3.99 2.92 2.S9
(1.25) (1.11) (1.22) (1.5S) (1.06) (1.06)
Absent 7.02 5.29 5.37 3.57 2.S2 2.77
(LIS) (1.16) (1.35) (LOS) (094) (1.04)
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Figure 3.1 Mean similarity ratings for all typicality combinations of Taxonomic and
Ad hoc item pairs; with and without context and self-report
The data were subjected to a Category Type (2) by Typicality (3) by Context (2) by
Self-Report (2) mixed ANOVA. The Category Type main effect was reliable, F(1,
126) = 465.185, p< .0005, eta squared = 0.787. Overall, taxonomic items were rated
more similar (5.52) than ad hoc items (3.11).
The main effect of Context was not reliable, F (1, 126) = 3.34, P = 0.070. There was a
reliable main effect of Typicality, F (2, 252) =231.57, p < .0005, eta squared = 0.648.
Overall, pairs of items made up of two highly typical items produced higher similarity
ratings than pairs of items made up of two atypical items, or one typical and one
atypical item. The means for the latter two pair types were remarkably close, and not
reliably different. For taxonomic categories they were 4.S2 and 5.02 for AA and TA
pairs, respectively; for ad hoc they were 2.S3 and 2.75 for AA and TA pairs
respectively. This pattern was true for both kinds of categories, with or without
context. The main effect of SR was not reliable, F (1, 126) =2.521, p = 0.115.
There were a number of interesting interactions. First, there was a reliable interaction
of Context by Category Type, F (1,126) = IS.51, P = 0.01, eta squared = 0.12S. The
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rated similarity of taxonomic items was slightly lower in the presence of context (M
= 5.4) than in the absence of context (M =5.7), whereas the rated similarity of ad hoc
items was slightly higher in the presence of context (M =3.4) than in the absence of
context (M=2.8). Individual post-hoc contrasts of the taxonomic and ad hoc data
showed the effect of context to be reliable in the case of the ad hoc category members,
F (1,126) = 9.7, P = 0.002, but not in the case of items from taxonomic categories, p=
0.l34.
Secondly, the nature of the Context by Category Type interaction in the absence and
presence of self-report was rather different. In the NSR condition, where subjects
made similarity ratings at a faster pace than in the SR conditions, the effect of context
is absent for taxonomic items F = 0.224, but the perceived similarity of ad hoc items
is reliably higher in the presence of context compared to the ratings made without
context, F(l, 41) = 14.5 p< 0.01 (see Figure 3.1). In the conditions which primed
subjects to think more deeply about the comparisons, namely the SR conditions, the
perceived similarity of ad hoc items was now uninfluenced by the context, F = 1.2,
but the perceived similarity of taxonomic items was reliably lower in the presence
than in the absence of the category label, F (1, 87) = 5.5 P = 0.021 (see Figure 3.1).
When Context exerted an influence on ratings of ad hoc items, namely in the NSR
condition, the interaction with Typicality approached significance, F (2,80)=2.9,
p=0.061, eta squared = 0.068. The most pronounced effect was on the pairs of highly
typical items. When Context had an effect upon ratings of taxonomic category
members, namely in the SR condition, there is no such interaction with Typicality F
(2,172) = 1.73. All types of pairing were equally rated more similar in the absence of
context. To summarise, the enhancing effect of context on the ratings for ad hoc pairs
found by Barsalou appeared only when there was no self-report and most strongly
when both of the items in the pair were typical of the category.
An attempt was made to use a range of items pairs from within each category in order
to increase confidence in the potential for generalising any conclusions to other
categories and category members. Participants could have seen anyone of three
pairings ofTT items, 9 pairings ofTA and 3 pairings of AA items. However, a
further analysis based on items (as a between factor) as opposed to participants
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showed small item effects in both conditions of category type (taxonomic and ad hoc)
and under every condition of typicality as follows:
Ad hoc TT: F(17,703) = 9.89, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.193
Ad hoc TA: F(53,556) = 2.98, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.221
Ad hoc AA: F(17,703) = 12.05, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.237
Taxonomic TT: F (11,466)= 6.88, p<O.OOl,eta squared = 0.140
Taxonomic TA: F(36,365) = 3.07, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.232
Taxonomic AA: F(l1,466) = 15.44, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.270
There were no significant main effects of self-report (as was the case in the analysis
by participant) except for the taxonomic TA pairs where there was a small effect of
protocol F(l,365) =6.38 p=0.012 eta squared = 0.017.
Most importantly, item did nor enter into any interactions with either protocol or
context with the exception of two small interactions between item and protocol in the
taxonomic AA condition F(11,459) = 1.96, p = 0.031, eta squared = 0.045 and TA
conditions F(36,365) = 1.77, P = 0.005, eta squared = 0.149.
There was still an effect of context for all pairings of ad hoc items, TT , F(1,703) =
42.612, p<O.OOleta squared = 0.057; TA, F(1,556) =14.97, p< 0.001 eta squared =
0.026: AA, F(1,700) = 19.04, p< 0.001 eta squared = 0.026 and significant
interactions with self-report due to the ratings with context being higher for pairs in
the no self -report condition but the pairs in the self-report condition not reflecting
the same pattern. This is consistent with the story of the effect of context and protocol
on ad hoc item pairs shown in the participant by analysis. (For example 100% of AA
item pairs showed higher ratings with context in NSR but only 47% showed this
pattern in the SR condition with the other item pairs showing the opposite pattern )
There was no effect of context for the TT and AA pairs but there was a small effect of
context for TA pairs across both conditions of self-report F(I,365) = 9.00 p<0.003
eta squared 0.024. There was no interaction of context and protocol for that condition
but there was such an interaction for the TT, F(l,466 ) = 5.08 p= 0.025 eta squared =
0.011 and AA pairs (1,459) = 10.634 p=O.OOIeta squared = 0.023. Where these
interactions occurred it was due to the ratings being slightly higher without context
than with context in the SR condition but the pattern not being repeated in the No SR
condition.
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Despite the item effects found, the overall pattern of findings concerning context and
self-report are also found at an item level. The findings from the participant analysis
concerning the differential effects of these factors on TT ad hoc pairs compared to TA
and AA pairs should perhaps be treated with some caution due to the small interaction
effects of protocol and item at some levels of typicality,
Discussion of the Similarity Ratings
Participants in the self-report conditions were informed at the outset that they would
be asked to explain their rating. Irrespective of whether the explanation was given
before or after the similarity rating, participants in both conditions approached each
judgement expecting to have to think more deeply about the comparison involved.
While the primary aim of collecting the self-reports was to afford an insight into
participants' reported considerations, it transpired that self-report was itself a causal
factor, entering into interesting interactions with the other variables.
Typicality had the expected effect. However, context had an effect only for categories
that were ad hoc and where there was no self-report. To put it another way,
instructions to self-report wiped out the effects of context found in previous studies.
Barsalou (1982) reported a reliable increase in similarity ratings for items from ad hoc
categories in the presence of a category label but not for taxonomic category items.
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, this interaction was replicated in the NSR condition, which
was procedurally closest to Barsalou (1982). Subjects in the NSR condition were not
encouraged to dwell upon their ratings, neither were they required to describe their
reasoning. In contrast, when subjects were required to describe their thoughts as they
formulated their ratings in the SR conditions, the presence or absence of category
label had no effect on the ratings of similarity of the ad hoc category items (see Figure
3.1). The self-report condition may have encouraged participants to generate their
own contexts for the judgements. This possibility will be pursued when the protocol
contents are examined.
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The results of this study suggest that the effect of providing context on ratings of ad
hoc pairs found by Barsalou (1982) may be confined to particular conditions under
which the ratings are made, namely, relatively speeded and unreflective.
Additionally, this effect of context on the ratings of ad hoc items found in the NSR
conditions was most marked for pairings of typical/typical items. This suggests that
the ad hoc items rated in Barsalou's study were good exemplars of the category. It is
unclear from the present study whether it is the extended time course of the
judgements alone or the requirement to report on the thoughts underlying the rating
that explains the loss of the effect when participants were asked to give protocols.
However, the results support the notion that different "kinds" of similarity judgements
are made about the same entities depending upon the time and effort afforded to the
task (Goldstone, 1995).
Itwill be suggested throughout this discussion that the co-presentation of the category
name with the items under comparison can be viewed as providing subjects with a
uniform framework for the comparisons- this will be referred to as explicit context.
Moreover, on a pragmatic basis, this information will be perceived as having been
supplied by the experimenter for a reason (cf. Hilton, 1995).
The mean ratings for items with an explicit context remain fairly stable across the SR
and NSR conditions. The phenomena of greater interest are the ratings in the absence
of explicit context. In the case of taxonomic category members, the mean ratings
without context are higher in the SR condition than they were in the NSR condition.
For ad hoc items, the Barsalou (1982) effect is lost at least partly because the mean
ratings made in the absence of explicit context are higher than they were in the NSR
condition. It appears then that an explanation of the results will hinge largely on what
is happening when participants are asked to rate items in the absence of explicit
context. It is proposed that, under these circumstances, the active construction of
similarity leads participants to instantiate a context for themselves, suggested by the
co-presentation of the items. Items that are more typical of a category are more likely
to evoke a context than items that are less typical. This implies that all judgements
are, in effect, made "in context", whether it is the explicit context provided by the
experimenter or the context instantiated by subjects in their search for similarity.
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Patterns of Effects of Typicality
A distinctive pattern of ratings for the varying degrees of item typicality was shown
overall and across both category types, with and without explicit context. Typical
pairs were rated more highly than the other two pair types, which were rated at a very
similar level.
The provision of an explicit context in the form of the category name directs
comparisons; pairs of typical items will then be more similar than pairs of less typical
items by virtue of sharing more features. When no category name was provided, the
high salience of the category membership of taxonomic items makes it likely that this
will nevertheless be the context most easily instantiated by subjects, yielding a similar
pattern of results, in this respect, to the explicit context condition. Indeed this was
found to be the case. While these results do not refute Barsalou's notion of Context
Independent properties, they are equally supportive of the notion that these highly
salient properties are dependent upon the activation of the equally salient context of
their category membership.
When ad hoc items were presented with a category name, pairs of typical items were
again rated as more similar than the other pairings; under a feature-matching model of
similarity, this would be due to sharing of a higher number of 'ideal' attributes. In the
absence of explicit context, the co-presentation of typical ad hoc items may have
evoked a plausible context for comparison. For example, camera and confetti (things
people take to weddings) would be likely to suggest the context Wedding even if not
specified and direct subjects' attention to a potential framework for the judgement;
these good exemplars will therefore be rated as more similar compared to the situation
in which less typical items, such as cake and hat are presented. Such items may be
less likely to evoke a frame of comparison to direct the judgement and therefore be
rated as less similar since they have few commonalities outside of this context.
The Effect of Context on Ad Hoc Category Members
When judgements were unreflective (NSR), participants who saw pairings of typical,
ad hoc category members with explicit context rated the items as reliably more similar
than did participants who saw the items in the absence of context. It is possible that
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the relatively speeded nature of the judgements meant that some participants failed to
find an association to direct their comparisons if one was not explicitly stated; even if
subjects did instantiate a context for themselves, it could have been a heterogeneous
set of contexts having an unpredictable effect upon ratings.
Barsalou explained this effect in terms of the activation of context-dependent
properties. This is a plausible explanation for the example Barsalou cites of a
basketball for which "floats" is a context-dependent property activated only in a
particular context. However, for items such as Confetti and Camera or Wallet and
Money, (things people take to a wedding and things you keep in your pocket,
respectively), it is difficult to identify a context dependent property that they share
and which would thus render them more similar once a context was established. One
of two explanations can be offered as to why these items are rated as more similar in
context. Firstly, in the search for similarity and to oblige the experimenter,
participants find ANY commonality a reason to rate perceptually dissimilar items as
more similar than at first thought. Alternatively, the fact that items both play roles in a
common scenario or situation is considered in the same way as a shared property of
any other kind. That is to say 'is used at weddings' is considered by many participants
to be a 'feature' of confetti and one that can be potentially shared by other objects.
The 'respects' in which the items could be considered similar has simply been
extended to include external factors such as situations.
The effect of context on ratings of ad hoc items was not found to the same extent for
pairings of atypical items or typical/atypical items. Even if a context is found, or
made explicit for these items, at least one item is a poor exemplar of the category and
as such may rarely have been experienced as a member of that category and may not
exhibit any characteristics associated with an ideal member; ratings of similarity may
therefore remain low. For example, the provision of the context things chased by dogs
could be seen to do little to enhance the similarity of cow and bicycle.
As observed, no effect of explicit context on ad hoc pairs was found when participants
made more careful considerations of their judgements in the SR conditions. This may
be explained then by subjects in this condition having more time in which to
instantiate their own context that could direct the comparison; this would then defuse
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the impact of explicit context. Additionally, when judgements are made relatively
quickly, the provision of explicit context (by virtue of which two seemingly dissimilar
items may be found similar in some unexpected way) may result in a rating which, if
given more time to consider, would be reduced; for example, although cats and sticks
are indeed both items which may be chased by dogs, they are, as objects, quite
different.
The Effect of Context on Taxonomic Category Members
For the taxonomic category items, the effects of context were quite different. When
judgements were relatively speeded, provision of explicit context had no reliable
effect upon ratings of these items. When participants see apple and orange, these
items have a high default similarity by virtue of their shared properties as fruit; the
membership of that category being (presumably) activated automatically. Co-
presentation of the category name did not, therefore, result in higher similarity ratings.
The reduced similarity of taxonomic category members in the presence of context
when ratings were made with self-report may have been a genuine effect of being
prompted to reflect upon the rating task more deeply. As suggested, under NSR
conditions the search for similarity between apple and orange produces 'fruit' (and
consequently fruit-like qualities) quite automatically, the judgement is made against
this background and the participant moves on. Possibly when the participant provided
with no context has time to ruminate upon the comparison, 'fruit' may seem too
obvious as the field of comparison intended by the experimenter and the items may be
judged against a wider category membership of, for example, food. Since this
category has a larger and more diverse membership, this may have the effect of
rendering two fruits within this instantiated context more similar than if the relevant
basis for the comparison is considered to be fruit (cf. Sjoberg and Thorslund, 1979).
Comments
The explanations of the complex interactions found in this study rely upon
understanding similarity judgements obtained under these conditions as an active,
goal-related construction; this is consistent with recent dynamic, process-based views
of similarity. Participants sought meaning for the task and made use of any
information provided in the explicit context of the comparison; in the absence of such
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information, a context of their own was likely to have been instantiated. It could be
argued then that similarity judgements are never 'context-free'. A context free
judgement would be one without constraints and would be subject to the famous
Goodman criticism that everything can be found similar to everything else (Goodman,
1970). The process of constructing a framework to identify relevant respects in which
items could be similar might be mediated by semantic, conceptual knowledge and
also may reflect pragmatic considerations whereby the participants seek to anticipate
the intentions of the experimenter. As mentioned earlier, recent studies of similarity
have shown that judgements are not always based solely on feature matching. Bassok
and Medin (1997) found that when participants were asked to assess the similarity of
paired statements which had matching nouns, for example "The carpenter fixed the
chair" and" The carpenter sat on the chair", subjects offered responses such as
"similar because he sat on the chair to see whether he fixed it well". Such a response
clearly refutes the conception of similarity as linear computations of shared and
different properties.
Medin, Goldstone and Gentner (1993) suggested that a distinction can, and should be
made between indirect measures of similarity (same-different judgements of stimuli),
direct measures of similarity (as in scaled ratings) and similarity as a theoretical
construct. However, the literature is replete with claims concerning the flexibility or
stability of similarity that ignore the distinction advised by Medin et al. Researchers
must be mindful of the likely differences between the way in which direct measures
of similarity can be influenced and the constraints which may operate upon similarity
as it is deployed in the service of other cognitive processes. At the very least
'context' effects upon measures of direct similarity are likely to include the
experimental context; that is the meaning that subjects attribute to the task and the
goals they formulate.
The data collected here, through an expanded set of experimental conditions in
comparison to Barsalou's much cited study, have shown that claims about the effect
of context on similarity should be carefully qualified.
In the next section, the analysis of the protocols will be used to investigate whether
the participants' considerations varied under different conditions and whether they
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drew on other sources of similarity altogether, such as event or experience-based
similarity
Protocol Analysis
The primary aim of the protocol analysis was to look for reports of other sources of
similarity apart from feature-matching and in particular the use of situational
knowledge. However, it was also deemed interesting to see ifprotocols could shed
any light on the pattern of ratings seen with and without context for the taxonomic
and ad hoc categories in the SR conditions, namely increased ratings in the no context
conditions for both ad hoc and taxonomic pairs compared to the NSR conditions. This
will be addressed first.
Each of the eighty-seven participants was asked to provide protocols for 30 similarity
judgements, giving rise to a total of2610 ratings and accompanying protocols. In
seven instances participants provided neither a rating nor a protocol for an item. This
left a total of 2603 protocols (1563 for ad hoc item pairs and 1040 for taxonomic item
pairs). In a few cases (1.3%) the participant provided a rating and no protocol- these
were subsequently coded as such and remained part of the analysis. Occasionally a
participant provided a protocol but no rating. The initial analysis of the protocols was
conducted to see whether they could offer any substantiation for the speculation with
regard to the cause of the context effect. The first question to be addressed concerned
the ad hoc category members and the loss of the context effect when protocols were
provided. Although, the basis for the ratings cannot be compared to the NSR
condition (the considerations of the participants in the NSR condition are, by
definition, unknown to us) it was felt that looking at the protocols for the ad hoc item
pairs with and without context may lend a partial understanding of the ratings. There
were two possibilities; firstly, that participants in the no context condition may have
had more chance to instantiate contexts for themselves and to find similarities that
would not be apparent when making a faster judgement. Secondly, participants in the
'with context' condition may have had more opportunity to dwell on the superficiality
of the category membership provided, and to consequently focus on perceptual and
functional differences between the items. The pattern of the ratings seemed to suggest
that the loss of effect was due to the 'without context' ratings and so the first
152
explanation was expected to be more consistent with the ratings. The initial
classification of the protocols therefore was in terms of whether or not they
instantiated the context when it was not explicitly provided and whether or not they
made reference to it as a basis for similarity when it was provided. Ad hoc and
taxonomic item pairs were separated for the purposes of this breakdown. For
protocols with no context the classification was Instantiated, Close or Not
Instantiated. For the 'with context' protocols the classification was Mentioned, Close
or Not Mentioned (see Method section for further definition of these terms). For
clarification purposes, the following examples of protocols from each of the four main
categories are presented:
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Table 3.2
Examples of each classification type. All examples relate to items from the category
things people take to a wedding.
No Context items
Instantiated Cake/Hat Associate with occasions - weddings, summer
days, special occasions. Even a similar shape
(could be!) S79NCRP
Close Present! Camera is a machine. A present is a gift given to
Camera someone, they are both used at special
occasions.
S7NCCP
Not CakelHat Different uses. You eat a cake. You wear a hat.
instantiated Made of different materials and come in
different sizes.
S76NCCP
With Context
Mentioned Rice/ Not so similar. So what if they are both at a
Cake wedding. S3WCCP
Close RicelHat They are both thrown! Specially, if you're a
man. Being hit by either can be painful.
S41 WCRP
Not mentioned Camera/Confetti A camera can take a picture of a moment in
time, whereas once confetti is thrown it cannot
be used again and is thrown away.
S55WCCP
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Ad hoc items pairs
Table 3.3.shows classification of protocols for ad hoc item pairs
Table 3.3
Number and percentage of protocols for ad hoc item pairs that did and did not
instantiate the context even when it was not provided (no context condition) and did
or did not mention the context when it was provided (with context condition).
10% 4% 86%
WITH CONTEXTNO CONTEXT
Instantiated Close Not
instantiated
Mentioned Close Not
mentioned
79 29 665 244 33 513
31% 4% 65%
Since it was the classification of the protocols that were of interest, as opposed to the
classification of participants, and since the participants had an equal number of
opportunities to produce protocols of any particular type, the protocols were treated as
the unit of analysis and a multinomial logistic regression was performed on the data
using the classifications as the dependent measure. This produced a highly significant
result from the 1563 protocols - -l(2) = 108.14, p <0.005. Unsurprisingly, the
proportion of references to the context was higher when context was provided and the
proportion of protocols failing to mention the context was lower when context was
provided. More importantly, it can be seen that when the context was provided, 65%
of the protocols made no reference to it and when it was not provided, 14% of
protocols instantiated it (or a category very close to it) anyway. However, since the
assumption of independence of cells was violated, it was possible that a small number
of participants may have contributed disproportionately to the pattern seen in Table
3.3. The pattern of protocol classification for each participant was therefore
examined. It was found that in the 'no context' condition, 100% of participants
showed the pattern reflected in table 3.3 where a significantly higher number of
protocols failed to instantiate the context (M= 15.47, s.d 1.5) than to instantiate it
(M= 2.07, s.d. = 2.04) t (42) = -27.507 P < 0.001. In the 'with context' condition 70%
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of participants showed the protocol classification pattern of Table 3.3 with
participants producing significantly more protocols that failed to mention the context
(M = 11.29, sd=5.51) than mentioning it (M =5.9, s.d. = 5.38) t (43) = -3.298, p =
0.002. It is consequently concluded that the protocol pattern reported in table 3.3 is
representative of the performance of participants and has not been unduly influenced
by the data from a small subset of the sample.
However, instantiating a context, or mentioning one provided, need not necessarily
result in finding items similar - note the example for Rice/Cake in Table 3.2.
The above protocol classifications were therefore subsequently further divided on the
basis of whether the protocols made reference only to similarities between the items
in the pair or to only differences between the items or to a mixture of both similarities
and differences. Protocols that did not fall into one of these three categories were
classified as 'other' (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.4
Number and percentage of protocols with and without context, mentioning only
similarities between items, only differences or both similarities and differences.
N Similarities Differences Both Other
only only
No Context
Instantiate it 79 29 1 32 17
% 37% 0% 41% 22%
Do not instantiate it 665 140 122 212 191
% 21% 18% 32% 29%
With Context
Mention it 244 67 53 72 52
% 28% 22% 29% 21%
Do not mention it 513 120 165 114 114
% 23% 32% 22% 22%
It can be seen that where no context was provided to participants and yet they still
instantiated that context, there were virtually no protocols referring only to
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differences between the items whereas 18% of the protocols in the no context
condition mentioned only differences when the context was not instantiated by the
participants themselves. Approximately a sixth of the protocols showed evidence of
participants instantiating their own context which matched or was close to the one the
experimenter had in mind and this did seem to have the effect of causing them to
focus somewhat less on the differences between the items. Perhaps more interestingly,
of the protocols showing no instantiation of the original context, 21% of these still
listed only similarities for these perceptually different items, and a further 32%
mentioned both differences and similarities. The question of what might constitute
similarity between these dissimilar items, other than the context label originally
envisaged, is addressed later.
When context was provided to participants, only 31%of the protocols contained a
specific reference to it (see Table 3.3) and of those protocols, 22% still mentioned
only differences between the items. The greatest number of 'difference only'
protocols occurred where context was provided but was not referred to at all.
As before, a multinomial logistic regression was performed on the data using the
classifications as the dependent measure,"l N(6, 1501) = 67.49, p<O.OOS.The
classifications were associated with both context, ..l N(3, 757) = 50.635, p<0.005 and
reference to context X2 N(3, 744) = 27.299, p<O.005. The effect arose mainly from
i) the higher than expected similarities only protocols, where a context was
instantiated even though it was not provided (37%);
ii) the lower than expected difference only protocols where a context was instantiated
even though it was not provided (0%)
iii) the higher than expected difference only protocols where a context was both
provided and mentioned (22%)
The same caveats apply to this analysis as to the previous analysis and so the pattern
of protocol classification for each participant was therefore examined with particular
reference to the proportion of 'similarity only' protocols versus 'difference only'
protocols produced. In the 'no context' condition where the participants instantiated
the context in any case, 53% of the participants did not produce any 'similarity only'
or 'difference only' protocols: 44% produced more 'similarity only' than 'difference
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only' protocols and only 3% produced the opposite pattern. Participants produced
significantly more 'similarity only' (M = 0.69) than 'difference only' protocols (M
=0.07) t (42)= 4.33, P < 0.001.
In the 'no context' condition where the participants did not instantiate the context,
7% of participants did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference only'
protocols: 9% produced the same number of each: 37% of participants produced more
'similarity only' than 'difference only' whilst 46% of participants produced the
opposite pattern but there was no significant difference between the mean number of
similarity only (M=3.26) and the mean number of difference only (M=2.81)
protocols produced by participants in this condition t (42) = 0.552, p=0.584.
In the 'with context' condition, where participants did mention the context provided
36% did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference only': 12% produced equal
numbers of each protocol type: 27% of participants produced more 'similarity only'
than 'difference only' whilst roughly the same percentage of participants (25%)
produced the reverse pattern and there was no significant difference between the
mean number of 'similarity only' (M=I.64) and the mean number of 'difference
only' (M=l.34) protocols produced by participants in this condition t (43) 1=0.634
p=0.530.
In the 'with context' condition, where participants did mention the context provided,
9% did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference only' protocols: 7% produced
an equal number of each protocol type: 32% produced more 'similarity only' than
'difference only' and 52% showed the opposite pattern but there was no significant
difference between the mean number of similarity only (M=2.79) and the mean
number of difference only protocols produced by Ps in this condition (M=3.45) t (43)
t=0.818 p=0.418 .
With the exception of the fmal condition, this suggests that the pattern of 'similarity
only' and 'difference only' protocols shown in table 3.4 is representative of the
performance of the participants and does not reflect an undue influence on the part of
few participants. In the case of the 'with context but no mention of the context'
situation, more participants did produce the pattern shown but the difference in mean
numbers of 'similarity only' and mean number of 'difference only' protocols was not
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significant. This suggests that there were a relatively high number of similarities
produced by those participants who did favour mentioning similarities only.
With regard to the explanations for the pattern of ratings discussed previously, it does
seem as though ratings in the 'no context' condition for ad hoc item pairs may have
been raised as a result of a combination of factors. Some protocols showed that the
participant had instantiated the experimenter's context for themselves and seemed
consequently to have focused somewhat less on differences between the items whilst
others did not instantiate that context but still showed consideration of only
similarities between these perceptually dissimilar items (e.g. clock and photograph)
Clearly, precisely the same considerations could have been made by participants who
did not provide protocols but since time has been shown to affect similarity ratings
(Ward, 1983) it is perhaps reasonable to speculate that the reflections of the self report
participants may differ from those in the relatively speeded condition.
Once again, it must be acknowledged that the protocols probably offer at best only a
small window on the processes involved in making similarity judgements; there are
likely to be more considerations taking place than participants report. However, in
summary for the ad hoc item pairs, there is some evidence to suggest that participants
found more differences than one might have expected when context was provided and
more similarities than one might have predicted when no context was provided. The
breakdown shown in Table 3.4 also suggests that participants are finding many
similarities between these items that are not directly related to the context that the
experimenter had in mind. The nature of these will be investigated later in this
section.
Before moving on to look at protocols for the taxonomic item pairs, it is interesting to
note that amongst the ad hoc item pairs, it was found that some contexts were more
easily suggested to the participants by the item pairs than others. An examination of
the 108 protocols in which the original context (or something very close to it, e.g.,
played with by dogs as opposed to chased by dogs) was instantiated in the 'no
context' condition showed the following breakdown by category
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Table 3.5
Number of protocols in which each ad hoc category was instantiated even when no
context was provided.
things things that things you things you things dogs things sold
people take maybe find on a find in an chase on the black
to a wedding conveniently shelf attic market in
kept in Russia.
pockets
40 27 21 12 8 0
N=129 N=129 N=129 N=29 N=129 N=129
The ad hoc categories of things people take to a wedding, things that may be
conveniently kept in pockets and things you find on a shelf were the most easily
suggested by the items themselves.
Taxonomic item pairs
The same classification as reported above was also made for the taxonomic category
item pairs as follows:
Table 3.6
Number and percentage of protocols for taxonomic category item pairs that
instantiated the context even when it was not provided (no context condition) and
mentioned the context when it was provided (with context condition).
314 42 158
WITH CONTEXTNO CONTEXT
Instantiated Close Not
instantiated
Mentioned Close Not
mentioned
252 38 236
61% 8% 31% 48% 7% 45%
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As was the case for the ad hoc protocols, a multinomial logistic regression was
performed on the data using the classifications as the dependent measure. This
produced a significant result - X2(2) (N=1040) = 22.411, p <0.005. The pattern of
classification differed with and without context, with the proportion of protocols
instantiating the context when none was given being higher than those mentioning it
when it was provided and the proportion of protocols failing to instantiate a context
when one was not given being lower than the proportion failing to mention it when it
was present. The pattern of protocol classification for each participant was examined
as for the Ad hoc category results. It was found that in the 'no context' condition,
82% of participants showed the pattern reflected in table 3.6 where a significantly
higher number of protocols instantiated the context (M = 7.3, s.d 2.45) than to failed
to instantiate it (M = 3.67, s.d. = 2.63) t (42) = 4.78 p < 0.001. In the 'with context'
condition, the mean number protocols that mentioned the context (M = 5.73, s.d =
2.91) was not significantly different to the mean number of protocols that did not
mentioning it (M =5.36, s.d. =3.14) t (43) = -0.405 P = 0.687. 43% of participants in
this condition produced more protocols that instantiated the context than protocols
that did not whilst 57% produced protocols showing the reverse pattern. It is
consequently concluded that the protocol pattern reported in table 3.6 is representative
of the performance of participants and has not been unduly influenced by the data
from a small subset of the sample
It can be seen that when the context was provided for taxonomic category items, it
was mentioned and not mentioned in roughly an equal number of protocols. When no
context was provided, the context was instantiated in 61% of cases. However, when it
was provided, 45% of the protocols made no reference to it at all when explaining
their judgements.
A further breakdown of the protocols was made as for the ad hoc category item pairs
to see what proportion within each of the categories shown in Table 3.6 were
mentioning similarities or differences between the items.
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Table 3.7
Number and percentage of protocols, with and without context, mentioning only
similarities between items, only differences or both similarities and differences.
N Similarities Differences Both Other
only only
No Context
Instantiate it 314 112 1 179 22
% 36% 1% 57% 7%
Do not instantiate it 158 46 13 57 42
% 29% 8% 36% 26%
With Context
Mention it 252 95 10 132 15
% 38% 4% 52% 6%
Do not mention it 236 67 40 98 31
% 28% 17% 42% 13%
A multinomial logistic regression was significant ..l N(6, 960) =112.401, p<0.005
The classifications were associated with both context X2N(3) = 20.123 p<0.005 and
reference to context X2 N(3) = 88.1 p<0.005. The effect arose mainly from
i) the lower than expected difference only protocols, where a context was instantiated
even though it was not provided (0%)
ii) the higher than expected protocols listing both similarities and differences, where a
context was instantiated even though it was not provided (57%).
The pattern of response was different with and without context.
Once again, the pattern of protocols produced by each participant was examined to
see if the apparent differences between the 'similarities only' and 'difference only'
protocols were the result of an extreme performance by only a small subset of the
sample. In the 'no context' condition where the participants mentioned the context in
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any case, 23% of the participants did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference
only' protocols: 3% produced the same number of each protocol type:
72% produced more 'similarity only' than 'difference only' protocols: Only 2%
showed the reverse pattern and participants produced significantly more 'similarity
only' (2.60) than 'difference only' protocols. There was a significant difference
overall between the mean number of similarity only and the mean number of
difference only protocols (0.07) t (42) = 5.77, P < 0.001.
In the 'no context' condition where the participants did not instantiate the context,
33% of participants did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference only'
protocols: 5% produced the same number of each: 49% of participants produced more
'similarity only' than 'difference only' whilst only 14% of participants showed the
reverse pattern and there was a significant difference overall between the mean
number of similarity only (M=1.07) and the mean number of difference only
(M=0.30) protocols produced by participants in this condition t (42) = 2.78, P = 0.008
In the 'with context' condition, where participants did mention the context provided,
25% did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference only' protocols: 2%
produced equal numbers of each: 66% of participants produced more 'similarity only'
than 'difference only' whilst 7% participants produced the reverse pattern and there
was a significant difference overall between the mean number of similarity only
(M=2.14) and the mean number of difference only (M=0.45) protocols produced by
participants, t (43) 4.75 p<O.OOI
In the 'with context' condition, where participants did not mention the context
provided,25% did not produce any 'similarity only' or 'difference only' protocols:
6% produced an equal number of each: 41% produced more 'similarity only' than
'difference only' and 27% produced the reverse pattern but there was no significant
difference overall between the mean number of similarity only (M=1.5) and the mean
number of difference only protocols produced by Ps in this condition (M=O.93) t (43)
== 1.475 P = 0.148.
With the exception of the final condition, the pattern of similarity only and difference
only protocols seen on a participant basis reflects the pattern shown in table 3.4 on a
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protocol basis. In the 'with context but did not mention it' condition, more
participants did produce protocols referring to similarities only than differences only
but the failure of the difference in the means to achieve significance suggests that
those participants showing the reverse pattern produced a relatively higher number of
differences.
Recall that in this self report (protocol) condition, pairs of taxonomic items were rated
as more similar without context than with context. Itwas speculated that this could
have resulted from participants finding more similarities, or fewer differences
between the items without context compared to with context. There seems to be some
evidence from the analysis that there were fewer differences only listed by
participants who saw the items without context but instantiated it anyway and that the
same participants listed more similarities and differences than would have been
expected. It is very difficult to know how the weighting of the similarities and
differences in such protocols took place when deciding upon a rating.
Itwas suggested in the discussion of the similarity rating data that participants seeing
the items without the category name, when allowed time to consider the judgement
more carefully, as in the SR condition, instantiated a category context that was
broader than the one envisaged (e.g., food rather than fruit) and consequently found
the items more similar in this wider classification. An examination of the protocols
for fruit was made to investigate this - there were 14 references to the property
"edible" as a basis for similarity in the 'with context' condition compared to 37
references to the same property in the 'no context' condition. Although it is possible
that participants made their comparisons against the background class of 'edible
things' - this difference again does not seem remarkable enough to account for the
effect found. Participants seemed to generate few differences in the 'no-context'
conditions -whether or not they instantiated a context of their own.
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Situational similarity
A further examination of the protocols provided in the 'no context' condition for ad
hoc pairs was made to establish the nature of the similarities that were reported when
the context intended by the experimenter was not instantiated. It will be recalled that
there were 66% of these protocols that mentioned some point of similarity between
the items. Itwas found that some protocols listed featural/functional similarities
despite the largely perceptually dissimilar nature of the items (e.g., lipsticks and pens
are both long and can be used to write with). There were, however, a number of
examples of participants citing a connection or link between the items that was not
based on standard feature matching at all. This included references to the items being
linked together in terms of physical contiguity (e.g. where you find spiders you find
dust) or a functional relationship (e.g. you might use screws to fix the telephone to the
wall). There were also a number of protocols that referred to the items appearing in a
common situation. For example, for phone and newspaper (things you would find on
a shelf), one participant in the 'no context' condition wrote:
"A reporter for the newspaper might use a telephone to obtain some information for
their story/report, Or over the telephone, someone may tell someone else their news"
S4NCRP.
An examination of the total set of protocols for ad hoc item pairs was conducted and
142 protocols for ad hoc item pairs were found to contain these types of links or
associations in the proportions for the 'context' and 'no context' conditions shown in
Table 3.8
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Table 3.8
Frequency of protocols for taxonomic and ad hoc item pairs in both conditions of
context showing thematic links (non-featural considerations)
With context
Context mentioned
Context not mentioned
Taxonomic
Taxonomic
Thematic link No thematic Total
link
11
18
151
218
252
236
Context mentioned Ad hoc 5 239 244
Context not mentioned Ad hoc 34 479 513
No Context
Context instantiated Taxonomic 7 307 314
Context not instantiated Taxonomic 21 137 158
Context instantiated
Context not instantiated
Ad hoc
Ad hoc
3
100
76
565
79
665
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These thematic link protocols broke down by category as shown in Table 3.9
Table 3.9
Breakdown of protocols for ad hoc item pairs in the 'no context' condition, which
showed evidence of situational links between items other than the category itself.
things dogs chase
things sold on the black market in Russia.
things that may be conveniently kept in pocket
things you find in an attic
things you find on a shelf
things people take to a wedding
Total
Number of situational
protocols (N=142)
Ad hoc category
29
28
30
28
18
9
142
It is interesting to note that the two categories giving rise to the highest number of
protocols that linked the items through a common scenario were those in which the
context envisaged by the experiment was rarely instantiated (see Table 3.5), i.e.,
things dogs chase and things sold on the black market in Russia. It appears that the
discovery of common situations was most likely to occur when no context was
provided for perceptually different ad hoc items and the experimenter's context was
not instantiated. It should be noted that the ad hoc category names themselves
constitute situations and that similarity based on membership of this category (they
are both kept on shelves) can be seen as thematic. Taking the "context instantiated"
protocols from the 'no context' condition (n = 108) together with the "context
mentioned" protocols from the 'with context' condition (n = 277) and the set of
protocols mentioned in Table 3.9 that refer to situational links other than these
expected contexts (n = 142), it can be argued that drawing on knowledge of shared
situations in assessing similarity is not a rare occurrence (total n = 527 from a total of
1563 protocols).
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Perhaps surprisingly, there was a similar proportion of thematic links between items
mentioned in the protocols for taxonomic category pairs.
As in the case of ad hoc item pairs, the highest number of protocols showing links
was in the 'no context' condition when the context was not instantiated in the
protocols. However, whereas these links occurred in more than one of the ad hoc
categories, it should also be noted that all the cases of thematic similarity occurred for
the category furniture, for example:
Chair/Piano
" They are similar because you need a chair/something to sit on if you want to playa
piano. Both made of wood" SINCCP rating (6)
CushionIF ootstool
" My first thought was that they weren't related at all but then I realised that you
might put a cushion on a footstool so I circled a number a little higher than 1" SIWCRP
rating ( 3)
Thematic differences
Itwas also noted that some protocols contained references to thematic difference
between items, for example for the pair cat /stick (things that dogs chase)
"Cat is wily and unpredictable, stick has quite a predictable trajectory of flight"
...... and for catlball (same category)
"Cat's may retaliate, ball won't"
It will be argued later that such protocols run counter to the notion that participants
are merely giving expression to rather non-specific feelings of association when they
evaluate thematic similarity.
Personal references
The protocols were examined for evidence of specific personal references that would
suggest that participants were not just consulting their general knowledge of objects
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and situations but were thinking about their own objects. There were found to be no
such personal references for the taxonomic category pairs and a total of 25 such
references in the protocols for ad hoc item pairs which broke down as follows: 14/236
in the 'with context' condition (context mentioned): 0/453 in with context condition
(context not mentioned): 4/78 in 'no context' condition (context instantiated) and
7/558 in 'no context' condition (context not instantiated).
Individual Differences
The analysis of the protocols reported in the previous sections suggests that when
participants are asked to judge similarity between items they engage in a wider
process than feature matching- often noting thematic connections between the items.
However, whilst classifying the protocols, it was noted that there seemed to be
considerable individual difference in participants' Willingness to take thematic
similarity into consideration when making their rating, even for the same items and
the same situation. Consider the following protocols which were both provided with
ratings for Money and Wallet (things that can conveniently be kept in pockets) with
no context:
"Money and a wallet are quite similar because they are connected, i.e., you put your
money in a wallet" SlNCCP rating (7)
"Money is what goes inside the wallet but it doesn't make them similar in any way.
They' go together' but are not alike" S 11 NCRP rating (1)
The following protocols were for items from things youjind on a shelf, 'with context'
condition:
Newspaper/Telephone
"both may be found on a shelf. Because they are both found on a shelf they are
therefore similar" S6WCCP rating (5)
Photograph/Clock
"So what if you find the two on a shelf, what makes them similar? Nothing!
S3WCCP rating (1)
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It seems that even when individuals notice a thematic link between the items, they are
not always prepared to count it as the relevant kind of similarity. These protocols also
indicate an awareness of differing sources of similarity.
It appears that individual differences exist in a) a tendency to perceive or report these
links whilst undertaking this type of task and b) once perceived, a willingness to be
influenced by such links in making a rating of similarity. Only 6/43 subjects in the 'no
context' condition reported no links of this nature for Ad hoc items, but only 4
participants reported them in a third or more of their protocols (total of 18 protocols)
with the highest percentage being 50% for just one participant. Most subjects reported
such links in just one or two protocols for these items under this condition.
Of the four participants who made most use of these links, only one produced
relatively high ratings for the items in question (mean rating 6.3) whereas the other
three seemed comparatively uninfluenced in their ratings (mean ratings 1.0,2.9 and
2.9). These three participants tended not to offer any other similarity basis for these
items. The participant with the higher ratings produced longer protocols that
elaborated the link in more detail.
The Relationship Between Protocols and Ratings
The content of the protocols can only be taken as revealing of the processes involved
(even to a partial extent) in making similarity judgements if one believes that they are
indeed the considerations made by the participants. A minimal requirement in
establishing their validity must be that the reported considerations should at least be
reflected in the ratings that they purport to explain. The following analysis attempted
to address this issue.
A mean similarity rating was calculated for the protocols classified in the following
way (see Table 3.10):
Sims only - protocol indicated only features the items shared andlor thematic links
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Diffs only - the protocol indicated only features/properties that the items did not
share.
Both - the protocol listed both properties/features that the items shared and others that
they did not share
NI- the protocol was non-informative in as much as it was not possible to know what
the participant was taking into consideration
Dclaim - the protocol consisted only of a claim that the items are totally different or
not similar at all.
Don't know an item - the protocol indicated that the participant only had a vague idea
about what one of the items was like.
No protocol - the participant had failed to write a protocol
SDclaim - the protocol consisted only of a claim that initially indicated a basis for
similarity (they both ... ) but then went on to say that this did not make them similar
ClaimS - the protocol initially indicated that the participant thought that the items
were totally different but then went on to find some similarity.
Can be other - the protocol consisted only of a claim that one item could be the other
(e.g. a clock can be an ornament)
Table 3.10
Mean similarity ratings and standard deviations for the various classifications of
protocols - ordered by similarity.
Protocol type Mean s.d. N
Sims only 5.63 2.20 723
Both 4.77 2.12 965
Don't know an item 4.58 2.02 24
Can be other 4.32 2.28 22
Non-informative 3.18 2.10 175
SD claim 2.78 1.65 101
ClaimS 2.59 1.21 39
Diffs only 1.96 1.34 417
No protocol 1.31 .87 35
DClaim 1.24 .81 102
TOTAL 2603
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It can be seen that this classification contains the three categories used in Tables 3.4
and 3.7 but also attempts to classify the 'other' category more finely. This latter
classification was conducted by one judge only and is included only for information
as to what other types of considerations constituted the 'other' category used earlier in
this section. Since for this finer classification inter-rater reliability was not established
and since it also gives rise to categories of very small size, all classifications apart
from Sims only, Diffs only and Both were collapsed to give just four categories of
protocols. The means for these can be seen in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11
Mean similarity ratings and standard deviations (in brackets) associated with
protocols in each of the four categories.
Sims only (n=723) Diffs only (n=417) Both (n=965) Other (n=482)
5.63 (2.20) 1.96 (1.34) 4.77 (2.12) 2.59 (2.45)
A one-way repeated measures Anova showed that there was a significant difference
amongst these four means, Wilks Lambda F (3,55) = 160.406, P < 0.01, eta squared =
0.90. The ratings accompanied by protocols listing similarities only were
significantly higher than the ratings against which participants had listed only
differences between the items, F (1,57) = 482.040, p<O.OOI, eta squared = 0.894. The
ratings for the protocols indicating both similarities and differences lay between the
two values, somewhat nearer to, but still significantly different from the similarity
ratings for similarities only F, (1,57) = 77.963, p< 0.01 eta squared = 0.578. This
initial analysis gives cause for some confidence that the ratings were reflecting the
reported considerations of the participants.
As a further test of the relationship between the protocols and the ratings, it was
reasoned that the higher the percentage of similarity only protocols produced by a
participant, the higher the overall mean rating should be. The percentage of each type
of protocol (Sims only, Diffs only, Both and Other) was calculated for each
participant.
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The overall pattern of protocol types across all participants can be seen in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12
Mean percentage of Sims only, Diffs only, Both and Other protocols
Sims only Diffs only Both Other
27.8 16.00 37.1 19.1
The percentage of similarity only protocols was found to be positively correlated with
the overall mean rating, r (86) = 0.290, p= 0.0035, 1 tailed. The percentage of
difference only protocols was found to be significantly negatively correlated with the
overall mean ratings, r (86) = - 0.247, P = 0.011, 1 tailed.
The calculation of the percentage of each type of protocol produced by each
participant enabled a mean profile to be produced across participants for both
conditions of context and according to whether the context was instantiated or not, for
both category types. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 Mean percentage of each protocol type across participants with and
without context
Despite the apparent variation in pattern of response across the context conditions,
this was not found to be significant using this participant profile, X2 (3) = 1.074, P =
0.783.
The final question to be addressed was whether the protocols that included thematic
similarity resulted in higher ratings than did those without such considerations. It has
already been argued that when participants in the 'no context' condition instantiated
the ad hoc categories (or close to it), they were making thematic links between the
perceptually dissimilar items. For example, when a participant says of dust and boxes
that both can be found in attics, then they are forming a thematic association.
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any other type of similarity the analysis is limited to 'similarity only' protocols for ad
hoc category members where no context was provided.
Table 3.13
Mean ratings and standard deviations from ad hoc protocols (no context) referring to
a thematic context and protocols making no such reference.
Thematic context No thematic context
Ad hoc 5.26 (2.04) 4.45 (2.12)
The ratings from the protocols where participants instantiated a thematic context for
themselves when comparing ad hoc category members were significantly higher than
the ratings from the protocols that showed no such context, t (184) = 2.272, p=0.024.
Interestingly, if one adds to the thematic context group those protocols that contained
novel thematic links, the mean rating for the group decreases (M= 4.94, sd =2.15) and
the difference only approaches significance, t (184) = 1.569, P = 0.059. This
suggests that the ratings given by participants for ad hoc items where there was no
context provided, but the participant reported considering at thematic link between the
items other than the original context (e.g. drugs and guns can both kill you) were
somewhat less influenced by this link than the when the context instantiated was more
specific.
General Discussion
The protocols collected for this study provided a rich source of qualitative data
concerning how participants claim to have decided upon a scaled rating of similarity
between items. A future analysis could attempt to catalogue the actual nature of the
properties mentioned as being both shared and unshared, and differences could be
classified as either alignable or non-alignable. For the purposes of this thesis, the
analysis of the protocols was undertaken with two aims in mind:
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• To see if they could help explain the quantitative data relating to the self-report
condition - in particular the failure of context to enhance the ratings of the ad hoc
item pairs which was evident in the NSR conditions.
• To look for evidence that knowledge of situations in which the items commonly
occur was playing a part in the process of judging similarity
The success, or otherwise, in achieving these aims will be discussed in turn.
Explaining the Similarity Ratings
The first classification of the protocols was into those that instantiated a context and
those that did not (when context was not provided) and those which made reference to
a given context and those that did not (when context was provided). The data from
the ratings showed that the provision of context for ad hoc items raised ratings in the
no self report condition but in the self report condition the ratings appeared to be at
much the same level as when context was not provided. Itwas speculated that either
the effect of context was weakened by participants having more time in which to
instantiate their own context when none was provided, or that the context was
examined more critically when it was provided. There was some evidence that when
faced with perceptually different items, a context was instantiated. Fourteen percent
of the protocols in the 'no context' condition made reference to the very context
provided in the context condition. Perhaps more importantly, 65% of the protocols
where context was provided made no reference whatsoever to that context, suggesting
that it did not serve to guide their judgements at all (see Table 3.3).
When the protocols were further classified into those that listed similarities only,
differences only, both similarities and differences or some other expression
altogether, it could be seen that the percentage of similarity only protocols was much
the same overall for the 'with context' and 'no context' conditions. The highest
percentage of difference only protocols was seen when context was provided but not
mentioned and was lowest when context was not provided but was instantiated
anyway by the participant. This suggests that there was an increased focus on
differences in the 'with context' condition compared to 'no context' condition. It must
be re-emphasised that the items in the ad hoc pairings were items that would not be
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expected to be viewed as similar at all under a traditional feature-matching model of
similarity. Although all the ad hoc pairs had a mean similarity of less than 5, there
was clearly felt to be some degree of similarity. The prevalence of similarities in the
protocols for these items is a testament to participants' efforts to find similarity when
faced with this task. It should also be noted that approximately a third of the protocols
indicated a process of weighing of similarities and differences as implied by the
Tversky (1977) model of similarity.
A similar breakdown for the taxonomic items failed to explain why the ratings for
these items were higher under the self-report condition without context than with
context. There was some suggestion that, by protocol, a greater proportion of
differences were listed when context was provided but not mentioned; however, it is
not clear that this in itself would explain the ratings for these items. A more detailed
analysis of the specific properties mentioned for the items may assist in understanding
the quantitative data but since this was not the main focus of the protocol collection, it
was not deemed appropriate at this time.
Gricean Pragmatics
As was noted earlier (page 142) the variability in the ratings (as indicated by the
standard deviations) was notably less for all both category types and all pairtypes
when no context was provided and there was no self-report. It seems then that there is
the highest degree of consensus around the mean ratings when judgements are made
fairly quickly and with no need to justify them and when the items are presented
without any other information (i.e., the category label). This may reflect the various
ways in which participants sought to make sense of the task with which they were
presented. As previously mentioned, although participants seem to have little
difficulty in coming to judgements about similarity between often unusual pairings of
items - the requirement to do so, and to place a numerical rating on that judgement, is
likely to occur only in experimental settings such as these. The task appears to have
no goal other than to satisfy the (unspecified) requirements of the experimenter. Since
the experimental setting can be seen as an interaction between the Experimenter and
the participant, then the Gricean (1975) maxims of conversation may be expected to
operate and participants are likely to seek to maximise the use of any information that
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is provided to them. In the case of this study, that information came in the form of the
category label but also in the form of the protocol requirement. It is perhaps therefore
somewhat surprising that less than 50% of the protocols for either the taxonomic or ad
hoc pairings made reference to those labels. This is particularly so for the ad hoc
pairings. The presentation of Fruit above the pairing of orange and banana may
simply be understood as orienting the participant to the stimuli (acting almost as the
word 'ready' in a lexical decision task). However, the ad hoc categories were perhaps
less predictable and in some cases very unusual (e.g. Things sold on the Black market
in Russia) and therefore one might have predicted that far more protocols would have
mentioned this heading in their protocols. The comparatively high variability in
ratings seen when protocols were required and when context was provided (even
without protocols) suggest participants made use of this information in different ways.
Although there were overall patterns of context and protocol effects, there was not a
tight consensus amongst the samples on the way in which this affected the ratings that
they decided upon. In the case of ad hoc items, it has been suggested that this, to a
certain extent may reflect differences in individual susceptibility to note, and be
influenced by, thematic relations between items but it is harder to explain the
variability around ratings for taxonomic item pairs that seems to occur in all
conditions except the relatively speeded, no context condition. The rather superfluous
provision of the taxonomic category labels may act to 'confuse' participants
wondering how to make use of it - this may also be the case when a protocol is
required but a label is not, given the rather obvious perceptual basis for similarity that
presents itself between two taxonomic. What does seem clear from the content of the
protocols is that in a spirit of co-operation, most participants expend considerable
effort in seeking similarity, as they seem to presume that this will meet the criteria for
a successful interaction from the perspective of the experimenter.
Influence of Situational Knowledge
The main focus of the data collection was to see if participants who had been asked to
judge similarity between items engaged in a much wider process than feature
matching. Specifically, it was hypothesised that the type of situational knowledge
exhibited in the strategies for the category member free-recall task reported in
Chapter 2 would also influence the deliberations of the participants in the similarity
task.
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It could be considered that the taxonomic item pairs in the studies reported in this
chapter generally correspond to the item pairs in Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) that
shared attributes but no thematic association (A+T-) whilst the ad hoc items are more
like A-T+ pairs, i.e., pairs of items that share few attributes but may share thematic
links. The higher ratings of similarity for the taxonomic versus the ad hoc pairs
overall would therefore be consistent with the Wisniewski and Bassok findings.
Since there was no systematic manipulation of items expected to evoke thematic
similarity in this study, it is contended that it acts as a strong demonstration of the
extent to which this type of similarity is spontaneously produced. It is true that in this
study, a subgroup of the items provided to the 'no context' participants had been
previously generated from an ad hoc category. In retrospect, it may be considered that
the ad hoc category could, in itself, be seen as constituting a scenario/situation and
that meant that these items were, a priori, thematically related. However, it could also
be argued that the nature of some of these thematic associations (kept in a pocket,
found on a shelf) would not have been expected to be as compelling as that between
the items used in Wisniewski and Bassok's study (car and tow-truck, chisel and
hammer). Some protocols in this study also exhibited a high level of creativity in
establishing thematic links between dissimilar items.
During the protocol analysis, it became apparent that particular participants seemed to
be predisposed to noticing or generating thematic similarity. Dunham and Dunham
(1995) posited individual differences in perceptual-cognitive styles that manifest
themselves in early conceptual development (3 yr. olds). A subsection of their
participants showed a persistent thematic approach to categorisation tasks, the
antecedents for which could be found in the use of a selective interest in relations
among objects and the use of certain relational terms at earlier ages. The degree to
which adults tend to make use of thematic organisation in such tasks as category
-member generation, similarity judgements and categorisation (Lin and Murphy,
2001) may vary considerably between participants but may be a relatively stable
characteristic across different tasks.
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Interestingly, the intrusion of thematic relations into tasks that 'should' be based on
taxonomic relations has been viewed by some as resulting solely from participants'
misunderstanding of the instructions for the task. However, a variety of instruction
manipulations have failed to eradicate the influence of thematic associations
(Wisniewski and Bassok, 1999; Lin and Murphy 2001). Instead, Gentner and Brem
(1999) have claimed that the discovery of these influences do not demand a radical
review of similarity theories as suggested by Bassok and Medin (1997) and
Wisniewski and Bassok (1999). Gentner and Brem proposed the confusability account
in which thematic influences are not an essential part of the similarity process but that
they influence the process when "participants have difficulty distinguishing between
the mental output that arises from accessing associations as opposed to the output of a
separate, independent comparison process" (p.180). The screening task of Gentner
and Brem's second experiment required 702 participants to look at triads of object
names that consisted ofa target (e.g., dart) and two other items (e.g., bullseye and
javelin) and asked to pick the one of the two that was most similar to the target. As a
result of repeated trials they identified a group of participants (11%) who were
"unable to distinguish similarity from association in over 90% of cases". A further
group of 41% were' correct' in over 90% of cases and the remainder of the
participants was intermediate in performance. This is mentioned in connection with
the protocol analysis reported here for two reasons. Firstly, it supports the notion of
individual differences in predisposition to make use of thematic relations in
"taxonomic" tasks. More importantly, the nature ofa number of the protocols
produced by the participants in the present study indicate a clear awareness of the
existence of more than one 'type' of similarity and their inclination to take account of
this in their ratings varies. Some participants clearly felt that the thematic relation was
not relevant to the question of similarity whereas for others, the term similar clearly
encompassed these relationships. There is little in the protocols collected here to
support Gentner and Brem's claim that the participants were unable to distinguish
between the two. Consider the following examples:
S9 No Context CP Wedding TIT Camera/Confetti rating 2
I think of a wedding and see that they both fit at a wedding and so they are similar but
as objects themselves they are not.
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SI No Context RP Black Market NA MagazinelFashion Accessories rating 4
In tenns of the materials they can be made can be quite different, however fashion
accessories can be found in magazines.
S2 No Context RP Shelf N A Book/Spider rating 2
They are not similar but are similar because it could be a book about spiders.
S9 No Context CP Wedding TIA PresentlHat rating 2
They both appear at weddings but the objects are completely different.
S2 No Context CP Attic T/A Dust/Spider rating I
When you think of spiders you think of dust because spiders are usually
found in dusty, dirty cellars and attics, you think of a spider web surrounded by dust
but they are not very similar at all.
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Summary of protocol analysis
The relationship between the nature of the protocols as classified (similarities only,
differences only or both) and the ratings gives rise to a certain amount of confidence
that the protocols are indeed informative of the process involved in the judgement of
similarity between items under these experimental conditions. The protocols suggest
that when people make direct assessments of similarity between items, with no
specified goal other than that they have been asked to do so, they engage in a feature
matching process but also generate other types of situational links between the items
that subsequently influence ratings of similarity.
The discovery of the thematic similarity in the protocols may have been viewed with
some caution were it not for the results of the studies in Chapter 2 and the subsequent
publications by Bassok and Medin (1997) and Wisniewski and Bassok (1999). It can
not be argued that the thematic similarity resulted purely from requiring protocols
from the participants since Wisniewski and Bassok found no effect of protocol upon
the ratings of items that were thematically associated. This suggests that the thematic
integration of items took place even in the absence of self-report. However, in this
study an interaction of self-report with context was found so self-report does seem to
affect ratings under particular conditions. The low occurrence of reported thematic
links in the protocols for the taxonomic pairing could be interpreted as suggesting
that taxonomically based similarity may be preferred over thematic based similarity,
where it can be utilised. However, it may also be the case that, as discussed in the
introduction, the taxonomic category labels did not themselves suggest situations or
contexts for the comparison in the same way that the ad hoc labels did and so may not
have evoked situational links between the items.
The protocols did not show the same level of self-reference that was witnessed in the
protocols from the category-member generation task but the similarity judgements did
seem to draw on the same generic knowledge of situations/events in which the items
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can occur. It is the co-occurrence of the items in these contexts that seems to form a
basis for thematic similarity.
Participants appeared to be aware of the difference between intrinsic feature-based
comparison and thematic association and for some people these are considered simply
to be different, but equally legitimate, sources of similarity. It has recently been
found that educated adults can demonstrate a hitherto unexpected tendency to form
categories on the basis of thematic relationships as opposed to taxonomic relations
(Lin and Murphy, 2001; Murphy, 2001). If such relationships are seen as a valid basis
of categorisation, and items that are categorised together are believed to be similar,
then it seems reasonable that the same type of relationship is viewed as constituting
similarity .
Both Bassok and Medin (1997) and Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) consider that
'abstract' attributes such as the thematic relation between items in familiar situations
could be encompassed by traditional similarity models as another type of feature that
serves to enhance or decrease similarity. Itmay be argued that participants are simply
switching between the sharing of physical/functional properties and the sharing of
situational scripts when they consider the respects in which items are seen as similar.
However, the question remains as to why the situational scripts should exercise such
an influence in adult cognition when it was previously thought that this organisation
of items on the basis of how they co-occur in situations was a rather immature
organisation, seen primarily in young infants (Markman, 1989) and believed to be
superseded in development by a more sophisticated taxonomic organisation. This
issue will be considered in detail in the concluding chapter.
As discussed in Chapter 2, it must be conceded that the content of the protocols can
not be assumed to be providing a full or accurate description of the cognitive
processes involved in completing the task set for participants. It is undoubtedly the
case that many other considerations entered into their judgements other than those
that they chose to report. This may account for the limited success in using the
protocols to explain the effect of context upon the similarity ratings.
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Summary of Results
The new factors included in the design of this study revealed the following:
• The effect of context on the ratings for ad hoc pairings shown by Barsalou (1982)
was found only if the participants made unreflective judgements that they were
not asked to explain or justify. The effect also seemed to apply most clearly to the
pairs of typical items.
• An interaction of self-report and context suggested that the effects of context were
influenced by time and effort.
• The content of the protocols suggests that context lead to a higher focus on
differences between items.
• Protocols revealed substantial consideration of situation -based associations
between items in addition to more standard feature matching.
• Where participants reported spontaneously instantiating the same context for ad
hoc item pairs as the one from which they had been originally generated,
similarity ratings were higher than when they did not make such a link between
items. The situational similarity did, in these cases, therefore appear to increase
the perceived similarity of the items to each other, as reflected by the ratings.
It also appeared from the protocols that the thematic link between some item pairs
gave rise to a stronger feeling of similarity compared to other thematically associated
pairs. The next chapter reports a study that set out to investigate the factors that affect
how compelling participants find thematic similarity between perceptually dissimilar
items.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Factors that Determine Thematic Similarity
Overview
This chapter reports an investigation on whether thematic similarity depends upon the
association between the items under consideration andfamiliar situations in which they
commonly feature. Both item-to-event and event-to-item association are measured.
Background
InChapter 3, the prevalence of 'thematic similarity' amongst the justifications for
similarity ratings was demonstrated and discussed. There seems to be general
agreement that this type of similarity arises when people think of items being 'linked'
by virtue of appearing together in the same situation or event (Wisniewski and
Bassok, 1999). It also seems to be clear that certain pairs of items are more likely to
elicit feelings of such similarity than are others. In Wisniewski and Bassok (1999,
exp.1), only half of the item pairs that shared both features and were thematically
related were rated as more similar than the item pairs that shared features only. This
suggests that some of the thematic relations did not enhance the similarity ratings. It
seems that items vary in their thematic similarity in the same way that they vary in
terms of their feature-based similarity. Whilst it is, arguably, easy to see why a
sparrow and a robin may be viewed as more similar to each other than a penguin and
a sparrow - it is perhaps harder to establish why a dog and bone may be viewed as
more similar than a bride and a church. If, as has been suggested here, people draw on
an alternative organisation of knowledge based on the situations in which items tend
to be encountered, one might expect that the strength of association between
individual items and these situations would be a factor in determining the relative
thematic similarity between items which feature in the same situation. The studies
reported in this chapter sought to explore this type of similarity.
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The idea that contiguity and similarity are the two basic laws of association, is of long
standing and has been attributed to, amongst others, J. S. Mill (1843/1930) who
identified a law of similarity - "similar ideas tend to excite one another" - and of
contiguity "when two impressions have been frequently experienced (or even thought
of) either simultaneously or in immediate succession, then whenever either of these
impressions or the idea of it recurs, it tends to excite the idea of the other". Lucariello
and Nelson (1985) claim in their introduction, "Since Hume, two bases of association
have been recognised, similarity and contiguity in space-time". These authors go on
to say that "these are reflected in the presumed bases for category formation and
formation of thematic groups (e.g. cup and milk) respectively"
There has been a tendency in cognitive psychology to separate similarity from
association rather than to see similarity as a form of association. To understand
thematic similarity it is helpful to see perceptual/functional similarity as only one,
albeit important, way in which items may be associated together in thought. It seems
that perceptually and functionally associated items form 'traditional' categories based
on shared features. However, items can be associated in a variety of other ways that
may also influence how we think about them.
If items are contiguous then they are adjoining, co-occurring or are in contact with
each other. Items may therefore be spatially contiguous (literally occurring together in
the same space) or temporally contiguous (occur together at the same point in time).
The former clearly entails the latter but items, which are temporally contiguous, may
vary in their degree of spatial contiguity. These types of contiguity should therefore
be considered separately.
As mentioned in chapter 3, Lin and Murphy (2001) have reported a programme of
work that is the most extensive to date to tackle thematic relations in adults' concepts.
These authors conducted a series of experiments that showed that when adults were
asked to choose which of two items would hest form a category with a target item, a
substantial proportion of choices were for the thematically linked option rather than
the taxonomically matched item. This finding persisted across a range of presentation
formats and instructions. Lin and Murphy explain thematic relations in the following
manner" thematic relations are the external or complementary relations among
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objects, events, people and other entities that co-occur or interact together in space or
time" . They proceeded to give examples of "some" thematic relations.
Spatial
Functional
Causal
Temporal
- a roof is on top of a house
- chalk is used to write on a blackboard
- electricity causes a light bulb to glow
- bills typically come after meals in restaurants.
This list is clearly not exhaustive. One could add 'episodic' relations, i.e., co-
occurring in scripts or stories. One of the difficulties in attempting to unravel the
nature of thematic similarities is the diverse and overlapping ways in which relations
between entities may be described. Lin and Murphy point out that items may share
more than one type of thematic relation (e.g. causal and spatial). This said, it seems
that the four candidates referred to by Lin and Murphy would be relatively easy to
identify and have been alluded to elsewhere in the literature. For example, Markman
(1981) notes that "In naturally occurring situations, objects exist in spatial, temporal
and causal contexts" and she also claims that "event-like meaningful structures might
be a more spontaneous, natural way of organising information" (p.203). For the
purposes of her thesis, Markman distinguishes between paradigmatic and syntagmatic
associations where the former are based on similarity or inclusion and the latter arise
from" some causal, temporal or thematic relation". (p.229) Note here that thematic is
cited separately as a form of association from temporal or causal. Lucariello and
Nelson (1985) also make reference to functionaVsyntagmatic relations as being those
"things that appear together in the same time-space and bear a functional relation to
one another, for example, cup and milk."
Wisniewski and Bassok's (1999) work is the only other paper to systematically
examine the effect of thematic relations between items on similarity ratings. These
authors assume that thematic groupings are considered to be plausible because they
go together as " a unified scene or event". They go on to say that entities in thematic
relations tend to each playa different role in that scene or event and therefore exhibit
different role-appropriate properties which in turns makes them unalignable. That is
to say they do not present themselves as suitable for comparison along shared
dimensions. However, an examination of the item pairs used in their study shows that
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they all share a 'direct' relationship, i.e., one that brings them into direct contact with
each other, such as car and towtruck, chisel and sculpture, ship and lifeboat. Seven
out of 12 pairs in Wisniewski and Bassok's A-T+ category (pairs of items that do not
share standard features but are thematically related) comprise agents who have use of,
or contact with, the base object, e.g., cat and vet, chair and carpenter, car and
mechanic. Other relations seem to be one of dependency through joint use e.g.,
hammer and chisel, kettle and cup. The nature of these relationships automatically
suggests a scenario, though not necessarily a well-rehearsed event of the type to be
used in the following study. This is also true of the materials used by Lin and
Murphy.
There do not appear to be any item pairs in the Wisniewski and Bassok work that are
thematically related only by virtue of playing some role in the same event or scenario
- they all share a further relationship. Most of the item pairs in the current study,
however, will be related purely by "theme" (e.g. present and turkey). This will then,
in itself, constitute a considerable difference between this study and the previous
work.
The Thematic Similarity Studies
As described above, there are a number of types of relationships that may exist
between items and it is likely that some, if not all, of these affect the degree to which
people are prepared to say that the items are similar to each other, even in the absence
of shared perceptual and/or functional features. In the work reported here, it was
decided to focus on the link that each item in the pair enjoys with a specified
event/situation rather than on the direct link between the items. If thematic similarity
reflects a feeling of "closeness" between the items arising from an organisation of
knowledge around situations, then the extent to which each item invokes that
situation, or is invoked by it, should predict the strength of thematic similarity as
shown through ratings. It was necessary therefore to establish some measure or index
of item-to-event association and event-to-item association. Both measures would be
required since the association between an item and an event is not symmetrical. For
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example, the item 'confetti' may not be strongly elicited by the event 'wedding' since
there are many other items that may be thought of first in connection with this
situation (church, bride, vicar, ring etc). However, the presentation of the item
'confetti' is likely to reliably produce 'wedding' as the only associated event. It was a
possibility that one "direction" of association would prove to be a better predictor of
thematic similarity than the other- especially if item pairs are presented for a
similarity judgement in the absence of context.
There are in existence a number of word association databases, but these did not result
from a data collection that specifically sought to elicit the relationship between items
and the events/situations in which they are regularly encountered. It was therefore
determined that the putative explanatory factors of item-to-event and event-to-item
strength of association should be measured by collecting data from similar samples to
those who would be asked to provide the similarity ratings. There were consequently
three stages of data collection. In stage 1 (eliciting item-to-event data) participants
were asked to generate items that they associated with 15 different events/situations.
The frequency of generation was taken to be a measure of association between the
event and the item. In stage 2 (eliciting event-to-item data), a subset of the items
produced in stage 1were presented to a new group of participants and they were
asked to list events/situations that they thought about in connection with that item.
Once again, frequency of generation of the target event was taken as an indication of
the strength of association between the item and the event. In stage 3, the items were
paired together according to a manipulation based on the measures obtained in stage 1
and 2 and were presented to a third set of participants who were required to rate the
pairs for similarity.
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Stage 1: Eliciting Item-to-Event Data
Method
Participants
Twenty-eight cognitive science undergraduates (8 males and 20 females) took part in
the pilot study for course credit. Four males were aged under 21 and 4 over 21.
Eight females were under 21 and 10 were over 21. Two female participants failed to
report their age group.
Materials
Fifteen situation/events were chosen by the experimenter (see Table 4.1) The events
were such that most participants could be reasonably expected to have experienced
them to varying degrees. An attempt was made to include both very specific cultural
events (Christmas Day) to more generic situations (getting ready for a special
occasion).
Table 4.1.
Events Used to Elicit Items.
A Wedding Looking for Something in the Attic
Visit to the Dentist Packing the Car to go on Holiday
A Day at the Beach Preparing a Picnic
Having a Shower Rescue at Sea
A Camping Trip A Children's Party
A Trip to the Supermarket Making a Cup of Coffee
Seeing a Film at the Cinema Getting Ready for a Special Occasion
Christmas Day
The stimuli were presented in a 16-page booklet of A4 typed sheets. The front page
provided instructions and on each of the following pages the name of the event
appeared in BOLD on the top of the page with the rest of the page lined to encourage
listing. At the bottom of each page appeared the statement I have been in this
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situation followed by the tick box options of Never, less than 10 times, more than 10
times, more than 50 times. This was included to provide some measure of the extent
to which participants had personal experience of the events. The order of the stimuli
was randomised for each participant (see Appendix J for instructions and sample
materials).
Procedure
All participants provided data for all 15 events. The data were collected from all
participants in one session. The booklets were distributed and the instructions shown
on the front were read aloud by the experimenter as follows.
When you think of an event or situation, there are a variety of
items that may come to mind. For example, when I think of a
lecture I think of a whiteboard, an overhead projector,
students, handouts etc. At the top of each of the following pages
you will see the name of an event or situation. For each page
you will be allowed 90 seconds to list as many items as you can
which the event or situation bring to mind. At the bottom of
each page I would like you to indicate how often you have been
in this situation by ticking one of the following options:
Neverlless than 10 times/more than 10 times/more than SO
times
You will be told when to start each page and when to turn over and start the next
page. Please do not start each page until you are told to do so.
These written instructions were supplemented with the verbal instruction that in
completing the question at the bottom of each page, participants were to understand
that "more than 10 times" included "but less than 50 times". Participants were given
the opportunity to ask questions before starting. Questions were raised about what
sort of items would be appropriate and participants were encouraged to write down
any sort of thing that came to mind when they thought about the event. A time limit of
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90 seconds per event was imposed to limit the length of the session. This particular
time constraint was used at it seemed, in Studies 1 and 2, to have proven to be
sufficient time to allow for substantial data generation but not so long as to induce
restlessness in participants. The procedure lasted 30 minutes in total.
Results
Fluency
An overall mean of 13.13 items were produced per event. The most items produced
for anyone event was 17.07 (a day at the beach) and least was 10.07 (getting ready
for a special occasion). Across events, the highest mean number of items produced by
anyone participant was 17.73 items and the lowest mean number of items generated
was 7.67. The mean number of items generated to each event can be seen in Table
4.2.
Table 4.2
Mean and standard deviation of number of items generated to each event.
Event Mean Standard
deviation
A Day at the beach 17.07 4.32
A Wedding 15.64 4.33
A Camping Trip 14.71 4.40
A Trip to the Supermarket 14.43 4.61
A Children's Party 14.32 3.70
Christmas Day 13.50 4.00
Visit to the dentist 13.36 4.19
Preparing a Picnic 12.61 3.26
Seeing a Film at the Cinema 12.54 3.71
Having a Shower 12.29 3.58
Making a Cup of Coffee 12.29 3.73
Looking for Something in the Attic 11.86 4.37
Rescue at Sea 11.75 3.45
Packing the Car to go on Holiday 10.57 4.14
Getting Ready for a Special Occasion 10.07 3.77
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Familiarity
Most of the events chosen were familiar to participants (see Table 4.3). Only one
category had more than 5 responses in the Never category, that was Rescue at Sea (25
participants had never experienced this event) and lOllS events had no responses at
all in the "Never" experienced category. For lOllS events, more than 70% of
participants indicated that they had experienced these events at least more than 10
times. For 3 categories, more than 70% of participants claimed that they had
experienced the event more than 50 times. Making a cup of coffee, having a shower
and a trip to the supermarket appeared to be the most familiar in terms of experience.
Participants had the least experience ofpreparing a picnic, a camping trip and rescue
at sea. It should be noted that despite rescue at sea being experienced by only 2
participants, there appeared to be no difficulty in generating items for this event.
Presumably participants were able to draw on second hand experience through film
and fiction to complete the task.
Table 4.3.
Percentage of participants who indicated how often they had experienced the event.
Event Never <10 times >10 times >50 times
A Wedding 3.7 25.9 55.6 14.8
Visit to the Dentist 0 0 74.1 25.9
A Day at the Beach 0 0 70.4 29.6
Having a Shower 0 0 7.4 92.6
A Camping Trip 18.5 40.8 33.3 7.4
A Trip to the Supermarket 0 0 0 100
Seeing a Film at the Cinema 0 3.7 29.6 66.7
Christmas Day 0 0 74.1 25.9
Looking for Something in the Attic 0 37 48.2 14.8
Packing the Car to go on Holiday 0 33.3 55.6 8.1
Preparing a Picnic 11.1 44.4 40.8 3.7
Rescue at Sea 92.6 7.4 0 0
A Children's Party 0 29.6 48.2 22.2
Making a Cup of Coffee 0 3.7 18.5 77.8
Getting Ready for a Special Occasion 0 3.7 51.9 44.4
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It should be noted that the for this breakdown only the percentage was calculated
from 27 rather than 28 participants as one participant indicated that he/she had
experienced Christmas Day more than 50 times despite having claimed to be under 21
- this cast some doubt on this aspect of their data and so their frequency of experience
data was excluded.
Items Generated
No systematic classification was conducted on the items generated by the participants
as it was not the focus of the study. It appears, however, that items tended to fall into
the following fairly distinct categories: Objects, Food, Clothes, People, Activities,
Weather, Emotions, Comments/personal associations. A full record of items and
frequencies for each event can be seen at Appendix K. With reference to Appendix K,
it should be noted that items mentioned by only one participant appear without any
recorded frequency and if such items represent a qualified member of the category
then they will not have been included in the total frequency for that item. For
example, warm flUffy towel was mentioned by only one participant and was not
included in the total frequency for Towel. This procedure was adopted in order to
avoid any risk of over-inflating the frequencies.
Stage 2: Eliciting Event-to-Item data
The purpose of this stage of the study was to obtain some measure of the extent to
which the items listed from the 15 events in the previous stage were associated with
the events from which they were generated. A second group of participants were
therefore presented with a subset of the 192 items and were asked to list events that
they associate with those items.
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty undergraduates and post-graduates from the University of
Hertfordshire took part in this stage of the data collection. Some participants were
awarded course credit, others were placed into a draw for a cash remuneration. These
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participants were drawn from a range of disciplines including law, nursing and
psychology. The mean age of the group was 26.45 years. The range was 43 yrs (l Syrs
minimum, 61 yrs maximum). There were 89 female and 31 male participants.
Materials
Three event categories from stage 1 were dropped, rescue at sea (least personal
experience) getting ready for a special occasion (items overlapped to a large extent
with having a shower) and packing the car to go on holiday (items overlapped with
day at the beach). For each of the remaining 12 events, 8 items generated with a
relative high frequency and 8 items generated with a low frequency were required for
stage 2. The following constraints operated in choosing these items:
• only one non-concrete item was included from each event ( e.g., noise, smiles)
• not more than one item from each event that made direct reference to the event
was included (e.g., Christmas Pudding, Shower Curtain)
• Superordinates (e.g., food, clothes) were excluded altogether as they were
considered too general and would cause difficulties in comparison across levels in
the final stage of the study
• In order to ensure that similarity between these items would be mainly thematic
and not perceptual, the inclusion of two items from the same superordinate
category within each event was avoided unless it was considered that they shared
few perceptual properties.
• Where an item had been generated for more than one event, it was included under
the event for which it had been generated with the highest frequency.
Once these constraints had been satisfied, 8 items generated with the highest
frequencies and 8 items generated with the lowest frequencies remaining in each
category were identified. In some event categories (where frequency of generation
dropped off quite quickly or where the above mentioned constraints had demanded
removal of high frequency items )this meant that items generated by as few as 6/28
participants were classified as relatively high frequency. However, the progressive
'culling' nature of this procedure meant that it was desirable to include as many items
as possible in the next stage. This gave rise to the set of items in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4
Items chosen from 12 events for inclusion in Stage 2 (Stage I frequency of
generation shown after each item).
High Frequency Low Frequency High Frequency I Low Frequency
BEACH ATTIC
Sandcastle 24 Lifeguard 2 Ladder 20 Suitcases 3
Sea 23 Candyfloss 2 Boxes 16 Pipes 2
Sand 23 Dinghy 2 Dust 13 Photos 2
Spade 17 Sunhat 2 Cobwebs 9 Antiques 2
Bucket 16 Frisbee 2 Spiders 7 Light switch 2
Swimming costume 14 Seaweed 2 Junk 8 Bags 2
Suntan Lotion 8 Toes 2 Old Books 5 Damp 2
Shells 7 Wet 2 Xmas decorations 5 Aerial 2
PARTY WEDDING
Presents 20 Decorations 4 Bride 21 Invitations 4
Balloons 16 Bouncy Castle 3 Church 21 Hymns 3
Cake 14 Lemonade 2 Vicar 12 Bagpipes 2
Clown 13 Chocolate 2 Flowers 10 Shoes 2
Noise 11 Paper plates 2 Champagne 8 Cameraman 2
Jelly 10 Streamers 2 Ring 7 Bells 2
Hats 9 Toys 2 White dress 7 Jewellery 2
Party bags 8 Pretty dress 2 Confetti 6 Smiles 2
CAMPING CINEMA
Tent 27 Scouts 2 Popcorn 2S Ushers 4
Sleeping Bag 22 Discomfort 2 Dark 21 Coke 3
Rucksack 9 Fishing Rod 2 Ticket 12 Laughter 3
Tentpegs 8 Matches 2 Sweets 10 Toilet 3
Stove 8 Wellington Boots 2 Screen 7 Actresses 2
Compass 7 Lantern 2 Ice cream 6 Torches 2
Sausages 6 Fish 2 Seat S Nachos 2
Grass 6 Caravan 2 Adverts 5 Projector 2
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Table 4.4 contd.
COFFEE PICNIC
Milk 23 Fridge 4 Sandwiches 15 Rug 3
Sugar 23 Electricity 3 Blanket l3 Thermos 3
Kettle 18 Tap 2 Fruit 11 Kitchen Roll 2
Water 17 Sink 2 Crisps 10 Wet wipes 2
Cup 14 Filter 2 Plates 8 Coolbox 2
Coffee 14 Relaxing 2 Napkin 6 Fruit Squash 2
Spoon 13 Plug 2 Wine 6 Pork pies 2
Biscuits 8 Brandy 2 Sun 6 Plastic Cup 2
DENTIST SHOWER
Drill 19 Window 2 Shampoo 24 Flannel 3
Chair 17 Floss 2 Towel 20 Hair 3
Fillings 16 Posters 2 Soap 14 Bathrobe 3
Light 12 Small mirror 2 Shower Curtain l3 Talc 3
Pain 10 Wisdom Tooth 2 Conditioner 10 Moisturiser 2
Mouthwash 9 Gloves 2 Hot 8 Tiles 2
Dentist 9 Toothpaste 2 Steam 6 Bodywash 2
Needle 7 Dread 2 Razor 5 Body 2
SUPERMARKET CHRISTMAS DAY
Trolley 23 Magazines 4 Tree 23 Wrapping paper 4
Checkout 16 Videos 2 Turkey 18 Cold 3
Vegetables 15 Cashiers 2 Cards 10 Mince pies 3
Aisles 9 Cigarettes 2 Crackers 10 Happiness 2
Money 9 Cashpoint 2 Television 10 Carols 2
Basket 8 Tins 2 Queen's speech 9 Films 2
Shopping List 8 Expensive 2 Xmas Pudding 8 Dinner 2
Meat 7 Credit card 2 Snow 7 Candles 2
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Procedure
The items were presented to participants in a 25-page booklet. The booklet consisted
of a cover page of instructions and examples and then 24 pages with one item printed
in bold at the top of each page (see Appendix L for instructions and sample
materials). Hence each participant was required to generate events for 24 items. Eight
different sets of materials were therefore constructed in order to collect data for each
of the 192 items. These were constructed as follows:
One high and one low frequency item from each event were randomly allocated to
each set. There was some concern that the co-presentation of certain items may
inadvertently suggest events to participants and so two other versions of each of the 8
sets of materials were created. This gave rise to 24 different booklets. Five copies of
each one was made and each copy was randomised according to one of five different
item orders. The booklets were then completed by the 120 participants.
The following instructions were shown on the front page of the booklet and were also
read aloud. "When you think of an object or item, there are a variety of
events/situations which may come to mind. For example, when I think of a
newspaper, Imay think of being in a shop buying one, or reading one on the train, or
someone using one to light a fire or putting them out in the rubbish. On each of the
following pages, you will see a word that is the name of an object or item. Some of
the words could be treated as verbs but Iwant you to think of them all as names of
objects or items. For each page, you will be allowed 30 seconds to list as many events
or situations as you can which the object/item brings to your mind. Iwill tell you
when to start each page".
Participants were run individually or in small groups and participated for course credit
or payment.
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Results
Despite the specific nature of the instructions and the presentation of an example,
many participants listed a number of associations other than events or situations.
Nevertheless, situations and events were generated. The responses for each event
were typed into a separate table. The situations that were mentioned by more than one
participant were tabulated by the experimenter. Decisions had to be made regarding a)
whether a response constituted a situation and b) whether two responses represented
the same situation. A second judge looked at 20% (38) of the tables and
independently tabulated the situations listed. The two judges then compared
classifications and frequencies for this subset of the items. Where agreement varied, it
tended to concern the subdivision of more 'inclusive' situations into smaller
categories. After discussion, these smaller situation categories were agreed. On 12 of
the items, agreement was 90%, on a further 20 agreement was over 70%. On only 2
items was the classification performed quite differently by the two judges. Although
the level of agreement was not perfect, it was decided that it was sufficiently high to
serve the purpose of the data collection. An example of the type of responses
generated can be seen in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5
Example of responses from stage 2 (event-to-item generation) for item
"BALLOONS" .
Item Subject
No. No.
I 1
2 9
3 17
4 25
5 33
6 43
7 51
Data
Parties: Age: Different colours: Christmas: Helium: Logos and messages
Fun: Children: Bouncy: Flyaway: Joke shop: Party: Go up in one(big)
Christmas: Parties: Birthdays :Colour: Names on balloons: Ages: price
I remember when I was a kid and I lost a balloon I was holding
Colourful balloons in birthday party: A small child holding a balloon
Party : Children: Food: Sweets: Music: Hats: plates
Party - birthday: Fun fair: Watching hot air balloons taking off
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8 59 Going to birthday parties where I was always made to play horrible games
which involved popping balloons and me ending in tears
9 67 Being at birthday parties: Balloons being let out of a net at a wedding:
Clowns making objects with balloons
10 75 At a child's party: Hot air flying over on a clear day
11 84 Lots of colours: Blue ,red, etc.: Put up at parties: You can use helium: Hot air
balloons : Fly in sky
12 92 Going to children's parties: Being scared of them popping
The BBC hot air balloon on TV
13 100 With helium they fly: Children's b-day parties
14 108 Parties!: Summer- hot air balloon events
15 116 Being at a fairground: Children's parties: Flying in a balloon
The situations of principal interest were those from which the item had been
originally generated. The situations generated for each of the 192 items were
tabulated and these events were identified amongst the responses. The frequency with
which each original event was generated in response to each item can be seen at
Appendix M. On the basis of the frequency with which the event had been listed in
response to the item, each item was classified as High or Low frequency. A table was
created showing for each item, the number of participants who generated this item
from the original event and who generated that original event in response to that item.
Each item was then classified as having a high or low item-to-event frequency and a
high or low event-to-item frequency using the following criteria:
For the item-to-event frequency, any item generated by more than 9 / 28 (32%)
participants was classified as high frequency and an item generated by less than 9 /28
participants was classified as low frequency (scores of9 were omitted). For the
event-to-item frequency, any item which gave rise to the target event with a frequency
of more than 5/15 (33%) was classified as high and an item which invoke the target
event with a frequency of less than 5 /15 was classified as low frequency (scores ofS
were omitted).
Clearly, these criteria are not as stringent as would be desirable. However, imposing a
more stringent criteria, such as requiring an item to have been generated by over 50%
of participants to classify as high frequency would have resulted in an inadequate
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number of stimuli in each category, bearing in mind the requirements for the final
stage of the study. Since almost 150 participants had already been involved in
collecting these data it was decided to run with these constraints. So, to take an
example, 82% of the participants mentioned Beach or going to the Beach in response
to SAND, giving SAND a high event-to-item frequency. Beach was only generated
by 13% of participants in response to SPADE, and so SPADE has a low event-to-item
frequency.
For the planned manipulation of materials in the final stage of the study, at least two
items from each situation were required that fitted each of the following categories:
HH - item was generated from the situation with a high frequency in Stage 1 and in
tum gave rise to that same situation with a high frequency in Stage 2.
HL - item was generated from the situation with a high frequency in Stage 1but only
gave rise to that same situation with a low frequency in stage 2.
LH - item was generated from the situation with a low frequency in Stage I but gave
rise to that same situation with a high frequency in stage 2.
LL - item was generated from the situation with a low frequency in Stage 1 and also
evoked that same situation with a low frequency in stage 2.
At the conclusion of the process described above, it was found that only 7 events had
resulted in a sufficient number of each item type from the two stages of data
collection to allow the planned manipulation in the final stage of the study. Five
events were therefore dropped at this stage leaving the event/items seen in Table 4.6.
It should be noted that there are items listed under particular events in Table 4.6 that
did not appear under that same event in Table 4.4. This is due to the fact that if an
item was generated for more than one event in Stage 1 then it was used only once in
Stage 2. This enabled the collection of frequency data for additional items and
avoided the repetition of anyone item in Stage 2. So, for example, candles was
generated in response to both Christmas day and Children's Party in Stage 1 but was
presented only once in Stage 2. When candles was presented in Stage 2 it prompted
mention of both Christmas day and Birthday party and so could be used for either
event in the final stage of the study. Appendix M shows the additional events (from
the original set) that were generated in response to this type of item.
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Table 4.6
Items which could be potentially included in final stage of study.
HH HL LH LL
BEACH SAND SUN FRISBEE CANDYFLOSS
SANDCASTLE SPADE LIFEGUARD DINGHY
BUCKET SEAWEED SUNTAN
LOTION
SWIMMING SHELLS TOES
COSTUME
SEA SUNHAT WET
COFFEE KETTLE COFFEE BISCUITS BRANDY
CUP MILK FILTER ELECTRICITY
SUGAR FRIDGE
WATER PLUG
RELAXING
SINK
TAP
SHOWER HH HL LH LL
SHOWER SHAMPOO BODYWASH BODY
CURTAIN
TOWEL CONDITIONER BATHROBE HAIR
WATER FLANNEL HOT
SOAP MOISTURISER
RAZOR
STEAM
TALCUM
POWDER
TILES
CHRISTMAS TURKEY TREE CAROLS CANDLES
DAY CARDS TELEVISION MINCE PIES COLD
CRACKERS XMAS DINNER
PUDDINGS
PRESENTS WRAPPING FILMS
PAPER
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SNOW HAPPINESS
DEC ORA TIONS
CHILD PARTY JELLY CLOWN PARTY BAG BOUNCY
CASTLE
BALLOONS CAKE PAPER PLATES CHOCOLATE
PRESENTS DECORATIONS
NOISE HATS
CANDLES LEMONADE
PRETTY
DRESS
STREAMERS
TOYS
SIMARKET HH HL LH LL
CHECKOUT VEGETABLES BASKET VIDEOS
TROLLEY FRUIT CASHIERS CASHPOINT
CREDIT CARD CIGARETTES
SHOPPING MAGAZINES
LIST
MONEY MEAT
TINS
EXPENSIVE
WEDDING BRIDE FLOWERS BELLS BAGPIPES
CHURCH VICAR CONFETTI CAMERAMAN
RING HYMNS
WHITE DRESS JEWELLERY
CHAMPAGNE SHOES
INVITA nONS SMILE
HATS
USHER
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Stage 3: Comparisons of Similarity Ratings
Following collection of the item-to-event and the event-to-item data, the items could
be paired together in order that they might be judged for similarity.
Of the 70 pairs used for the final stage of the study (see Appendix N for full details
of pairs), only 3 pairs clearly shared perceptual properties of the type that would be
expected to underpin 'traditional' similarity, i.e., similarity based on shared features
(fruit-vegetables, party bags-paper plates, shampoo -conditioner). Itwas therefore
assumed that any similarity rated by participants for most of the pairs would be based
on something else i.e., thematic similarity.
Since context had been shown to heighten similarity ratings (see Chapter 3) amongst
items that shared few standard features, it was decided to present the pairs in this
study both in the context of the situation to which they had been shown to be
associated and also without that context. It was reasoned that any systematic effect of
strength of association between the item and the situation on ratings should be most
evident if participants were to be encouraged to focus on the situational organisation
of their item knowledge by highlighting the situation in question. However, previous
studies (e.g. Wisniewski and Bassok, 1999) did not provide any context for the
comparisons and still thematic associations were seen to influence ratings of
similarity. For this reason both a 'context' and a 'no context' condition were included
in this study. It was also felt that a blocked presentation of the pairs relating to the
same situation would further encourage participants to think about these items
specifically as they related to the situation of origin whereas a randomised
presentation of non - perceptually similar items would possibly weaken the effect,
particularly if no context was provided either. Both conditions of presentation,
blocked and random, were therefore prepared. It was hypothesised that items pairs
with comparatively high item-to-event and event-to-item indices would result in
higher similarity ratings than the pairs with low item-to-event and event-to-item
indices.
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Method
Participants
A further 264 participants took part in the experimental stage of the study. All
participants, 53 males and 211 females were undergraduates on psychology and
psychology related courses. The age range of the participants was 18 to 59 years and
the mean age was 22 years. The mean number of years lived in this country was 20
years. 84% (n=222) of the participants had lived in this country for all of their lives.
Only 6% of participants had lived in this country for less than 10 years.
Design
A five factor mixed design was utilised. The first between-subjects factor was order.
There were two different orders of items as they were presented on each page. The
second between-subjects factor was set. Three different sets of materials were
prepared (see Materials and Appendix M). The third between-subjects factor was
presentation. Item pairs were presented as either blocked (relating to the event with
which they were associated) or random. The final between-subjects factor was
context: participants saw the item pairs either in the presence of the event name (with
context) or alone (no context).
The within participants factor was the paircode with ten possible pairtypes. The
dependent measure was the ratings of similarity given on a scale of 1 - 9 where 1
indicated 'not similar at all' and 9 indicated 'very similar'.
Materials
The items identified through stages one and two of this study were combined into
item pairs for the purpose of collecting similarity ratings between the two items.
There were four possible item types ( HH, LL,HL, and LH) and, without including all
possible orders, ten combinations or "pairtypes" (see Table 4.7).
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Table 4.7.
Pair combinations used in final study
HH HH
HL HL
LH LH
LL LL
HH HL
HL LH
LH LL
LL HH
HH LH
HL LL
The first letter of the coding for each word refers to the frequency with which the item
was generated from the event (item-to-event index of association henceforth referred
to as ie) - the second refers to the frequency with which the event was generated from
the item (event-to-item index of association henceforth referred to as ei).
An attempt was made to order the items within the pairs so that each of the four types
appeared first or second fairly evenly. Direction of comparison has been shown to
affect the features taken into consideration when judging similarity of items
(Goldstone, Gentner and Markman, 1993). It is possible that this is also the case for
thematically related items (situations associated with the first item in the pair may be
'searched' for the second item). However, in the absence of empirical evidence to this
effect, it was considered that a full combination of item types would constitute an
unwieldy number of stimuli and the stimuli set was therefore limited to the ten
combinations shown above. It was decided that participants could reasonably be
asked to provide ratings for 35 pairs of items (five pairs from each event) without
losing interest. In order to obtain ratings for all pairtypes and all events without
participants seeing the same item repeated within the stimuli, it was necessary to
create 3 different sets (A, B, C) of materials. Certain pairs were necessarily repeated
across the sets but no item appeared more than once within the same set. A blocked
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and randomised version of each set, with and without context was produced, The
stimuli were presented in an eight-page A4 booklet. The front page gave instructions
and an example. On each of the remaining pages, five pairs of items were printed.
Above each item pair appeared the question" How similar are the following items to
each other?" Below each pair was a scale of 1 - 9 where the number 1 was labelled
not similar at all and 9 was labelled very similar. In the blocked version, the five item
pairs on each page were all related to one of the seven events. In the randomised
version, the item pairs were presented randomly through the booklet. In the blocked
'with context' condition, the name of the event appeared in bold type at the top of the
page (e.g. Having a Shower) and preceding each pair was the phrase" Think about:
having a shower". In the blocked 'no context' condition the layout of the similarity
question, the item pairs and the scale was preserved but there was no event mentioned
anywhere on the page. In the 'randomised with context' condition, the phrase "Think
about: followed by the relevant event" was included above each pair but this was
removed for the 'randomised no context' condition. Finally a second order for each
version was prepared. This was achieved by altering the order of the item pairs on
each page for the blocked condition from 12345 in the first version to 34512 in the
second version. For the randomised condition, a second randomised order was used.
When the booklets were compiled, the order of the pages was reversed for half the
materials. Instructions and sample pages for each of these conditions can be seen at
Appendix O.
Procedure
The data collection was run in groups of various sizes (maximum 60 participants at
any one time). Participants were asked to read the instructions on the first page and
were given the opportunity to ask questions before starting the task. The standard
demographic details were collected in addition to data concerning how long the
participant had lived in this country. The reason for this was the culture specific
nature of some of the events/situations. There was no time constraint placed upon
the task.
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Results
Analysis by Pairtype
The first analysis to be conducted was based on the original ten pairtypes. The mean
ratings for each of the ten pairtypes were calculated (see Table 4.8).
Table 4.8
Mean similarity ratings and standard deviations for each pairtype. Means are
displayed in ascending order.
LL- HL- LH- HL- LL- HH- LH- HH- HL- HH-
LL LL LL LH HH LH LH HL HL HH
Mean 2.51 3.32 3.62 3.99 4.33 4.48 4.68 4.85 5.23 5.29
s.d. (1.5) (1.91) (1.71) (2.08) (2.04) (2.10) (2.08) (2.41 ) (2.01) (2.26)
The data were initially entered into a five factor (2*2*2*3*5) mixed ANOVA: order
(2 orders, between group) by presentation (blocked or random, between group) by
context (with or without, between group) by 3 set types (A, B, C, between group) by
paircode (10 codes, repeated measures). All analyses were conducted at 95%
confidence level. Wilks Lambda F values are reported throughout due to a violation
of sphericity shown by a significant Mauchly's sphericity test, p< 0.01. There were
Figure 4.1 Mean similarity ratings as a function of pairtype for both conditions of
context.
no main effects of order, set or presentation and so the data were collapsed across
these factors and subjected to a 2*10 mixed ANOVA. This showed a main effect of
pairtype F(9,254) = 112.62, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.80 and of context, F(1, 262) =
42.81, p< 0.001, eta squared = 0.87) and a small interaction effect between pairtype
and context F(9,254) = 8.726, p< 0.0005, eta squared = 0.24 (see figure 4.1). There
was a significant linear polynomial contrast F(I,262)= 659.85 p<O.OOI,eta squared =
0.72 and contrasts were significant for all pairwise comparisons except LL-HH vs.
HH-LH and HL-HL vs. HH-RH .
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Figure 4. J Mean similarity ratings as a function of pairtype for both conditions of
context
Table 4.9
Marginal mean similarity ratings presented by position of item in pair and index type.
I" in pair 2nd in pair
Item-to-event Event -to-item Item- to-event Event-to-item
L H L H L H L H
3.78 4.52 3.18 4.51 3.76 4.92 4.09 4.59
In first pair, ratings are lowest when either ie or ei is low. Ratings are increased when
ie or ei is high but it seems irrelevant which one is high. In second pair, the same
story applies but ie seems to be most effective at raising ratings. The same means are
re-arranged in ascending order in table 4.10.
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Table 4.10
Marginal mean similarity ratings presented in ascending order
Position 1st 2nd 1st 2nd Ist 1st 2nd 2nd
in pair
index El IE IE El El IE El IE
L L L L H H H H
3.18 3.76 3.78 4.09 4.51 4.52 4.59 4.92
It appears, from the sub-set of combinations used in this study, that the position of the
item in the pair does not affect the strength of the thematic similarity. Both items
seem to be considered equally. It also seems to be the case that it does not matter
whether it is the event-to-item or the item-to-event index that is high. It seems clear
that if one of the indices is high in one of the pairs, the ratings will be raised
compared to when that index is low.
Analysis based on Item-to-Event indices of Association Only
There are clearly alternative ways of grouping the pairtypes for analysis. It is possible
that the component indices (item-to-event and event-to-item) may have exerted a
differential effect upon the ratings. For this reason, two further sets of analyses were
conducted based on these components. Firstly, the pairs were recoded according to
whether the item-to- event indices for the pair were high. This gave rise to the
following codings:
0= neither of the items in the pair were generated from the event with a high
frequency
1= one of the items in the pair was generated from the event with a high frequency
2= both of the items in the pair were generated from the event with a high frequency
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Table 4.11
Coding system used for distinguishing between item-to-event and event-to-item
association
Item-to- Event-
event to-item
LL-LL 0 0
LH-LL 0 1
HL-LL 1 0
LH-LH 0 2
HL-LH 1 1
LL-HH 1 1
HL-HL 2 0
HH-LH 1 2
HH-HL 2 1
HH-HH 2 2
Means ratings were calculated based on this new coding (see Table 4.12).
Table 4.12
Mean similarity ratings for each paircode under conditions of with and without
context (sds in brackets) collapsed across mode of presentation.
Paircode
0 1 2
With context 4.15 (1.59) 4.78 (1.90) 5.28 (2.00)
Without context 2.50 (0.99) 3.50 (1.55) 4.21 (1.84)
Overall 3.33 (1.56) 4.14 (1.84) 4.75 (1.99)
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Table 4.13
Mean similarity ratings for each paircode under conditions of with and without
context, blocked and random presentation (sds in brackets)
Paircode
0 1 2
With Context
Blocked 4.00 (1.71) 4.73 (2.08) 5.18 (2.14)
Random 4.30 (1.46) 4.83 (1.71) 5.39 (1.86)
Without Context
Blocked 2.52 (1.12) 3.34 (1.69) 3.97 (1.92)
Random 2.49 (0.86) 3.67 (1.39) 4.45 (1.74)
The overall pattern of results with and without context was very similar to the pattern
seen in the previous analysis. As in the previous analysis, effects of order and set were
initially tested for by including them both as between factors in the initial ANOVA .
Context and presentation were also between factors and the new coding was a
repeated measures factor with three levels (0,1,2).
The ratings with context were higher than without context, F(1,240) = 47.518, p<
0.01, eta squared = 0.165 and the ratings differed with the paircode, F(2,239)
=230.89, p< 0.01, eta squared = 0.659. Both with and without context, the ratings for
the pairs with one item having a high item-to-event association were higher than for
pairs where neither item had a high item-to-event association. Pairs where both
members have a high item-to-event association were rated highest of all. There was a
significant linear trend for paircode, F(I,262) = 435.488, p< 0.01 eta squared = 0.624.
All pairwise comparisons were significant at p< 0.001.
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Figure 4.2 The effect of context and pair type on mean similarity ratings.
There were no other significant main effects. Paircode featured in a small interaction
effect with context and presentation, F ( 2,239) = 3.466 p=0.033 eta squared = 0.028.
Set featured in a small interaction effect with paircode , F (4,478) = 13.21, p <0.001
eta squared =0.10. This latter effect appears to be the result of a slightly inflated
pattern of increase in the ratings with code in set B but since the pattern of results is
similar to elsewhere in the analysis, subsequent analysis collapsed the data across set
and order.
The 2* 5 mixed ANOVA conducted on the data after removing order, set and
presentation as factors confirmed the main effect of paircode, F(2,261) = 293.583 ,
p<.0005, eta squared = 0.625. Overall the pairs were rated significantly higher with
context (M = 4.74 ) compared to without context (M = 3.4) F(1,262) = 46.632, p<
0.01 eta squared = 0.151. There was one other significant interaction, between
paircode and context, F(2,261) = 8.926, p< 0.01, eta squared = 0.064.
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One way repeated measures ANOVAs showed that the effect of paircode was
present at both levels of context. With context F(2,130) = 103.465, p< 0.01 eta
squared = 0.614, Without context F(2,130) = 118.706, p< 0.01 eta squared = 0.646.
Analysis Based on Event-to-Item Indices of Association Only
Finally, the pairs were coded once again, this time according to whether the event-to-
item indices for the pair were high. This gave the following possible codings:
o = neither of the items in the pair generated the target event with a high frequency
1 = one of the items in the pair generated the event with a high frequency
2= both of the items in the pair generated the event with a high frequency
See column 2 of Table 4.11 for the resulting pair groupings. Means ratings were re-
calculated based on this new coding (see Table 4.14).
Table 4.14
Mean similarity ratings for each paircode under conditions of with and without
context (sds in brackets) collapsed across mode of presentation.
Paircode
0 1 2
With context 4.09 (1.70) 4.79 (1.85) 5.76 (2.03)
Without context 2.9 (1.19) 3.41 (1.44) 4.33 (1.78)
Overall 3.50 (1.58) 4.10 (1.79) 5.05 (2.04)
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Table 4.15
Mean similarity ratings for each paircode under conditions of with and without
context, blocked and random presentation (sds in brackets)
Paircode
0 1 2
With Context
Blocked 4.00 (1.85) 4.74 (2.06) 5.57 (2.17)
Random 4.10 (1.55) 4.83 (1.62) 5.96 (l.87)
Without Context
Blocked 2.79 (1.31) 3.33 (1.57) 4.15 (l.98)
Random 3.01 (1.05) 3.49 (1.31) 4.51 (1.56)
The pattern of ratings seen in Table 4.18 is, unsurprisingly, similar to that seen in the
previous two analyses. The provision of context inflated the similarity ratings
compared to no context, F(l,240) = 46.061, p< 0.01, eta squared = 0.161, whilst
presentation, blocked or random, exerted no effect overall. As before, all five factors
were included in an initial ANOVA. There was a main effect of paircode, F(2,239) =
300.711, p< 0.01, eta squared = 0.716. If both items in the pair are items that are
strongly associated with a common situation then the ratings are highest. Ifone item
is strongly associated with the situation then the items are seen as less similar than if
it is true of both items but are still perceived as more similar than if neither item is
.closely associated to the event. There was a significant linear trend of paircode,
F(I,262) = 610.221, p< 0.01, eta squared = 0.7 and all pairwise comparisons were
significant.
Set interacted significantly with paircode, F (4,480) = 6.054, p< 0.01, eta squared =
0.048. The interaction appeared to stem from the increased ratings for paircode 0 in
set C. The interactions involving set led to an examination of the distribution of the
data by set. Seven outliers were identified, cases 1,95,102,103,117,154 and 185.
These were removed and the previous analyses were re-run but the principal findings
remained unaltered. Since the interaction was associated with a very small effect size
(0.062), it was decided to collapse the data across set.
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The 2*3 mixed ANOVA conducted on the data collapsed across set, order and
presentation confirmed a small main effect of context, F(1,262) = 45.304, p< 0.01,
eta squared = 0.147 and a large effect of paircode, F(2,26l) = 303.962, p< 0.01, eta
squared = 0.7. This time there was no interaction between context and paircode.
Regression Analysis
It was decided that since the HighILow frequency classification could be subject to
inconsistencies and relatively small levels of differentiation, a more useful analysis
would be one that made use of frequency as a continuous variable. A stepwise
multiple regression was therefore performed with the similarity ratings as the
dependent measure and the frequencies associated with the four indices (first item in
pair ie, first item in pair ei, second item in pair ie and second item in pair ei) as
predictors. The best predictor of variance in the ratings was the ie index of the second
item, explaining 12.5% of the variance, F (1,68) = 10.867, p = 0.002. The ie index of
the first item was the next best predictor, explaining a further 8% of the variance
F(2,67) = 9.45, p< 0.001 and the ei of the first item explained a further 5% of the
variance F(3,66) = 8.179, p< 0.001. The total variance explained by the model was
therefore 23.8%. The ei of the second item did not significantly add to the variance
explained.
It was found that all four indices correlated positively and significantly with the
ratings (all correlations were performed 2 -tailed):
1st item ie : r (70) = 0.357, p = 0.002
l" item ei : r (70) = 0.321, P = 0.007
2nd item ie: r (70) = 0.371, p = 0.002
2nd item ei: r (70) = 0.286, p = 0.016
The indices did not correlate significantly with each other with the exception of the
2nd item ie and ei indices r (70) = 0.287, P = 0.016. This suggests that by chance, the
higher ie frequencies for the second item in the pairs tended to be linked with the
higher ei ratings. An overall rating for the pair of items (calculated by averaging the
four indices' frequencies) also correlated positively and significantly with the
similarity ratings r (70) = 0.527, p< 0.001.
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The indices of strength of association between the item and the event account for a
significant amount of variance in the similarity ratings. This analysis gives a clearer
picture of the relative contributions of the different indices and it seems that it is the
ie indeces (indicating the likelihood of thinking of that item given a particular event)
that have the greater influence on similarity ratings than the ei indeces though the
chance correlation between the two indeces for the second item pair may have
obscured any potential contribution from the ei index for the second item in the pair.
There is still over 75 % of variance to be accounted for - other relationships discussed
in the introduction to this chapter like spatial contiguity and temporal contiguity may
well account for some of this unexplained variance.
Discussion
The empirical work reported in this chapter comprised three stages. The data from the
first two stages were used to formulate the materials for the final stage. The first data
collection consisted of requiring participants to list items that they associated with
each of 15 events/situations. The relative frequency with which these items were
generated was used to calculate an index (high or low) which was attached to that
item as the item-to-event (ie) index. A subset of the items generated (192) were then
presented to a different set of participants who were asked to list the events/situations
that they associated with that item. The relative frequency with which the original
event was listed for each item was then calculated and used to produce an index (high
or low) of event-to-item (ei) frequency. Each item consequently had two indices. In
the final data collection, these items were combined in pairs and presented to a final
set of participants who gave scaled similarity judgements for the pairs. The pairs were
presented with or without the event name (context) and blocked by event or
randomised. It was predicted that pairs of items that were highly associated with the
event would be rated as more similar than pairs of items that were weakly associated
with the event and that the presence of context would inflate the ratings.
The following principal findings emerged from the analysis of the ratings in the final
stage of the study:
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• The strength of association between items and events was a major source of
similarity when participants are asked to rate pairs of items under experimental
conditions.
• A high strength of association between the item and the event seemed to have the
more effect upon ratings of similarity as a high strength of association between the
event and the item
• There was a strong effect of context on ratings of thematically related items - if
even one index on one item was high, the mean ratings exceeded those given for
any pairs without context. However, even without context, the ratings
demonstrated sensitivity to the item/event association indices.
As mentioned in the introduction, previous studies that have documented the
influence of thematic similarity have tended to use pairs of items that not only can be
linked together through a common scenario or situation but also are linked directly to
each other by spatial contiguity or functional relatedness. It is not surprising then that
the co-presentation of those items give rise to a common situation in the mind of the
participant. In the work reported here, most of the pairs of items were linked only by
virtue of featuring in the "script' of the same situation. The first question then was
whether this link would be sufficient reason for participants to find these items
similar. Recall that the items generally shared few, if any, perceptual features.
There was indeed a great deal of variability in the ratings, suggesting that participants
are not all equally inclined to rate items as similar on this basis. However, the mean
ratings indicate that this ~ of similarity is viewed as a legitimate basis for finding
items similar in a standard similarity rating task. It could be argued that if
participants are able to complete the phrase, 'they are similar because they
both ' , then the items are similar and in the case of these items, if they both
feature in the same event/situation, then that is sufficient reason to rate them as being
fairly similar to each other. Moreover, the results of the similarity ratings suggest that
this type of similarity is sensitive, to a certain extent, to the strength of the association
between each individual item and the event under consideration. The highest mean
ratings were allocated to those items that were associated highly with the event on all
indices whilst the lowest mean ratings were accorded to those items that scored low
on all indices. Pairs coded in such a way as to represent some interim level of
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association with the event received interim ratings which gave rise to a significant
linear trend.
It could be argued that the ratings of similarity are arising simply from the strength of
word association between the two words presented rather than through the strength of
their shared association to an event. Measures of word association are usually
obtained from published norms and these norms, in tum, are usually an indication of
the percentage of respondents who give a particular word as their first response in free
association to a target word. It has been noted that these associations can themselves
be categorised as particular types of relationships (see Hutchison, 2003) and so it is
difficult to separate out the effect of these different types of association. No attempt
was made in this study to provide this type of control and clearly a further study
would be required to do so before associative links other than situational could be
ruled out as an explanation for these results. However, a post-hoc search of the
Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber (1999) word association norms of the first item in
each pair used in the study showed only 2 of the second words in the pair as an
associate at all ( shampoo-conditioner, 00403 and vegetables-fruit, 0.208). A search of
the second word in each pair as the target showed only 2 of the first words as an
associate ( conditioner-shampoo 0.455 and fruit-vegetables 0.082). This would
suggest that there were few direct associations between the word pairs in this study. A
number of the words used in this study did not appear as target words in these norms
at all (n=27). Once it could be shown that the items used in this study are only
weakly associated according to such norms, they could be compared against a set of
wordpairs that are not situationally linked but are known to be associated by the
standard of the association norms. If similarity ratings were to be as high for these
items (which must not share perceptual or functional features either) as for the
situationally linked items, then one could infer that thematic similarity is simply the
reflection of any association between the words and is not actually thematic at all.
As predicted, ratings for pairs of items shown in the presence of the event were
significantly higher than the ratings for pairs shown without the event name.
Interestingly, the pattern described above was repeated both with and without context.
This suggests that when participants are asked to judge the similarity of these
apparently dissimilar items without any cue to the appropriate context, the context
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they instantiate is an event or situation brought to mind by one or both of the items
and that their subsequent assessment of similarity reflects the level of association
between the event and the item. Perhaps even more remarkably, this seems also to be
true even when the items are presented in a randomised fashion. It appears then that
the inclination to use a common situation or event as the basis of the judgement is
strong and pervasive but it is also graded according to, at least in part, the strength of
association between that situation and the items being assessed. Importantly, this
suggests that the "link' between the items is not necessarily directly between them but
is provoked by the link between each item and the event. This is analogous to the
claim that taxonomically related items are related through their shared membership of
a superordinate category.
The regression analysis conducted on the data suggested that the item-to-event indices
were better predictors of variance in the ratings than the event-to-item indices. It
might have been reasoned that, particularly in the absence of context, the extent to
which the item brings to mind the event (event-to-item association) would exert a
greater influence than the association in the other direction. This does not seem to
have been the case. However, there are several factors that should be kept in mind
when interpreting the data with regard to the different indices. Firstly, not all
combinations ofpairtypes were included in this study. The full range of possible
combinations would be required to make more systematic comparisons. This could be
achieved by using a smaller number of event categories or a larger participant group.
One has to be mindful when conducting this type of study of the maximum number of
judgements that can be made with the requisite degree of attention. Secondly, the
frequencies on which the indices were based arose from a comparatively small
number of participants (n= 28 for the item-to-event data and n = 15 for the event-to-
item data). The frequencies often dropped off quite steeply and so the distinction
between low and high frequency items was, in some cases, quite small. This may
explain why the clearest difference in ratings based on this classification occurred
when all indices were either high or low. A future study would focus on the final
seven events used here and collect frequency data (in both directions) from a larger
participant group. Having drawn attention to the limitations of this study, it could
also be argued that the compelling and persistent pattern in the ratings across all
conditions speaks to the robust nature of the effect.
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As mentioned earlier, there are many other ways in which items may be linked
together and only one factor has been considered here. There is clearly more
explanation required for these ratings and further types of relationships between the
item pairs to be investigated but the factor chosen does seem have been sufficient in
explaining some variance in the rated similarity between these perceptually different
items and perhaps more importantly, it illustrates that a direct link between the items
(functional, causal, spatial) is not necessary for thematic similarity to be perceived. In
the concluding chapter it will be argued that this constitutes further evidence that the
organisation of object knowledge based around every day events and situations exerts
a stronger influence on adult cognition than previously thought.
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CHAPTER5
General Discussion and Conclusions
Overview
The empirical evidence generated by this research programme suggests that a
structured knowledge of the situations and events in which items commonly feature is
sufficiently well-entrenched and important as to playa substantial role in the
organisation of conceptual knowledge
In this chapter, thefindings from the category generation task will first be
summarised and will be discussed with reference to the two recent theories of
conceptual knowledge, Barsalou (1999, 2002) and Funnell (2001), described in
Chapter 1. Thefindings of the similarity studies will then be summarised and also
discussed in the light of the same two models. Implications of the research for
cognitive psychology more generally are then considered, leading on to a discussion
of avenues for future investigation. Thefinal summary highlights the main
contribution of the research.
Generating Category Members in a Free Emission Task
In Chapter 2, two studies were reported in which participants were required to list
members of common and ad hoc categories within a limited period of time. It was
found that participants generated, on average, more items for the taxonomic than for
the ad hoc categories. However, when the mean number of items for each category
was plotted, there was no obvious discontinuity between the two category types, with
things that you keep in your pocket resulting in the same level of output as vehicle.
Similarly, when item dominance was examined for each category, there was no clear
distinction between taxonomic and ad hoc categories. The categories with the highest
degree of consensus on the top ten items generated were fruit, vehicle, things that you
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keep in your pockets and things that dogs chase. The item dominance distribution for
these four categories did not differ significantly. This suggests that that in these
respects, at least, common and ad hoc categories showed some unexpected overlap.
Most importantly for the perspective taken in this thesis, the protocols provided by
participants explaining the strategies that they had used to complete the task revealed
an unexpectedly high reliance on personal, generic experiences of situations in which
the category members had been encountered. This was equally the case for common
categories such as fruit and birds as for ad hoc categories such as things people keep
in their pockets. It appeared that in order to retrieve category members from both
types of category, participants cued themselves by instantiating environments in
which they frequently come across the category, e.g.fruit; buying it, preparing it,
keeping it in a bowl etc. What is the nature of these memories? They are not episodic
in the sense that episodic memories are usually understood to refer to one specific
experience. Rather they seem to encapsulate a number of experiences of the same
type of episode (shopping in a supermarket, going to weddings etc.). Other
researchers have noted these types of memory and have referred to them using varied
terminology. Neisser (1986) has used the term "extendure" to refer to repetition of
actions and to events that extend over a period (e.g. all the plane trips I have been on).
Williams and Dritschel (1992) who noted the prevalence of this type of memory in
studies designed to elicit specific autobiographical memories, refer to them as
'general memories'. Pillemer et al. (1986) described a general memory as one that
"does not pin down a specific event, the narrative often goes beyond any single
happening and presents a theme for numerous events" (p.l12). These types of
memory are most often mentioned in the literature appertaining to autobiographical
memory where they are viewed as errors when the participant has been asked to
produce a specific autobiographical memory. Williams and Dritschel further
distinguish between general memories that refer to a category of events comprising of
a number of specific episodes, e.g., drinking in pubs, and those general memories
which cover an extended period of time (lasting more than one day). The first of these
they call 'categoric' memories. It would seem that the participants in the free
emission task were drawing on 'categoric' memories (as opposed to category
knowledge) to aid their retrieval of semantic information.
223
Predictions from Models (Category Member Generation)
The Funnell (2001) model, described in Chapter 1, would have predicted a difference
in strategy for the different category types. The generation of taxonomic category
members might have been expected through the 'concepts' level of abstraction, given
that this equates to most notions of semantic memory. On the other hand, since ad
hoc categories are often more closely linked to events, then their members could be
predicted to be generated via general event knowledge. If one assumes that
participants are aware of this process then one might have expected to see more
mention of events and situations in the reported strategies for these categories than for
taxonomic. Looking at the results of the emission study in the light of the Funnell
model, it would seem that participants searched their general event knowledge rather
than their 'concepts' to produce category members for both types of category. Using
the Funnell model, it could be argued that the level of abstraction that is utilised in
achieving a cognitive task would be the one most suited to meeting the aim of that
task. It is easy to see how generating members of an ad hoc category of things people
take to a wedding could be achieved by consulting one's knowledge of this type of
event in non-specific terms. However, it is harder to see why the level of general
event knowledge was also the one used most frequently to generate members of
taxonomic categories. A possible explanation for this may arise from the Gentner and
Brem (1999) study mentioned in the discussion of Chapter 3. This showed that when
participants were put under pressure of time to decide which of two items (e.g.,
bullseye or javelin) was most similar to a target item (e.g., dart), their performance
times for picking the 'correct' match (the taxonomically related item) was slower in
the presence of a themed alternative than in the presence of an unrelated foil. Gentner
and Brem claim that "thematic influences rise with increased cognitive load" (p.179).
This could imply that the most effortful access to object knowledge is at the
'decontextualised' level and accessing object knowledge via the general event level is
relatively effortless. Perhaps this is why participants drew from the same event level
knowledge base to produce members of taxonomic categories. In couching her
model in terms of 'levels', Funnell has implied a hierarchical relationship between the
different degrees of abstraction with 'concepts' being the highest level. This is
presumably because this level would be the last to develop (information about
regularities of objects would be drawn from repeated episodes of interaction with
those objects, where the repeated episodes would themselves consist of a number of
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single episodes). This would also fit with the observation in dementia patients that the
'top' level is the first to be lost. However, this relationship requires testing against
alternatives. Since non-clinical samples appear to draw on general event knowledge
to perform tasks such as category generation for all types of category, then it would
seem that the 'concepts' level is not necessarily privileged to deal with semantic
tasks. Although the post hoc predictions have not been entirely supported, it could be
considered that the results offer support for the need to recognise close links between
general event knowledge and knowledge of objects.
The Barsalou position (1999) would predict that when listing category members,
concepts should be simulated in settings and situations and one might therefore expect
to see mention of these settings in the strategies reported by the participants.
Barsalou's claims about situated concepts do not seem to distinguish between
taxonomic and ad hoc representations and so the same strategy would be expected for
both types of category. This was indeed what was found and Barsalou has interpreted
the published version of results reported in Chapter 2 (Vallee-Tourangeau, Anthony
& Austin, 1998) as demonstrating, amongst other studies, that categories are situated
in background settings (Barsalou, 2003). He points out that work on visual object
processing also demonstrates the strong links between objects and their settings. If
Barsalou is on the right track then presumably the category name, e.g.,fruit was
simulated in a variety of settings, each of which was then searched for specific
category members. This seems consistent with the strategies reported by participants
- buying it, making fruit salad etc. Under Barsalou's theory, the simulations would
also include information about the interactions of agents with the items (i.e., motor
routines), emotional responses as well as visual, auditory and tactile information. This
might explain why some participants employed such strategies as "fruit I like", "fruit
my children like" and why so many of the strategies involved actions.
Similarity Judgements
The effect of context
In Chapter 3, the effects of type of category, context and typicality on ratings of
similarity for pairs of everyday items were reported. Although the main purpose of
this study was to collect protocols of the judgements in order to look for the influence
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of situational knowledge on a 'semantic task', the quantitative data showing the
constraints upon the effect of context on similarity judgements was also of interest. It
was found that although the provision of context (in the form of the category name)
enhanced the similarity ratings for pairs of items from ad hoc categories pairs (as was
the case in Barsalou, 1982), this effect applied only to the most typical items and only
when participants were obliged to make relatively speeded judgements (the no self-
report condition). These results will be re-visited in the light of both the Funnell and
the Barsalou theories before considering thematic similarity more generally.
Barsalou (1982) interpreted the effect of context on the perceived similarity of ad hoc
category members as a demonstration of context-dependent property activation.
Jewellery and pets may not seem very similar in the absence of any context but the
common property of being 'things people hold as precious' will render them more
similar if thought of in the context of things people save from their house in afire.
It could be also argued that when the context, i.e., the ad hoc category title, is
provided, it is activating knowledge at the general event level in Funnell's model.
Consider again the 'contexts' provided in Chapter 3:
things you find in an attic, things you find on a shelf, things people take to a
wedding, things that may be conveniently kept in pockets, things dogs chase
and things sold on the black market in Russia.
All of these constitute situations or settings in which items mayor may not appear. It
is certainly the case that certain situations will highlight different properties of an item
(arranging flowers in a vase is unlikely to render 'roots' salient but planting flowers in
a garden would be more likely to do so) but since the properties shared by many ad
hoc category members tend to be few and very broad (things dogs chase may share
the property of 'can move or be made to move'), one questions whether the
highlighting of these characteristics would be sufficient to raise ratings of similarity
by the observed amount. Ifone accepts that many ad hoc and goal derived categories
are, or involve, situations then it may be that the realisation that one has, or can, or
will come across both items in the situation under consideration that is in itself the
basis for the feeling of similarity. Under this view, the sense of similarity arises from
association at the general event level of memory rather than at the most abstract
(concept level) of the model and is prompted by the provision of the name of the
event itself (the category label).
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The similarity ratings for the taxonomic items seemed to be unaffected by the
provision of a category label. Why would this label not act in the same way as the ad
hoc category name? The answer may lie in nature of the category labels themselves.
Although both are presented in this study (and that of Barsalou) as providing 'context'
- they can not be seen as equivalent if context in this instance is understood to be
information about situations. The category names for taxonomic categories, unlike ad
hoc category names, do not represent situations. Exemplars of fruit, vehicle, furniture
and bird will indeed feature in general event knowledge, as shown in the first two
studies, but the superordinate label itself WOUld,at best, only be tied to extremely
broad events (eating, travelling etc.). Any additional similarity to be felt due to their
presence at the general event level of knowledge is therefore unlikely. Can this
interpretation explain the rather surprising finding that in the self-report condition, the
taxonomic pairs were rated as more similar in the absence of the category name?
Possibly. It has just been proposed that the presence of the category superordinate
(e.g., fruit) does not activate general event knowledge at a sufficiently specific level
as to enhance similarity. Indeed, its diffuse association with a large range of events
could in itself inhibit the activation of any more specific event knowledge. When
participants perform the rating task quickly and unreflectively, the items are judged
purely on the basis of their shared properties. However, when the participants have
the chance to consider their judgement more carefully, it is possible that the co-
presentation of individual fruits, for example, apples and bananas, may well activate a
more specific situational script that then enhances the rating. This may be suppressed
in the presence of the superordinate label. These explanations are seductive but it
should be noted that no specific evidence for them was found in the protocols. It is of
course possible that such considerations did take place but were not reported. Further
protocol collection under different types of instruction may serve to elicit the
evidence required to support these speculations.
Situated Conceptualisations
How do the effects of context and typicality, discussed in Chapter 3, fit into
Barsalou's theory of concepts as simulators of situated conceptualisations? Under
Barsalou's theory, the presentation ofa concept name will evoke a situated
conceptualisation. The comparison of two concept names would presumably involve a
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comparison of these conceptualisations. This could involve comparing the intrinsic
features/properties of the items, comparing motor routines that drive use of the items
and comparing the most common settings in which they have been experienced.
Barsalou claims that the particular situated conceptualisation that is activated depends
upon context. That would suggest that when the category label for ad hoc category
pairs is provided, such as things you keep on a shelf alongside photo and clock, then
the conceptualisation of those items in that particular setting is brought to mind and
one does not therefore think of the setting of photos in an album or a clock beside
your bed. Given that the same setting can reasonably surround each item, this forms
the basis for similarity. However, why should the co-presentation of these items not
suggest the same, shared, setting when not explicitly provided? The protocols
suggested that for many participants this did happen and that may explain the loss of
the effect in the self -report condition. Perhaps it can be inferred from the differing
results in the no self-report condition that self-initiation of situational information
takes some time and that under relatively speeded conditions, the comparison tends to
be limited to the items themselves unless the situational information is already
provided.
With regard to the ratings for the common category members, a similar story to the
one drawn from Funnell's levels of meaning model could be told from the Barsalou
perspective. The superordinate category may be associated with too many diverse
settings for anyone situated conceptualisation to apply and so comparison may be
limited to intrinsic features of the objects. However, under slower, more reflective
conditions, the presentation of the exemplars without the superordinate have the
potential for allowing a comparison of situational information as well as of features.
Effect of Protocol (Time and Effort)
The protocols were collected to permit an investigation of whether or not participants
considered situations and settings wbenjudging similarity, However, it transpired that
this condition also affected ratings, and in fact seemed to be responsible for
eliminating the previously documented effect of context on ad hoc item pairs. It is not
known to what extent participants felt that they were justifying their ratings but the
lack of difference in ratings between the concurrent and retrospective protocol
conditions suggests that the protocol effect arose from the increased time and depth of
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reflection that giving a protocol entails rather than from an element of post-hoc
justification. Recall that the concurrent protocol was made prior to the rating.
Interestingly, Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) also included an 'explanation' condition
in which participants were instructed to write an explanation for their similarity
ratings. In contrast to this study, they found that the pattern and magnitude of the
ratings did not vary as a result of giving the protocol. This suggests that their
participants' considerations did not differ with or without explanation. How is this
finding compatible with the effect of protocol found here? Itmay be that the use of
the word 'explanation' in the Wisniewski and Bassok instructions resulted in a
justification of a fairly quick judgement rather than a consideration of new
perspectives as has been argued to be the case here. The difference is also likely to be
due to the nature of the stimuli. The Wisniewski and Bassok stimuli had been chosen
specifically to meet the criteria of their manipulation. That is to say, the thematically
linked items were chosen by the experimenter on the assumption that they were could
clearly be integrated into a scenario (e.g., milk/cow, sailor/ship, cat/vet) whereas the
items from the ad hoc categories in this study were less obviously linked and
therefore additional time and effort afforded in the protocol condition could indeed
allow a less obvious link to be made.
Thematic Similarity
The analysis of the protocols collected with the similarity ratings discussed in chapter
3 showed that judgements of similarity between two items, made under experimental
conditions, often involve more than a weighting of shared and unshared perceptual or
functional features. In many cases, other links and associations between the items are
also considered to render them similar. Those links frequently result from the items
appearing in a common location, situation or event. This did not occur in all cases,
but it did occur in one form or another in approximately one third of the protocols
collected and this is not easily dismissed. It should be noted that the situations
instantiated by participants rarely included personal references of the sort seen in the
protocols accompanying the category member generation task. Nevertheless, in many
cases they seemed to make use of similar generic event or situational knowledge. The
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results of Chapter 3 add support to the fmdings of Wisniewski and Bassok (1999),
published after the Chapter 3 data were collected. However, the Chapter 3 study
differed from that published work in that the pairs of items were not specifically
chosen to be 'thematically related' and no manipulation was grounded in that
relationship. This study therefore provides an effective demonstration of the high
degree to which thematic similarity is spontaneously produced during rating tasks.
There can be little doubt that similarity is not a passive computation of matching and
mis-matching features. Perhaps more importantly, the detailed nature of some of the
protocols recorded in this study indicated clearly;
• that participants were very aware of the different 'types' of similarity that were
available to them when making their judgements
• that there was considerable individual difference in participants' willingness to
base their ratings in this task on thematic similarity.
Neither of these observations arose from the Wisniewski and Bassok study and they
may be important for the following reasons. Firstly, as mentioned previously, there
have been attempts to portray thematic similarity as the results of unconscious
interference from associative processes (Gentner and Brem, 1999). The introspection
of some of the participants in the present study shows that there is nothing
unconscious about the 'interference'. The conscious knowledge of two different
types of reasons for finding things similar may speak to the awareness of two
different organisations of object knowledge that may serve different goals. Secondly,
the individual differences, which are rarely considered in such studies since the nature
of the analysis is to collapse across these, may be predictive of differences in other
domains. For example, if an individual is prone to high levels of influence from
situational knowledge in this task (i.e., not only notes this similarity but allows it to
enhance ratings ofperceptuaUy distinct items), then it is possible that this person may
allow this conception of similarity to affect their choice of analogies when problem
solving in this manner. It is contended then that this study makes a distinctive and
useful contribution to the literature despite certain commonalities with the published
work.
Both Funnell (2001) and Barsalou's (2003) models of conceptual knowledge could
predict thematic similarity. Barsalou's (2003) proposal that any conceptual
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knowledge is likely to be situated would make it possible that this information could
exert an influence on any cognitive operations involving concepts. As discussed
earlier, a comparison of situated conceptualisations for the purpose of judging
similarity could well include a comparison of those situations and this indeed appears
to have been the case. Funnell's (2001) model, however, would predict thematic
similarity only if judgements included accessing knowledge at the general event level.
If the assessment of similarity took place only at the 'concepts' level, one would
expect to see judgements were based only on feature comparison. The presence of
thematic similarity therefore implies that this task taps both the proposed concepts
level and the general event level.
It is easy to dismiss thematic similarity as a mistake that people make when being
asked to judge similarity but this would be to risk overlooking important data. It
seems more likely that when people tell you about thematic similarity or allow it to
influence their ratings, they are not demonstrating their misunderstanding of the task,
but are indicating a 'closeness' of these items in an organisation of knowledge that
pivots around experiences of situations in which these items feature. The protocols of
some participants in the Chapter 3 study indicate clearly that they are often aware that
this is not the same type of similarity that arises from a closeness of items in an
organisation based on overlapping perceptual and functional features, but it is, for
many of them, similarity. Associations that are predicated on close positions in a
hierarchical, feature-based structure of object memory have been privileged in the
literature to such an extent that they are rarely referred to as 'associations' at all and
this may have resulted in a demeaning of the role played by other types of association
in cognition. New models of semantic memory or conceptual knowledge such as
those considered here help to redress the balance and in doing so open up new
directions for research in concepts.
Factors Determining Thematic Similarity
In the work described in Chapter 4, an attempt was made to start to isolate the factors
that may determine the strength of thematic similarity. It is clear that when rating on
the basis of thematic similarity, participants find the similarity much more compelling
for some pairs than for others. Whilst both the Funnell and the Barsalou models can
comfortably explain thematic similarity, neither would specifically predict these
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differences in ratings within a set of items said to be thematically related. In the
introduction to Chapter 4, various types of relationships that can exist between entities
were considered as candidates for influencing thematic similarity (spatial, temporal,
and causal). The factor that was chosen for investigation was strength of association
between the event (situation) and the item. Measures of this association, both item-to-
event and event-to-item, were collected and used to manipulate the stimuli in the final
study; these stimuli were paired and presented to participants to be rated for similarity
to each other. It should be recalled that very few of the item pairs shared any
perceptual or functional similarities and were all connected to one of seven events
with either high or low frequency.
Despite the comparatively small participant groups providing the measures of strength
of association and despite the sometimes small difference in criterion between high
and low frequency, the results showed clearly that:
• item pairs that were highly associated to the event (in both directions of
association) were rated the most similar and item pairs that were the most weakly
associated to the event (in both directions of association) received the lowest
ratings of similarity.
• Context (the name of the event) enhanced the ratings but the same effect was seen
whether participants saw the items blocked by event or randomised.
• The pattern of ratings for item pairs representing intermediate combinations of
levels of association was compelling but difficult to interpret due to the fact that
only a subset of the total number of combinations available were used.
Nevertheless, it is clearly not the case that any two items appearing in the same
situation will receive the same rating of thematic similarity. It will depend upon
the likelihood, in the experience of the rater, of them appearing in that particular
event. In the terms of the Funnell model, this judgement would take place at the
general event level of knowledge.
In view of the fact that the sensitivity to item-event strength was demonstrated even
without context - why should providing a context result in overall higher similarity
ratings? It can be speculated that perhaps the co-presentation of the event, whilst not
suggesting a context that would not otherwise occur for the participant, has the
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pragmatic effect of confirming the participants' sense of similarity when judging
perceptually dissimilar items and thus enhances the ratings.
Implications of the Research
There are a number of reasons why the investigation of concepts or semantic memory
has tended to take place with comparatively little reference to other forms of memory.
The requirement to identify items in our environment and to ensure a high degree of
consensus amongst language users has led to a great deal of attention being paid to the
information necessary for classification. Possibly, it is the phenomenology of
generating such information that distinguishes it from the effort associated with
'remembering'. One feels that it is not necessary to remember that birds have beaks or
that sparrows are birds - such propositions have the status of facts which are so
common as to make little demand on memory, rather like recognising one's mother's
face. Itmay be the repeated nature of human interaction with the extensions of
concepts that gives the information we have about them a different 'flavour' to
information which can be recalled from one experience or even from multiple events.
Studies such as those of Rosch in which participants are requested to list features of
everyday objects or to generate category members are not usually referred to as
memory tasks. Instructions to participants tend to be phrased in terms of " list as
many members of the category bird as you can" - the word "remember" is not
included at the end of the sentence. If, on completion of such a generation task,
omissions were to be pointed out to the participant, s/he may well explain this in
terms of forgetting - "oh, yes ...I forgot those". This does not indicate that the
participant forgot that those members were birds but that they forgot to mention them
in response to the experimenter's instruction. Nevertheless, knowledge beyond
sensory experience is available to us only through the facility of memory and so one
should be wary of investigating 'types' of memory without being constantly mindful
of their inter-relationships.
A key issue in the interpretation of the results of this thesis is the extent to which the
tasks used are believed to reveal underlying organisation inmemory. For example, are
the strategies that participants report using to achieve the free recall of category
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members indicative of a particular organisation? As stated in Chapter 2, there is
precedent for inferring organisation from the nature of the clusters of outputs from
free recall of learned lists (Barsalou and Sewell, 1985; Chase and Ericsson, 1981;
Graesser and Mandler, 1975; Mandler, 1967; Reitman, 1976; Tulving, 1962,1964,
1966; Tulving and Pearlstone, 1966) and to a lesser extent from free recall of
categories (Rips, Shoben and Smith 1973; Henley, 1969). It is also a plausible
argument that it would be maximally effective to tap into an existing organisation to
access information about category members rather than to deploy some other set of
self-generated cues that are not reflected in that structure. It is interesting to recall
that Walker and Kintsch (1985) documented a high incidence of 'experiential
clusters' in the generation output of participants' recall of categories (77%) but when
the same participants later sorted their own output, the tendency was to use semantic
groupings (86%). This suggests different strategies for each task; is it the case that
one of these strategies takes advantage of underlying knowledge structures and the
other does not? This seems unlikely - in which case it must be that each task is
drawing on a different organisation.
In this thesis, it has been shown that adults' knowledge of the everyday settings and
situations that surround objects and entities in the world plays a substantial role in
certain cognitive operations that might have been expected to depend only upon de-
contextualised conceptual knowledge. The strong view that could be drawn from this
evidence is that 'semantic' memory is inseparable from generalised event memory
and that knowledge of objects and their features is never activated in isolation from a
situation. This seems to be the position adopted in Barsalou' s (2003) theory of
situated conceptualisation. A weaker claim based on the same evidence would be that
the organisation of object-knowledge around situations and events is an alternative
organisation to that of objects based on shared-features and that adults switch between
these knowledge bases according to the goal of the particular task. This would be
more compatible with Funnell's (2001) model. The studies conducted here were not
designed to test these alternatives and the results of the category generation and
similarity tasks are open to explanation from either perspective. It would seem that
the results from the final study, looking at the determination of thematic similarity
strength suggest a further level of complexity of situational knowledge that is not
specifically addressed by either of these models.
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Critique of the empirical work
In both the category generation task and the similarity ratings task, the claims in this
thesis concerning the role of situational knowledge flow directly from accepting that
these studies have a) revealed something about how participants performed these
tasks and b) that how they claim to have performed them reveals, in turn, something
of import concerning the organisation of conceptual knowledge. Each of these
premises is open to challenge. The argument concerning the reliance (or otherwise)
that can be placed on protocols as windows upon cognitive processing was considered
in some detail in chapter one and will not be re-run here. In reviewing a new edition
of Ericsson and Simon's seminal work concerning verbal reports as data, Crutcher
(1994) documents a growing body of work that views protocols as offering insight
into cognitive processes and discusses the increasing level of credibility that such data
is accorded. Crutcher also points out that thought sequences can be accurately
reported by participants retrospectively if the task is brief and the protocol is recorded
as soon as the task is completed. Both of these conditions were met by the design of
the category generation task inchapter 2 and the similarity rating task reported in
chapter 3.
A number of reasons were also provided in the discussion of chapter 2 as to why the
protocol contents accompanying the category member generation task should be
considered genuinely informative of cognitive processes and indeed, there is good
precedent for believing that clusters in output from free recall can reflect underlying
structure of memory. Nevertheless, this study was unfortunately not designed to
permit validation of the strategies claimed in the protocols through examination of the
output. Audio recording of the task performance would at least allow the
identification of clusters of items through temporal pauses although it may still be
difficult to subsequently confirm that anyone cluster was indeed the result of a
particular strategic search due to the personal nature of some of the strategies claimed.
An improved approach may be to assume the validity of the strategies claimed and to
require the task to be performed under a variety of conditions that one could predict to
interfere with this method of retrieval. For example, the task could be accompanied by
images of category members (unidentifiable birds flying in the distance during the
generation of Birds) versus images ofa compatible situation (e.g. a garden) versus
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images of incompatible situations (e.g. hospitals). If the presence of an incompatible
situation image reduces fluency or results in a longer time to generate a comparable
number of items compared to the other two conditions then one's confidence of the
instantiation of situations as a means of retrieval may be increased.
It would also be desirable to collect the data in such a way as to be able to check the
statistical differences between types of protocol more easily - the collection of
nominal data with attendant difficulties of non-independence of cells leads to
problems in analysis.
The requirement to provide a protocol for any task can potentially change the way in
which the task is carried out; this may be because of the pragmatics of the situation
i.e. some participants did feel comfortable with offering no real explanation of how
they produced the category members (just wrote down the ones I knew - just popped
into my mind) and so it could be argued that if that was what actually happened for all
participants on most occasions then they could easily have said so. However, being
asked to explain one's own performance repeatedly during the study may well result
in participants feeling pressurised to provide 'better', more detailed, or even just more
interesting explanations. Alternatively (or indeed additionally), the extra time
afforded by the protocol and the attendant opportunity to reflect upon the task more
carefully may actually result in the task being undertaken in a different manner
altogether, as was demonstrated by Smith and Sloman (1994) and discussed in
Chapter One. This indeed appeared to be the case in the study reported in Chapter 3.
The effect of providing a context for the ad hoc category members, which enhanced
similarity ratings under relatively speeded conditions, was not evident when the
protocols were recorded. An examination of the protocols did not serve to entirely
explain this finding.
The effect of (speak aloud) protocols in the Smith and Sloman (1994) study was to
apparently encourage rule-based reasoning about whether an item belonged to
particular category rather than making the same decision based purely on similarity. It
could be argued that the participants in the similarity study reported here, although
engaged in a different task to Smith and Sloman's participants (my participants were
not required to make categorisation judgements at all), were drawn, through the
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protocols, into reasoning about the task in a way that would not have occurred in the
no self-report conditions. That is to say, they possibly reasoned that they would not
be asked about the similarity between apparently dissimilar items if there were not
some similarity to be found and that their effort to find such similarity led them to
make use of thematic similarity when they would not perhaps have done so otherwise.
Whilst this interpretation seems plausible, it is not consistent with the findings of
Wisniewski and Bassok (1999); an enhancing effect on similarity ratings for items
that were thematically related could be seen in their study whether protocols were
recorded or not.
The inclusion of typicality as a factor in study 3, whilst well-motivated, was not
entirely successful in that the differential effects of context and protocol at the
different levels of typicality that showed in analysis at the level of participant became
less clear when examined at the level of item. Although the item effects did not
swamp the effects of protocol and context, they do cast some doubt on the
generalisability of the findings to other item pairs and much more work is needed on a
wider range of items before more confidence can be placed in the conclusions. That
said, the findings from the final study show that thematic similarity itself varies
depending at least partly upon the strength of association between the items under
consideration and the event/situation that into which they are being integrated. Itmay
be the case then that for thematically related items, such item effects are inevitable if
not systematically controlled.
To return to my second premise, even if the protocols in these studies truly reveal the
thought processes of the participants- need this necessarily have any impact Onthe
theories of organisation? The strategies reported for the category generation task may
just be effective, context-dependent cues. The items could be contextualised at
retrieval, having been retrieved from a context-free storage. It is difficult to argue
conclusively that these interpretations are mistaken and it is challenging to devise
experiments that will help to decide upon these issues but let us imagine that context-
free organization of conceptual knowledge is at some time in the future shown to be
the case- if conceptual information is consistently contextualised at retrieval then it
will still be necessary for the use of this situational information to be carefully
documented as to its role in various cognitive operations.
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The final studies did not rely on protocols but other problems arose. The frequency of
generation from event-to-item and item-to-event was a fairly crude measure of
item/event association. The position of the item in the list generated was not used as
an as indicator of association strength, neither was any account made of the extent to
which anyone item might be associated with other events (bucket may reliably evoke
beach but may equally reliably evoke window cleaning). Other, more complex
measures that may include these possibilities should be developed since the effect of
the measure used may have underestimated the role of item/event association in
influencing thematic similarity. Possibly picture based measures that assess levels of
surprise at the presence of items in a scene could be utilised. Arguably, pictures could
be considered more appropriate in capturing situational aspects of an item than word
cues in generation tasks.
As noted in the discussion to Chapter 4, a larger corpus of normative data for
item/event association is required.
This would allow for greater flexibility in testing a greater combination of item pairs
and would also allow for word association to be controlled for a priori and items
chosen on this basis rather than checking post -hoc as was the case here. It would
have been preferable if the event -to-item data could have been collected from the
same number of participants as the item-to event data but the large number of items
required in the former data collection necessitated a considerable number of
participants even in order to obtain data from a sample of 15 for each item.
There are clearly alternative interpretations to be made of the data presented here that
would not support the argument for situational information as an organising factor in
conceptual knowledge. In studies I and 2, the retrieval strategies used by participants
may be just that - retrieval strategies and may not necessarily indicate anything new
about the structure of conceptual knowledge. The presence of context in Study 3 may
act to render particular properties more salient as suggested by Barsalou' s (1982)
paper; the participants producing thematic similarity in Study 4 may simply be
misguided in their understanding of the term similarity and the results from Study 5
may simply reflect associations between the pairs of words themselves that
undoubtedly exist. However, it is contended that taken together, and viewed in
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conjunction with other recent empirical work (Wisniewski and Bassok 1999; Lin and
Murphy, 2001; Murphy 2001) these studies should be seen as having demonstrated
that situational knowledge of objects plays a role in adult cognition that has been, at
worst, ignored and, at best, under-specified until quite recently. The degree to which
this limitation may have constrained our understanding of other cognitive processes
that rely upon concepts, such as reasoning and problem solving, should now be
established.
Future Research
Other Directions for Research
Ifone accepts that information that was not previously seen as part of a 'core concept'
consistently plays a role in cognitive tasks, then it seems unhelpful to cling to separate
notions of decontextualised concepts and (unspecified) associated information as
separate knowledge organisations. It would seem more elegant to accept that a
concept comprises both the abstracted feature descriptions and the information of
background settings, motor routines etc. Similarly, it seems to be time to extend our
understanding of semantic memory along the same lines. These ultimately may turn
out to be arguments about terminology and in my view, such arguments need not bear
on the direction of empirical research which should continue to gamer further
evidence for, or against, the 'situated concepts' position. However, I believe that the
research should also now move on to examine and test the implications of such a view
by addressing the following questions:
• Which subsets of the full range of conceptual information available to a person
become activated by which tasks and for which purposes? Are there any tasks in
which only decontextualised object knowledge is utilised?
• How does conceptual information about items in situations affect other cognitive
processes believed to rely upon concepts? If it affects perception of similarity,
does it affect reasoning by analogy or inductive reasoning?
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• Are there individual differences in the extent to which possibly inappropriate or
unhelpful conceptual knowledge is permitted to enter into reasoning about
objects/items?
• Can this new view of conceptual knowledge shed light on cases of semantic
impairment? Funnell has already suggested that a broader conception of semantic
memory can be useful in predicting and understanding patterns of performance
and behaviour in semantic dementia.
Ongoing Work
Through the supervision of undergraduate and postgraduate work, I have started to
pursue some of the issues raised above. We have made use of insights into thematic
similarity to re-interpret over-inclusive and under-inclusive categories formed by
patients suffering from schizophrenia. Performance on sorting tasks has often been
judged as 'incorrect' ifit is not based on standard taxonomic relationships between
the items. However, the patient samples have been shown to make use of thematic
similarity in sorting tasks and to note the same types of thematic similarity as normal
participants in protocols that accompany a similarity judgement task (Green, 2002). It
has also been demonstrated that schizophrenia patients tend to allow thematic
similarity to influence their ratings to a higher degree than do normal participants and
current work suggests that they may make use of thematic organisation even when it
is not considered appropriate to the task by normal controls. This interpretation of
data from schizophrenic performance on semantic tasks suggests that discrepancies
between this and the data obtained from control groups may not indicate a difference
in semantic structure and category boundaries, as is usually suggested, but may reflect
their use of an event-based organisation of knowledge in tasks that controls tend to
use a taxonomic organisation to tackle.
A recent undergraduate project examined the effect of a heightened perception of
thematic similarity on problem solving through example. Participants were classified
on the basis of their tendency to make thematic similarity judgements. All participants
were trained on probability principles using a training example and then asked to
solve new problems. The new problems could have the same or different story line to
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the training example and could also have the same or different object correspondence.
It was found that all participants performed worse on the problems with reversed
object correspondences but that the thematic raters performed even worse when this
condition was combined with a dissimilar story line. This finding can be explained in
terms of the thematic raters being less able to see the similarity between the test and
training problem when the story line differs. It seems that differences in perception of
thematic similarity may well affect performance on other tasks where similarity plays
a role.
Follow-on Studies
The overlapping nature of many of the relationships that can exist between two items
makes it difficult to extricate anyone particular relationship and to argue for its
unique influence on organising conceptual knowledge and hence of cognitive
processes. The sharing of perceptual and functional features has been the most
successful relationship to date in providing explanations of the way in which people
seem to think about and use concepts and so structures based on these relationships
have enjoyed a virtually unrivalled supremacy in many models of semantic memory.
It has been argued here that the demonstration of the influence of the relationship that
results from items regularly co-occurring in common situation and events on simple
cognitive tasks requires that we look more closely at this type of association. The last
study reported here attempted to start to break down the source of thematic similarity
by seeing whether it could be explained by the strength of item-to-event and event-to-
item association. As mentioned in the discussion of Chapter 4, there are a number of
ways that this study could be extended to consolidate the findings. Firstly, a
manipulation based on situational association versus word association is required to
rule out the possibility that the fmdings were the due to the latter rather than the
former. Secondly, additional data could be collected from a larger group of
participants for a small range of events in order to obtain a full set of combinations of
the event-to-item and item-to-event indices. This may enable a clearer picture to
emerge of the ratings for the items that have intermediate strength of association to
the event and to thus reveal the extent of participants' sensitivity to less dramatic
differences in the item-to-event and event-to-item strength of association.
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Further studies to collect other types of data that may be used to model thematic
similarity more precisely are also called for. I am in the process of collecting data
concerning the temporal contiguity of items within an event that I suspect will also
contribute to their perceived similarity. For example, kettle and sugar may be
viewed as less similar than kettle and tap as the former occur at the beginning and end
of a 'making a cup of coffee' scenario whereas the latter both occur near the
beginning. There is a problem of separating this relationship from that of spatial
contiguity and reliable methods of measuring spatial contiguity are under deliberation.
Since the judgement of similarity is proving to be such a complex process, this fine-
grained level of examination of the factors that affect is deemed to be necessary.
It is also desirable that alternative methodologies should be utilised to further
establish the extent of influence exerted by a situational organisation of conceptual
knowledge. One such possibility is the use of a priming paradigm.
Priming Studies
Priming studies have a long history of being used to test the strength of association
between items. The task most frequently used in connection with this paradigm is the
lexical decision task whereby a participant has to identify a letter string as a real word
or a non-word. If the task is facilitated by the pre-presentation ofa different word (the
o prime) then it is inferred that the two words are associated within the lexicon.
Priming effects have been found to arise from a variety of relationships between the
prime and the target such as phrasal associations (bee- hive), synonyms and category
co-ordinates (bee-wasp). Considerable attention has been paid to the priming effects
found for shared category membership since this has been taken as further evidence of
the status of semantic (taxonomic) categories as organising structures in semantic
memory. Different manipulations have been adopted in an attempt to establish
whether the facilitation from this type of relationship provides support for a holistic
model of semantic memory (such as Collins and Loftus, 1975) or whether is more
consistent with a distributed model. The difference between these two models is that
nodes in holistic models represent entire lexical units whereas in distributed models
the nodes of the network are individual features (e.g. Moss, Hare, Day and Tyler,
1994). By attempting to separate the prime/target stimuli pairs into those that share
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features and are additionally associated, those that share features and are not
additionally associated and those that are associated but have no overlapping features,
the applicability of each of these models can be tested. If priming occurs for
'overlapping feature only' pairs but not for 'associative only' pairs then this is taken
as evidence for the distributed model. In reviewing some of the studies that claim to
have demonstrated either 'pure' semantic priming or 'pure' associative priming,
Hutchison (2003) points out a consistent difficulty with the creation of stimuli for
studies of this type, namely that of discriminating between feature overlap and
associative strength. As mentioned in the previous chapter, for the purposes of this
line of research, 'strength of association' between a pair of words is usually measured
by the percentage of respondents who give one of the words as their first response in
free association to the other word. However, Hutchison (2003) suggests that the
assumption that such association norms arise principally from phrasal contiguity
between the items may be mistaken since a close examination of the norms reveal a
variety of other associations between the items including natural category
membership, functional relations and script relations. These relationships could all be
reasonably classed as semantic, even though this term is frequently reserved for
relationships based on shared features. It follows then that researchers using these
norms as a measure of non-semantic association in order to create stimuli to compare
against semantically related items will be confounding the manipulation. Hutchinson
contends that many priming studies have suffered from this problem. A clear
demonstration of the priming potential of pairs that are truly not associated or are only
weakly associated according to association norms is required before one can suggest
that their relationship has particular significance within semantic memory or the
lexicon. Since associated items are invariably related semantically as well as
associatively, one would expect their potential for priming to be the result of both
components of their relationship (with semantic relations being additionally
'boosted' through association). Items that are only semantically linked but are not
highly associated should show priming due only to their semantic relationship which
should be less than that of the associated pairs. This was convincingly demonstrated
in a study by Moss, Ostrin, Tyler and Marslen-Wilson (1995) that clearly
distinguished between semantic relatedness and association (based on 'first-word-
generated ' norms) and also distinguished between three types of semantic relatedness,
category-coordinates, functional relatedness and instrumental relatedness. Moss et a1.
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found that across three experiments using different modes of presentation, pairs that
shared 'instrumental' relationships (e.g. hammer-nail, broom-floor) showed robust
priming effects even when they were not associated. When compared to the priming
effects found for artifact category coordinates, this finding leads the authors to claim
that functional information about artifactual items may be more easily accessed than
category information and a case is made for raising the status of this type of
relationship. Since this thesis seeks to make to make a similar plea on behalf of items
related 'situationally', it follows that a similar demonstration of this relationship in
priming studies is called for. Interestingly, the Moss et al. study also included script-
related pairs (such as restaurant-wine and circus-lion). These were found to show
priming effects when presented as an auditory stimulus but not when presented
visually (even when associated). Moss and her colleagues argue that this may mean
that there is no automatic priming from these relationships or that the time course of
access to this type of relationship is slower than for the functional information. There
are several comments to make upon this result in relation to this thesis.
• In the Moss et a1.study the item pairs consisted of the situation itself and atypical
item that would appear in a script for that situation and not of two items that share
a common script (such as the pairs used in Chapter 4). Although one might expect
restaurant to prime wine in the same way thatfruit will prime apple -it may be
that the relationship between event names and items that feature in them do not
share the same type of superordinate relations.
• Many of the primes in this subset of materials were locations rather than events.
Whilst it may be argued that events and places are invariably entwined, it is
possible that naming a location such as 'hospital' does not evoke the kind of
specific simulation of a situation that is required to link the items together in the
way that would be necessary to demonstrate the organising role of situations.
When the instrumentally linked stimuli are examined, it can be seen that many of
these pairs also suggest situations, e.g., razor-leg (shaving), drill-teeth (at the
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dentist), spoon-dessert (having a meal), hammer -nail (fixing or making), pub-
beer (going for a drink), kitchen-sink (washing up), butcher-meat (shopping),
kettle -tea (making a drink). Indeed, these are very similar pairs as those used by
Wisniewski et a1. (1999). One would expect these pairs to be viewed as
'thematically similar' and as has been repeatedly claimed throughout this thesis,
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the basis of thematic similarity is the co-occurrence of these items in a situation or
scenario. The nature of the relationship between these items is complex and bears
further scrutiny.
It is suggested, then that further investigation of the priming potential of items that are
'situationally' related may serve to test whether co-occurrence in everyday situations
provide links that 'more than associative'. If 'pure' semantic priming raises the status
of feature based organisations, and priming from instrumentally linked pairs can raise
the status of functional relationships then a convincing demonstration of priming from
purely situationally related items could be used to argue for the status of situational
organisation.
Summary of Main Findings
The presentation of this body of empirical work has been set in the context of recent
changes in the way some researchers wish to think about the ways in which we store
and access information about the things that surround us in our environment. I have
argued that the findings are in line with a broader view of semantic memory than as a
warehouse of facts about what objects are like. However, there are also new and
specific findings arising from the data that have extended our knowledge about the
two tasks utilised, category member generation and judgements of similarity under
experimental conditions:
• The category generation study was the first to provide an in-depth examination of
the strategies that participants claim to use when generating members of a wide
range of categories (Ch.2).
• The protocol analysis for the above uncovered the use of everyday situations to
cue retrieval of category members (Ch.2).
• Taxonomic and ad hoc categories vary less than might have been expected in
terms of participants' ability to generate members; the degree of consensus on the
items generated and the strategies that participants report having used to generate
their members (Ch.2).
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• The quantitative data from the similarity judgement study showed that important
qualifications should be made to a much cited study (Barsalou, 1982) concerning
the effect of context on similarity of ad hoc item pairs, namely that this effect
appears to manifest itself only when the speed of judgements allows little chance
for reflection and that it is strongest when items are comparatively typical of the
ad hoc category (Ch.3).
• The protocols accompanying the similarity judgements showed evidence of
participants spontaneously and consciously including situational links between the
items in their consideration of similarity (Ch.3).
• There was evidence of individual differences in the extent to which the above
links were viewed as constituting 'similarity' (Ch.3).
• The first known attempt to examine the factors that govern the strength of
thematic similarity was made via a manipulation based on item-to-event and
event-to-item association (Ch.4).
• Previous suppositions that thematic similarity is based on items being integrated
into a common scenario or situation were empirically supported through the
manipulation based on item-to-event and event-to-item association (Ch.4).
• If treated with caution, written protocols may be used to shed light on the way in
which participants achieve certain simple tasks.
Furthermore, the studies have raised new research questions that may ultimately help
to test recent theoretical positions regarding conceptual knowledge.
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Strategies for Generating M ultiple Instances of
Common and Ad Hoc Categories
Frederic Vallee-Tourangeau, Susan H. Anthony,
and Neville G. Austin
University of Hertfordshire, UK
In a free-emission procedure participants were asked to generate instances of a
given category and to report, retrospectively, the strategies that they were aware
of using in retrieving instances. In two studies reported here, participants
generated instances for common categories (e.g. frUit) and for ad hoc categories
(e.g. things people keep in their pockets) for 90 seconds and for each category
described how they had proceeded in doing so. Analysis of the protocols
identified three broad classes of strategy: (1) experiential, where memories of
specific or generic personal experiences involving interactions with the category
instances acted as cues; (2) semantic, where a consideration of abstract
conceptual characteristics of a category were employed to retrieve category
exemplars; (3) unmediated, where instances were effortlessly retrieved without
mediating cognitions of which subjects were aware. Experiential strategies
outnum bered semantic strategies (on average 4 to 1) not only for ad hoc
categories but also for common categories. This pattern was noticeably reversed
for ad hoc categories that subjects were unlikely to have experienced personally
(e.g. things sold on the black market in Russia). Whereas more traditional
accounts of semantic memory have favoured decontextualised abstract represen-
tations of category knowledge, to the extent that mode of access informs us of
know ledge structures, our data suggest that category know ledge is significantly
grounded in term s of everyday contexts where category instances are encoun-
tered.
INTRODUCTION
The studies reported here concern the nature of the strategies people
spontaneously use when asked to retrieve instances for a given category.
Item retrieval during this so-called "free emission" procedure appears to reflect
Requests for reprints should be sent to Frederic ValIee-Tourangeau, Department of Psychology,
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK, ALIO 9AB. E-mail: psyqfv@herts.ac.uk
A partial report of these data was presented at the BPS Cognitive Section XII Annual Conference.
Bristol, Septem ber 1995.
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certain organisational processes in memory. Bousfie Id and Sedgew ick
(1944, p. 153), for example, remarked about the nature and order of the
instances retrieved for an ima Is that "various types of contiguity are
apparent (... ) we may observe groups of domesticated animals, commonly
exhibited species, and various zoological phyla." It soon became apparent that
delineating these clusters was an important thing to do, albeit a difficult one
(Kausler, 1974).
Research on the nature of the items and their clustering, as well as on the
nature of the underlying retrieval process was neglected in favour of efforts
aimed at quantifying various aspects of the participants' output. Retrieval norm s
were produced (e.g. Battig & Montague's 1969 Category norms for verbal items
in 56 categories) and algorithms were developed to identify the size and number
of clusters. Thus, Graesser and Mandler (1978, Study 2) obtained item
generation data using a six-m inute free-emission procedure and determ ined that
clusters averaged about five item s. Gruenewald and Lockhead (1980) reported
that in their free-emission data 74% of the clusters were smaller than three items,
and that an hyperbolic function fitted the latency between clusters of item s
during item retrieval. Kail and N ippold (1984) assessed developmental
differences in the size and num ber of clusters generated and concluded that
hyperbolic functions modelled adequately the cumulative output of participants
from different age groups. Gronlund and Shiffrin (1986) investigated the
modelling performance of the search of associative memory model of
Raaijm akers and Shiffrin (1981) for cumulative output and item dom inance
curves produced under different retrieval conditions, for example by providing
cues or by having subjects use a particular strategy (e.g. listing instances of fish
by cycling through the letters of the alphabet).
In most of these studies, the strategies that participants use to generate
category instances received scant attention. Graesser and Mandler (1978, p. 94)
spoke briefly about them suggesting that subjects accessed "conceptual
dimensions" which guided item generation. Kail and N ippold (1984, pp. 950-
951) stated that "[our] account of retrieval is distinctly 'nonstrategic' in
nature"; they assumed that retrieval was determ ined by the associative strength
between a category name and the category exemplars. Gronlund and Shiffrin
(1986) observed that subjects instructed to use an alphabetic strategy (or one
based on the size of exemplars; see also Barsalou & Sewell, 1985) produced
fewer items than subjects who were free to retrieve instances as they pleased; the
nature of these "idiosyncratic" strategies was not addressed however. In
contrast, Gruenewald and Lockhead (1980) ventured the broad outlines of a
mechanism underlying item production. They proposed a two-process model:
The first process searches for a "semantic field" and a second retrieves items
associated with that field. Gruenewald and Lockhead sometimes take semantic
fields to be taxonomic or sub-taxonomic groups (e.g. pets, p.239), but in other
places their notion seems to correspond to a much broader class of things,
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including autobiographical facts and personal experiences of varying specificity.
For example, they speculated about the exploration of the following semantic
fields during the generation of items for food (pp. 229-230): "Consider recalling
food words. Perhaps you would consider that supermarkets have foods and
attempt to search aisles in your imagination; then you m ight recall foods on the
dining room table; perhaps next to vegetables, then to fruits, to foods that are
disliked, and so on; to foods of different countries, then foods from memorable
gourmet meals, then (aha) wines, cheeses and so forth."
Two studies, however, sought to characterise the retrieval strategies in greater
detail: Williams and Hollan (1981) and Walker and Kintsch (1985). Williams
and Hollan studied a small group of subjects who were asked to retrieve, over
many sessions, names of high school classmates, in some cases 16 years after
graduation. Subjects were asked to comment on their retrieval strategies as they
were producing the names. On the basis of the subjects' protocols, an iterative
"retrieval cycle" was proposed, consisting of three stages: (l) establishing a
retrieval context, (2) searching that context, and (3) verifying candidate to-be-
recalled items. M any of these retrieval contexts were essentially experiential in
that they were contexts that specified places, situations, and activities where
classmates were encountered.
Walker and Kitsch (1985) used a 12-minute free-emission procedure with
three categories, automobiles, soups, and detergents. Half of their subjects
concurrently described their retrieval strategies and the other half retro-
spectively described how they retrieved instances. Walker and K intsch reported
that 77% of the retrieval strategies or cues were of an episodic memory
character. Thus, for the category automobiles, subjects used episodic retrieval
strategies like "my cars, friends' cars, cars I have wrecked, cars I have seen
on TV [in contrast to semantic cues like] small cars, foreign cars, GM cars,
luxury cars" (Walker & K intsch, 1985, p.269). Thus, the retrieval process
seemed to depend considerably on memory of personal experiences of varying
specificity. Walker and Kintsch also noted that the nature of the strategies
reported in concurrent or retrospective protocols did not differ, although the
num ber of reported strategies was greater with the concurrent protocols (we
shall return to this point later).
The nature of the subjects' introspection in Williams and Hollan (1980) and
Walker and Kintsch (1985) suggests that exemplar generation is mediated by a
reflection on personal experience or the re-creation of contexts in which subjects
interacted with these objects as members of the given category. However, the
range of categories was extremely narrow. The studies reported here sought to
document over a wider range of categories and in greater detail the retrieval
strategies subjects use spontaneously as reported in their retrospective protocols.
We chose different kinds of categories to encourage a broad range of retrieval
strategies. Some of the categories were well established common categories
(taken from Rosch & Mervis, 1975) like fruit and furn iture , others were more ad
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1hoc (Barsalou, 1983). The ad hoc categories were chosen as a function of their
value along two dimensions, namely a concreteness dimension, where
concreteness characterises the physical nature of the instances, and a fam iliarity
dimension, or the (likely) degree to which subjects would be familiar with the
category (even if they had rarely, if ever, instantiated the category as such).
Thus, we compared the retrieval strategies underlying item production for things
people keep in their pockets (high concrete, high familiar) with animals found on
the Galapagos (high concrete, low familiar) with excuses for arriving
somewhere late (low concrete, high familiar); we did not construct a low
concrete, low fam iliar ad hoc category.
STUDY 1
The participants in this study generated instances for each category for a 90-
second period. After each category the participants wrote down the strategies
they had used in the process. One of our aims was to assess the extent of the
prevalence of experiential strategies documented in Walker and K intsch (1985)
across a more representative range of categories, and in particular to assess their
usage for common categories. Previous research has established a close
connection between autobiographical memories and ad hoc categories (Conway,
1990a) and we expected that instance retrieval from "fam iliar" ad hoc
categories would be mediated to a greater extent by experiential strategies. We
believed that instance retrieval for categories that are better established in long-
term memory, for example, the common category fruit, might not be mediated
by experiential cues to the same degree as fam iliar ad hoc categories: for
example, as suggested in Barsalou (1983), the strong category-instance
associations might render such mediations superfluous. In addition. if
experiential cues are used spontaneously for familiar ad hoc categories, it is
I The scope of the class of categories that should be designated "ad hoc" is not entirely clear.
Barsalou (1983) proposed that such categories are "not well established in memory" (p.21I), "are
created spontaneously for use in specialized contexts" (p.21I), "to achieve goals" (p.214). Barsalou
(1985, p.632) later proposed a more general class of" goal-derived categories" which "include both
ad hoc categories and better established categories that were once ad hoc." We use the term to
denote sets of things, events, or ideas which we presume (i) are not generally well rehearsed as sets,
(ii) do not have a commonly used conventional name, and (iii) have as instances or mem bers entities
that satisfy requirements stated in the phrase describing the category. The category description may
state characteristics of the instances that would enable category members to be recognised
independent of a context (e.g. things made mostly of plastic) or may mention a situation or context
into which instances must fit but do not state explicitly what characteristics of the instances
themselves give the fit to the situation (e.g. things people hate when they are ill-see Study 2; "food
to eat on a diet"). Common categories (e.g. fruit, etc.) are presumably well rehearsed, clearly do have
conventional names, but are silent on the criteria for membership.
RETRIEVAL STRATEGIES 559
of interest to investigate what cues subjects employ when they have had little or
no experience with a category (e.g. animals found on the Galapagos).
Method
Participants. A total of 50 undergraduates from the University of
Hertfordshire volunteered for this study.
Categories. Ten categories were selected, two common categories taken
from Rosch and Mervis (1975), namely vehicle and fruit, and eight ad hoc
categories. These eight ad hoc categories were made up of three subgroups of
categories. The first group was one for which the category instances were
concrete objects whose grouping was likely to be familiar to the participants,
namely things people keep in their pockets, things dogs chase, things people take
to a wedding, things made mostly of plastic. For ease of exposition we will refer
to these four categories as pockets, dogs chase, wedding, and plastic
respectively. The second group of ad hoc categories was one for which the
category instances would cover a different ontological range including, for
example, moods, feelings, life events, causal explanations, although participants
were unlikely to think the groupings odd. These were reasons for going on a
holiday, and excuses for arriving somewhere late. For convenience these will be
referred to as holiday and late. The final group of ad hoc categories was made up
of concrete entities whose groupings were unlikely to be familiar to the
participants. These were animals found on the Galapagos, and things sold on the
black market in Russii (these two categories will be referred to as Galapagos
and black market).
Design and Procedure. A11participants received all 10 category names in
one of IO random ised orders. After generating category m em bers for each
category, participants were asked to rate the difficulty of the retrieval process
and to estimate how many more items they could have produced if they were
given an extra IOm inutes (as data from these two questions were not the focus
of this investigation, they will not be reported in the main body of the Results
section). The participants were then asked to answer in writing the question
"how did you go about thinking of items for this category?". Answers to this
question provided the data on the nature of the retrieval strategies.
Test materials were assembled in a booklet. Single category names were
printed on the top of separate lined sheets. A fter each category sheet, a sheet
with the three questions was inserted. The front page of the booklet informed the
2 Our better informed colleagues told us that it was more appropriate to speak of a black economy
in Russia than a black market as such. We suspect, however, that our inaccurate and stereotypical
view of the Russian econom y did not unduly concern our subjects.
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participants about the nature of the task and that for each category they would be
given 90 seconds to list the names of as many item s they could think of.
Participants were run in groups ranging in size from five to ten. Once the
experimenter had answered any queries, participants were instructed to turn over
the cover page and start listing item s for the first category. After 90 seconds had
elapsed, participants were instructed to turn over the page; they were given
another 90 seconds to answer the three post-retrieval questions. This procedure
was repeated for the remaining nine categories. We chose to segment the
experimental procedure into those time intervals in order that test booklets
would take no longer than 30 minutes to complete.
Measures. Three measures are reported. These are, (1) the number of items
produced for each category (output fluency); (2) the proportion of participants
who generated each of the 10 most generated item s for each category, a measure
of consensus termed item dominance (more comprehensive production
frequencies for the items in each of the 10 categories are reported in the
Appendix); and (3) the segmentation and classification of subjects' answers to
the question' 'how did you go about thinking of item s for this category?". These
answers were first segmented into parts, where each segment appeared to
correspond to a distinct idea or approach to item generation. (In many cases the
answers were naturally segmented by the participants with the use of terms such
as "and" and "then".) Two investigators independently segmented all
protocols and met to compare their resulting segmentations and resolve
disagreements. The number of protocol segments ranged from 93 (holiday) to
117 (pockets), with a mean of 102 segments per category (s.d. = 9.5).
All protocol segments were then transcribed onto index cards labelled with a
subject number and the category name. Triplicates of the cards were produced
and a set given to each of the three authors. The cards were independently sorted
into groups. In a first classificatory stage, segments were sorted largely on the
basis of their surface form, that is on a minimal interpretation of their meaning.
For example, for fruit, protocol segments like "fruit I eat" and "fruit I like"
were sorted initially in different groups. In a second phase we sought to identify
groupings of protocol segments that appeared to reflect similar approaches to
item generation. A 11three authors agreed the final classification of the segments.
Three broad classes of strategies were identified: (1) experiential mediation, (2)
semantic mediation, and (3) unmediated retrieval. Of the protocol segments,
88% could be classified under these headings (8% resisted such groups and 4%
were uninterpretable). Table la reports all the subgroups that were identified in
each of the three categories for fruit from the protocol segments of Study 1.
Protocol segments classified within the experiential mediation category
indicated that the generation of category instances was based on autobiogra-
phical facts; or mediated by the recreation of specific or generic personal
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experiences during which these instances are encountered. This latter distinction
is based on the one made in Conway (1990c, p. 134) between specifically
dateable experienced events and "experienced events ( ... ) which subjects could
only date to a lifetime period and which were abstracted from specific
experiences." Barsalou et al. (1993, p. 38) similarly argue that "( ... ) an
episodic situation represents a single event that occurred at a specific time, [and
that] a generic situation generalized over related episodic situations." Thus, our
subjects reported using specific personal experiences to aid retrieval, such as, for
wedding, "the last wedding I attended" or more generic experiences, such as for
dogs chase, "dogs I've seen in the park". Finally, strategies that described
secondhand personal inform ation, that is, of being told directly of the experience
(e.g. by friends, via the television) were also included in the experiential
mediation category. Segments classified within the semantic mediation category
suggested that instance retrieval was mediated by access to subtaxonomic
groupings; or by the consideration of the abstract characteristics of the category;
or by analogy to related indices ("I just thought of the type of things which are
black market in other places"); or by using a distinctive reasoning strategy, like
a recipe for a fruit salad (or thinking of the contents of yoghurt pots). The
unmediated retrieval category grouped together protocols that implied that
instances were not retrieved via an intermediate cue of which subjects were
aware at the time of report or which implied an appreciation of the graded
structure of the category (i.e. that some instances were "common"). Segments
classified in that category specified that instances "popped into my mind", or
"came unbidden", or were "common knowledge".
Table 1b reports representative examples of actual protocol segments for fruit
in Study 1. The protocol segments classified in the experiential mediation
TABLE 1A
Subgroups of Protocol Segments for Fruit Within Each of the Three Classes of
Retrieval Strategies in Study 1
Experiential Semantic Unmediated
1. Fru it I eat 1. Consideration of 1. Popped into head
2. Fruit I like or don't like subcategories: citrus fruits, 2. General know ledge ("I just
3. Fruit I buy exotic fruits, garden fruits knew them")
4. Fruit I've seen 2. Reasoning about features 3. Notion 0 f typica lity
5. Fruit seen in supermarkets (sweet vs. bitter) 4. Inter-item cueing
6. Fruit bowl at home 3. Recipe
7. Specific memories of 4. Cued by other products, e.g.
eating a fruit types of yoghurt, fruit
8. Fruits I've heard of juices
9. Media 5. Linguistic cues like
10. What I know other people "berry"
eat
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category ranged from autobiographical facts (e.g. "what I hate"), reflections on
specific life episodes where fruits were encountered (e.g. "the fruit salad my
friend made the other day"), to generic episodes (e.g. "fruits I see in the
supermarket"), to experiences of others (e.g. "fruits my children like"). The
protocol segments classified in the sem antic mediation category indicated that
instances were generated on the basis of strategies that made no reference to
personal experience, such as a reflection on taxonomic organisation (e.g.
"summer fruits"); a consideration of where they grow (e.g. "garden") or how
they are utilised (e.g. "yoghurt pots"). The unmediated retrieval category was
more liberally constructed, including any protocol segments that did not refer to
a deliberate strategy and/or that indicated that the category instances were
retrieved automatically. As w ill become apparent later, because the proportion
of protocol segments fitting this category was quite small, adopting such a
liberal classification criterion did not artificially inflate the importance of these
protocol segments.
TABLE 1B
Actual Protocol Segments that Described Instance Retrieval Strategies for
Fruit in Study 1
Experien tial Mediation
"What I hate"
"What I eat"
"First thinking of all my favourite fruits."
"Thought about the fruits I bought"
"I thought of the fruit my friend made the other day"
"My auntie's fruit bow I'"
"What I have growing in my garden"
"I took the easy way out and wrote what I see in the supermarket"
"Fruits that my children like or dislike"
"Visualised media adverts"
Semantic Mediation
"I thought of categories, e.g. summer fruits"
"Tropics, orchard, garden"
"I thought of fruit which you can grow in the garden"
"Fruits to m ake fruit salad"
"Yoghurt pots"
Unmediated Retrieval
"Fruits-all different kinds are common know ledge"
"General knowledge"
"By the word association i.e. one fruit brought back recollection of the next"
"Whatever came to mind"
"I listed the fruit I knew of"
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Results
Output Fluency. The mean number of items generated for each category
and each category type are reported in the second column (Study 1) of Table 2.
Subjects generated most items for the common categories (mean of 12.98) and
fewest for concrete unfamiliar ad hoc categories (mean of 5.87)3 To illustrate the
differences and similarities both between and within category types, a number of
pairwise comparisons were carried out. Thus, within the common categories,
fluency for fruit was significantly greater than for vehicle, t(49) = 4.86, P < .0001
(all tests two-tailed). The means for vehicle and pockets were identical, but
within the concrete familiar ad hoc type, fluency for plastic was significantly
smaller than for pockets, t(49) = -10.3, P < .0001, and across ad hoc category
type the mean for plastic was smaller than for holiday, t(49)=-3.44, P<.OOl.
Finally, the fluency for late was significantly greater than the fluency for black
market, t(49) = 2.23, P < .03.
Item Dominance. Figure 1 plots the proportion of subjects who generated
the ith most generated items (i ranged from 1 to 10) for each category (right
panel) as well as the average by category type (left panel). The picture conveyed
by the left panel is clearer: item dom inance distributions for common categories
showed the most consensus while the least consensus was observed for the
unfamiliar ad hoc categories. The right panel portrays a fuzzier picture where the
item dominance distributions for each category overlap a great deal. On the basis
of Kolmogorov-Sm irnov analyses (W ilkinson, 1990), the item dom inance
distribution for fruit, which reflected the highest consensus, was significantly
different from the distributions for most categories, except vehicle, pockets, and
dogs. In turn, the item dominance distribution for plastic, which reflected the
least consensus, was significantly different from most categories except
Galapagos and black market. For the categories between these two extremes,
the item dominance distributions did not differ significantly.
Retrieval Strategies. The percentage of experiential, semantic and
unmediated protocol segments for each category as well as averages for each
3 Participants were also asked to rate, on a scale from I to 10 (l = "not difficult at all" and
10 = "very difficult"), the difficulty of the retrieval process for each category, as well as to predict
the number of items they could produce had they been given 10 more minutes. Both these measures
were systematically related to output fluency. Producing instances for the common categories was
rated the easiest (mean of 2.19) and for the unfamiliar ad hoc type the hardest (mean of 7.38). The
correlation between output fluency and output difficulty ratings was strongly negative, r = - .62.
P < .000 1. Estimates of output fluency forecast varied a lot across subjects but were nonetheless
significantly correlated both with output fluency, r = .26, P < .001, and difficulty ratings, r = - .26,
P < .001.
TABLE 2
Mean Output Fluency for the 10 Categories in Study 1 and the 9 Categories in Each of
the Three Conditions of Study 2
Study 2
Category Study 1 A B C
Common Categories
Fruitl.2 14.80 13.65 13.97 14.39
(0.63) (0.52) (0.43) (0.64 )
Veh icle 1.2 11.14 8.23 8.40 10.04
(0.61 ) (0.82) (0.93) (0.57)
Biri 9.19 10.83 12.52
(1.05) (0.97) (1.00)
Furniture 2 11.74 12.57 10.75
(0.54) (0.57) (0.40)
Mean 12.98 10.70 11.44 11.96
(0.48) (0.43) (0.42) (0.37)
Concrete Familiar Ad Hoc Categories
Pocketsl•2 11.14 11.97 11.43 9.03
(0.40) (0.59) (0.71 ) (0.64 )
Dogs chase 1.2 9.10 11.43 10.50 9.77
(0.30) (0.58) (0.61 ) (0.48)
Wedding
1 8.04
(0.41 )
Plasticl 6.78
(0.35)
wsu? 11.94 11.07 9.40
(0.53) (0.57) (0.31)
Mean 8.77 11.79 11.00 9.40
(0.21 ) (0.32) (0.36) (0.31 )
Abstract Familiar Ad Hoc Categories
Holiday
1
8.20
(0.36)
Late
1
8.18
(0.36)
III 9.71 7.67 6.60
(0.66) (0.52) (0.41 )
Mean 8.19 9.71 7.67 6.60
(0.26) (0.66) (0.52) (0.4 1)
Unfamiliar Ad Hoc Categories
Galapagos 1 5.00
(0.37)
Black marketl•2 6.74 9.39 8.03 7.50
(0.53) (0.68) (0.78) (0.45)
Mean 5.87 9.39 8.03 7.50
(0.34 ) (0.68) (0.78) (0.45)
Standard error in parentheses.
I == included in Study I; 2 = included in Study 2.
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FIG. 1. Proportion of participants generating each of the lO most generated item s for the lO
categories in Study I (right panel); averaged proportions for each category type (left panel).
category type are reported in Table 3. As most subjects reported more than one
strategy, protocol segments were not independently produced. Consequently, no
inferential statistics are reported. However, clear patterns in the segment
distributions can be observed. For seven of the eight categories, experiential
strategies greatly outnumbered both semantic strategies and reports of
unmediated retrieval. In terms of individual categories, the percentage of
experiential protocols outnumbered semantic protocols for fruit, pockets, dogs
chase, wedding, plastic, holiday, and late; for vehicle the percentages were
nearly even. Striking reversals of this pattern were observed for black market
and Galapagos.
Discussion
The data on output fluency and retrieval consensus w ill be discussed first,
followed by a discussion of the data on retrieval strategies. Participants found it
easier to generate items for the common than for the ad hoc categories, and
within ad hoc categories, they found it easier to generate items for the familiar
types. These results are in general agreement with those reported in Barsalou
(1983) where the average output fluency for nine common categories and the
average for nine ad hoc categories differed reliably. These statistical differences
may suggest a clear dichotomy between common and ad hoc categories.
However, if the mean output fluency for each category is plotted in rank order,
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TABLE 3
Percentage of Protocol Segments Classified as Indicating Experiential
Mediation, Semantic Mediation, and Unmediated Retrieval for Each
Category and Each Category Type in Study 1
Ex perien tial Semantic Unmediated
Common Categories
Fruit
Vehicle
Mean
67
36
52
Mean 28
16 17
40 25
28 21
10 7
31 15
25 14
12 14
19 13
27 13
10 22
19 18
67 9
65 4
66 7
Concrete Familiar Ad Hoc Categories
Pockets 83
Dogs chase 54
Wedding 62
Plastic 74
Mean 68
Abstract Familiar Ad Hoc Categories
Holiday
Late
Mean
60
69
65
Unfamiliar Ad Hoc Categories
Galapagos 24
Black market 32
as in Fig. 2, a more subtle picture emerges: while fruit and Galapagos anchor the
two extremes of the graph, the smooth transition within these two poles suggests
no important discontinuities corresponding to a processing boundary between
common and ad hoc categories (nor between the different types of ad hoc
category). In this respect, it is interesting to note that our item dom inance
distributions overlapped considerably (see right panel of Fig. 1) as they did. in
fact, in Barsalou (1985).4
The data on the reported strategies (see Table 3) suggest that the mediators
that participants often used were more closely related to personal experiences
that we believe establish, sustain, and tune the meanings of everyday concepts
than to the decontextualised semantics in which theories of everyday concepts
are generally framed. For seven out of the ten categories in this study. the
4 The item dominance distributions for Barsalou's (1985) common and ad hoc categories were
calculated for the top 10 most generated items from the raw data provided in the appendix of his
paper. Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses of these distributions revealed that only weapons and
personality characteristics in others that prevent you [rom being friends with them differed reliably
from the other categories in terms of item dominance; the remaining categories showed item
dominance distributions that did not differ statistically.
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FIG. 2. Rank order of the mean output fluency for each of the 10 categories in Study 1.
proportion of protocol segments indicating an experiential strategy was much
greater than those indicating a semantic strategy. This pattern was noticeably
reversed for Galapagos and black marke I. In these two categories, less than a
third of the protocol segments indicated an experiential strategy.s Participants
were forced to reason explicitly about the membership criteria for these two
unfamiliar categories. Furthermore, the distribution of experiential/semantic
strategies for these two categories indicates that the question' 'how did you go
about thinking of items for this category?" did not bias the retrospective
description of the strategies in a way that would artificially favour experiential
over semantic strategies.
Semantic strategies were about as frequent as experiential strategies for
vehicle. It appears that despite the common usage of this category label, in both
everyday discourse and in concept research, anum ber of subjects experienced
some uncertainty in defining the scope of category mem bership. For example,
one participant wrote: "Thinking that vehicle includes a moving means of
transport on 4 wheels. Is it true? I'm not sure" and another wrote: "1 think 1 may
S Lest the reader thinks that subjects reporting an experiential strategy for these categories were
well travelled. all the protocol segments classified as experiential for Galapagos described television
program mes on exotic islands or the Galapagos Archipelago. For black market, descriptions of media
sources accounted for a third of the experiential strategies (in comparison, for the remaining eight
categories, the average percentage of segments describing a media source was 7%); one subject
reported using her last visit to Russia to generate items; the remaining protocol segments classified as
experiential mediation described information heard from other sources such as friends and relatives.
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have got a bit carried away and put things which would come under transport
rather than vehicles ... ". This uncertainty over category membership seemed to
result in some subjects seeking to establish a definition of the category in term s
of properties, for example, "Transportation over distance for 1 or more human
beings which requires a source of power ... ". Protocols such as these were
classified as semantic. This was the only category that appeared to cause
widespread' 'boundary disputes".
The percentage of protocols indicating unmediated retrieval was lower than
20% in eight of the ten categories. It is likely that only the production of the first
few items for any category was unmediated (Walker & Kintsch, 1985): once the
strong associates of the category labels have been listed, the production of the
remaining items was mediated by elaborative retrieval strategies.
Certain considerations m ight have led us to expect a greater proportion of
semantic strategies for both common and ad hoc categories. In some traditional
accounts, the long-term memory representation of categories is characterised as
being structured along conceptual dimensions (e.g. Henley, 1969; Rips, Shoben,
& Smith, 1973; Lund & Burgess, 1996; Rubin & Olson, 1980). These
dimensions are uncovered through analyses of item proxim ity in subjects' free
recall output; or on the basis of pairwise similarity ratings; or on the basis of
lexical co-occurrence in text. Matrices of item proximity are cluster analysed
(e.g. Friendly, 1977) or subjected to a multidimensional scaling analysis that
yields "interpretable" dimensions along which items vary. For example, Rubin
and Olson (1980) report that size and ferocity are dimensions that underlie
mammals. Given that subjects' output for a common category can be
characterised by a small set of semantic dimensions, it is perhaps surprising
that subjects referred to them so rarely when generating instances. It has been
generally assumed that the nature of the cues that provide the most successful
access to category exemplars shares important similarities with the way these
exemplars are represented in memory (e.g. Barsalou & Sewell, 1985, p. 651;
Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977; Tulving & Thompson, 1973). The protocol
segments from Study 1 suggest that experiential aspects of the context in which
objects as instances of a category are encountered are an intrinsic part of the
category representation.
As Barsalou (1991) has demonstrated, an explicit consideration of the ideals
defining an ad hoc category often guides the generation of instances during
planning. For example, in planning a holiday, people need to consider the
category vacation location. Barsalou reported data indicating that people tailor
the candidate instances of vacation locations along certain ideals, reflecting their
current goals and constraints. Furthermore, the graded structure of an ad hoc
category is determined in part by the extent to which its instances satisfy the
ideal or goal associated with the category (Barsalou, 1985). In this respect, one
might surmise that ad hoc categories are perhaps to some extent even more
amenable to a conscious consideration of the semantic dimensions that define
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them than are common categories. Thus, in the case of pockets, it may not have
been unreasonable to expect subjects' protocols to display an appreciation of the
practical nature of the objects carried in pockets in terms of quotidian needs and
goals. Yet such considerations very rarely surfaced in the subjects' protocols, in
stark contrast with the panoply of personal experience descriptions.
Before we discuss the implications of the prevalence of experiential strategies
in our subjects' protocols, two possible methodological artefacts must be
addressed. The first concerns the way in which ad hoc categories were defined to
the participants. For example, the formulation of things people keep in their
pockets might be interpreted to mean "things people I know-myself
included-keep in their pockets". Instead of focusing on the nature of the
instances that belong to the category, participants might have been encouraged
to retrieve personally relevant memories of things kept in pockets. It is possible
to rephrase ad hoc categories in a way that focuses more clearly on the nature of
the instances; e.g. things that may conveniently be kept in pockets. This
formulation not only eliminates reference to "people" but also emphasises the
nature (and perhaps even the function) of the category instances.
The second potential artefact concerns the relative proportion of ad hoc and
common categories in Study 1 (4 to 1), and their order of presentation. On
average, across all the randomised orders of presentation created for Study I,
participants were much more likely to have generated instances for ad hoc
categories before generating items for the common categories. If the wording of
the ad hoc categories encouraged an experiential retrieval strategy or otherwise
did not sufficiently stress the conceptual dimensions that characterise the
category members, the participants might have simply continued using
experiential strategies for common categories. Study 2 sought to remedy these
shortcom ings by (1) varying the wordings of ad hoc categories, (2) reducing the
ratio of ad hoc to common categories, and (3) by fixing the order of presentation
such that some participants generated item s for common categories before they
were presented with the ad hoc categories.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants. A total of 92 undergraduates from the University of
Hertfordshire volunteered for this study.
Categories. Nine categories were used, four common and five ad hoc. The
common categories, taken from Rosch and Mervis (1975), were fruit, vehicle,
bird, and furniture. Three of the five ad hoc categories were of the concrete
familiar type, namely things people keep in their pockets (or the alternative
wording, things that may conveniently be kept in pockets), things dogs chase (or
things that might be chased by dogs), and a new category things people put on
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walls (or things that can be put on walls). The fourth one was a new abstract
familiar ad hoc category, namely things people hate when they are ill (or things
people would hate when they are if!), and the fifth one was the unfamiliar things
sold on the black market in Russia (or things that could be sold on the black
market in Russia). For convenience the five ad hoc categories will be referred to
as pockets, dogs chase, walls, ill, and black market.
Design and Procedure. The order of presentation of the categories and the
wordings of the ad hoc categories were manipulated in three conditions. In all
three conditions, the categories were blocked such that the participants were
presented with the four common or the five ad hoc categories in consecutive
order. Four different randomised orders of presentation were created within each
block of categories.
Condition A. The four common categories were presented first, followed by
the five ad hoc categories defined with the original wording of Study 1.
Condition B. The five ad hoc categories, defined with the original wording,
were presented first, followed by the four common categories.
Condition C. The same presentation order as in B was used. However, the ad
hoc categories were now defined with an alternative wording that might
encourage the participants to consider the nature andlor the function of the
category members, for example things people keep in their pockets was
presented as things that may conveniently be kept in pockets.
The same experimental procedures as in Study 1 were employed. There were
31 participants in Condition A, 31 in Condition B, and 30 in Condition C.
Across all three conditions, 83% of the protocol segments were classified within
one of the three retrieval strategy categories (experiential, semantic, or
unmediated), 9% resisted the classification scheme, and 8% were uninterpre-
table. The average number of classified protocol segments, across categories,
varied little within each condition: means of 41.2,41.0, and 40.7 for Conditions
A, B, and C respectively.
Results
Output Fluency and Item Dominance. The mean output fluency for each
category and the average output fluency by category type in the three conditions
of Study 2 are reported in the last three columns of Table 2. Highest fluency was
observed for some of the common categories (e.g. !ruit).6 For the common
categories, fluency seemed relatively stable across condition (if anything the
6 As in Study I, difficulty ratings were negatively correlated with output fluency in all three
experimental conditions, smallest r = -.35, P < .0001 (in Condition A), and output forecast was
positively correlated with output fluency in all three conditions, smallest r = .22, P < .0001 (Condition
C). and negatively correlated with difficulty ratings in all three conditions, smallest r= -.23.
p < .0001 (Condition A).
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means slightly increased from A to C). In contrast, for the three types of ad hoc
categories, output fluency seemed to decrease across the conditions. A series of
ANOV A for each category type revealed that output fluency did not differ
reliably across conditions for common categories [F(2, 243) = 1.69] nor for the
unfamiliar ad hoc category [F(2,90) = 2.27]. However, output fluency decreased
reliably across conditions in the abstract familiar [F(2,90) = 8.52, P < .0004], and
concrete familiar ad hoc category types [F(2, 176) = 6.86, P < .002]. The
difference between Conditions Band C, which reflects the effect of rewording
the ad hoc categories, was reliable for two of the five ad hoc categories, namely
pockets (P < .01 using Fisher's post hoc least significant difference) and walls
(P < .03).
The experimental manipulations had little effect on the item dom inance
distributions: within each category, item dominance distributions did not differ
significantly (on the basis of Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses); production
frequencies for the categories used in Study 2 are reported in the Appendix. As
in Study I, there were few salient differences between categories. Thus fruit
showed the highest consensus and ill the lowest. Among the common categories,
consensus for bird and vehicle were the lowest, and the item dom inance
distributions for bird differed significantly from the ones for fruit in all three
conditions. The three fam iliar concrete ad hoc categories showed very sim ilar
distributions across conditions which, generally, did not differ significantly from
the distributions for the common categories. Finally, the item dom inance
distributions for ill differed significantly from the item dominance distributions
from all other categories with the exception of bird, black market, and walls in
Condition A, and black market in Condition C.
Retrieval Strategies. The percentages of protocol segments coded as
reflecting an experiential strategy, a semantic strategy, or no strate gy
(unmediated retrieval) are shown in Fig. 3 for each category in all three
conditions. To facilitate the comparison with the percentages observed for the
categories that were also used in Study 1 (fruit, vehicle, dogs chase, pockets, and
black market) they are plotted alongside the percentages observed in Study 2.
The experimental manipulations appeared to have had no systematic effect on
the relative distribution of the protocol segments: as in Study 1, for all but the
unfamiliar ad hoc category black market, experiential strategies outnumbered
semantic strategies in all conditions, including the two new ad hoc categories, ill
and walls, and, importantly, the two new common categories, bird and furn iture.
The sole exception to this pattern was for vehicle in Condition A. As in Study 1,
retrieving instances for black market was done mostly on the basis of semantic
strategies.
The influence of the prior presentation of the ad hoc categories (using the
wording of Study 1) on the percentage of experiential strategies in common
categories can be assessed by exam ining the data for the four common
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categories between Condition A, in which they were presented first, and
Condition B, in which they followed the ad hoc categories. Vehicle registered an
important difference in that experiential strategies were used much more after
the presentation of the ad hoc categories (Condition B and also in Condition C)
than when the common categories preceded the ad hoc ones (Condition A). For
the remaining three common categories, fruit, bird, and furniture, the
presentation order seemed to have little influenced the extent to which
experiential strategies were employed.
A comparison of Conditions Band C for the ad hoc categories assesses the
effect of rewording the ad hoc concepts in a way that emphasised object-centred
properties. As Fig. 3 indicates, the preponderance of Experiential strategies did
not vary across Conditions Band C for walls and ill; it increased slightly for
pockets, but decreased slightly for dogs chase.
Discussion
The data on output fluency and retrieval consensus essentially painted the same
picture produced by the data in Study 1. Fruit was the best established category
with the largest output fluency and the greatest output consensus. The new
abstract ad hoc category ill, in turn, showed the smallest output fluency and the
lowest output consensus. However, in between these two extremes, neither the
output fluency data nor the item dominance distributions could produce a clear
and systematic wedge between common and ad hoc categories.
The data produced by the first study appeared to indicate that people, when
asked to produce a list of items that are members of some target category, will
do so primarily by retrieving memories of personal experiences in which they
interacted with those items qua mem bers of the target category. Importantly, this
kind of retrieval strategy was employed as much for common as for ad hoc
categories. The categories for which experiential strategies were not used where
the ones for which the participants were unlikely to have experienced the objects
as members of the group specified by the concept. For example, even if the
participants in this study were likely to be very familiar with the items they
listed for black market (e.g. alcohol, jeans, cigarettes) they did not construct
personally relevant contexts in which they encounter these objects. Rather, as
the category is instantiated in Russia and all our participants (except one) had
never set foot there, they were forced to reason about what they knew or intuited
about the Russian black market.
The prevalence of experiential strategies in the first study could have resulted
from certain methodological limitations which Study 2 sought to remedy. Thus,
the wordings of the ad hoc categories were modified to emphasise the
characteristics of the category instances, to see if this would then encourage a
consideration of those characteristics as reported in the retrospective protocols.
The change in wordings had some impact on the participants, as revealed by the
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lower output fluency for all ad hoc category types. Yet as Fig. 3 reveals clearly,
the prevalence of experiential strategies in ad hoc categories was not affected by
the change in wordings (compare Conditions B and C). The category black
market was still the only ad hoc category for which semantic strategies
outnumbered experiential strategies.
Another important aim of the second study was to assess whether the
prevalence of experiential strategies in common categories such as fruit (and to a
lesser extent vehicle) could be attributed to the greater proportion of ad hoc
categories in the test booklets. To that end the ratio of comm on to ad hoc
categories was modified from 1:4 to 4:5, and, importantly, in one condition (A),
the four common categories were presented in a block before the presentation of
the ad hoc categories. Using this procedure, experiential strategies were
dom inant in both Conditions A and B in three of the four common categories
replicating the findings for fruit, and extending them to bird and furniture. In
Condition A, however, only 11% of the protocol segments indicated an
experiential strategy for vehicle. Although vehicle was the only familiar
category in Study 1 that showed a large proportion of semantic protocols, the
distribution of strategies for vehicle in Condition A is difficult to interpret in
light of the fact that the distribution of retrieval strategies for the other three
common categories was stable across the three experimental conditions. This
category was, however, the only one whose scope appeared to be ambiguous to
our subjects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have been fairly sanguine about the informativeness of the retrospective
protocols obtained in these studies. It could be argued that the protocols merely
reflect a reconstructive process ancillary to the one that determ ined the kind
and number of instances generated, and that the predominance of experiential
retrieval strategies is an artefact of that process. A number of considerations,
however, strongly suggest that the strategies reported by the participants did
reflect the ways in which they generated instances. These are, (1) the
specificity of some of the protocol segments, (2) the presence of clusters in
the generated item list that corresponded to the reported strategies, (3) the
tendency to group items into semantic, but not experiential, categories when
people sort a list of items (Walker & Kintsch, 1985), and (4) the lack of
difference in the nature of the strategies reported in concurrent and retro-
spective protocols (Walker & Kintsch, 1985). Let us examine each of these
points in turn.
First, the participants often reported strategies that were very specific. This
specificity casts doubt on the hypothesis that the participants invented strategies
in order to answer the question "how did you go about thinking of items for this
category?". For example, for fruit, one participant wrote:
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If you go to Tesco's in Royston you meet the fruit and vegetable section first of all.
I imagined I was shopping and can remember the layout and most of the fruit.
Another reported the follow ing strategy for bird:
I do a lot of sailing and many boats in the type of sailing boats I sail in are named
after birds; so I went through my memory of the opposition's boats' names.
It seems unlikely that subjects would have put in the effort to confabulate these
detailed and idiosyncratic accounts as opposed to reporting the strategies they
used spontaneously.
The procedure employed for the studies reported here did not lend itself to a
systematic analysis of the correspondence between reported strategies and
instances generated. This is due, in part, to the fact that most strategies were
too idiosyncratic to permit a plausible mapping of generated items to strategies.
For example, a subject m ight report the strategies "what I see at the
supermarket" and "fruits I like" for fruit, but it is then hard to determ ine
whether the production of any particular item was done on the basis of the first
or the second strategy. However, when the reported strategies were based on
norms or knowledge shared by both participants and experimenters (e.g.
arrangement of bedroom furniture) analysis of the protocols revealed some
striking correspondences. Table 4 lists items generated by three participants
(from Study 2), shown in the left portion of each column, along with their
retrospective protocols, shown in the right portion of each column (the back-
slashes indicate how these were segmented). The protocol from 65c accounts
for all the items generated, although the series from blue tit to house martin
could have included smaller clusters produced by local strategies or processes.
The protocol from 82a matches the clusters only to some extent: presumably
furniture van was triggered by van, and scooter is a member of a previous
category. Finally, the protocol from 62c, while perfectly interpretable, is not
specific enough to suggest clusters, and without knowing the arrangement of
this participant's house, it is hard to be confident that he is being quite as
systematic as he says.
Third, Walker and K intsch (1985) asked subjects in one session to sort item s
they had themselves generated in a previous free-emission task. The subjects
were then asked to sort the same items according to the strategy that produced
them. The two groupings hardly overlapped: 85% of the clusters in the first
sorting task were semantic whereas 77% of the clusters in the second sorting
task were episodic. This dissociation suggests that if our participants had no
introspective access to their retrieval strategies and compensated by looking
back on the items they had generated to identify meaningful groupings, they
would have reported, mostly, descriptions of semantic groupings. In contrast,
our subjects converged in great num bers on experiential strategies, replicating
the findings of Walker and Kintsch.
TABLE 4
Protocols of Three Subjects
65 c bird
eagle
owl
blue tit
robin
chaffinch
sparrow
blackbird
thrush
swift
house martin
I thought of big birds/then
of birds I would see in the
garden/then in a zoo.!
W hen I thought of pigeon
the next two came
automatically to mind.
ostrich
pigeon
dove
seagull
82a vehicle
car
lorry
bus
train
coach
motorbike
bicycle
The modes of transport
seen on the road.!
Followed by two wheeled
variety/and then the
building trade. My
husbands works in this
field.
tractor
Land Rover
JeB
crane
van
furniture van
scooter
62 c furn iture
table
chair
dresser
piano
sofa
easy chair
coffee table
wardrobe
bed
dressing table
hi-fi unit
stool
ottoman
desk
M y own house- going
room to room
576
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Fourth, the distribution of experiential and semantic strategies is unlikely to
have been biased by the retrospective nature of the protocol. In Walker and
Kintsch (1985) half of the participants described their retrieval strategies as they
were generating instances and half were asked to do so retrospectively. Although
the concurrent protocols yielded a greater num ber of strategies, an analysis of
the kinds of strategies reported with both procedures revealed that the relative
distribution of semantic and episodic strategies was the same (see Walker &
Kintsch, 1985, p. 277).
Experiential Contexts as Effective Retrieval
Strategies: Implications for Theories of Concepts
The analysis of the protocols generated in the present studies suggests that
output in a free-em ission procedure is governed to a considerable extent by the
nature of the participant's personal experiences. Some of the examples of
semantic fields provided by Gruenewald and Lockhead (1980) correspond to
what we have called experiential strategies (e.g. memorable gourmet meals,
visits to the local supermarket) and these "semantic fields" might be better
characterised as event frames (Barsalou, 1992) where memories for objects,
actions, participants, and situations are woven in a rich fabric of thematic
connections.
Barsalou and his colleagues have offered empirical evidence supporting the
idea that aspects of the situations in which objects are encountered become
integrated in the know ledge of objects and categories. In a concept learning
experiment, Yeh and Barsalou (1996) presented their subjects with instances
from the same category but in different situations. Each situation was correlated
with a different set of re levant properties. If the category representation that
develops as subjects experience different instances across situations is
principally decontextualised, reflecting an abstraction of properties across
contexts, then the recognition of situation-relevant properties should not be
faster when it takes place in that situation. Yet, situations primed the recognition
of situation-relevant properties. Such results suggest that aspects of the
situations in which category instances are encountered form an integral part
of their representation.
The feature list that people report when cued by the name of a category is
presumably a reflection of their mental intension of that category, their concept
of it. Such intensions are known to vary with the cultural point of view the
person takes, they are context-dependent. Similarly context-dependent are the
decisions people make as to the extensional scope of category names,
presumably because the concepts they are instantiating differ with context.
Concrete instantiations of general concepts also vary with context. (See
Barsalou, 1993, for a review). Each of these phenomena can be understood on
the supposition that people are responding on the basis of having retrieved a
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restricted set of individual or generic instances associated with the explicit,
implied, or an analogous context in the stored representation of that concept in
memory. Our own subjects' retrieval efforts consisted mostly in the re-creation
of situations where objects were encountered and experienced.
Barsalou et al. (1993, p. 26) sketch the outlines of a broad ranging theory of
conceptualisation and meaning in which "the fundamental conceptual
representations in the human cognitive system are schematic perceptual images
extracted from all modes of experience" (see also Barsalou, 1993). More
relevant to understanding why experiential context frequently mediates retrieval
in our experiments is their equally radical proposal (p. 38) that' 'concepts are
neither context independent nor universal but are situated and local." Mental
concepts of both particular individuals and generic types of individual, are
always established within and include the perspective of the experiential
scenarios in which they are encountered or imagined. Rather than having an
essential meaning, or even a univocal core, according to Barsalou et al. (1993, p.
47), they are "collections of all specialised models for a particular type of
individual together with their associated generic situations." Context and
context effects are not an optional extra to context-free theories of concepts and
categorisation but are intrinsic to the mental representations constituting
concepts.
That (some) fruit can be bought from a particular display counter in a
supermarket might ordinarily be regarded as encyclopaedic information about
fruit rather than being a part of what "fruit" really means. An alternative view,
however, is that "fruit" has varying usages and does not have a singular real
meaning; rather, "fruit" extensionally refers to just those (partially overlapping)
sets of things, and intensionally to the represented characteristics of the things in
each set that have historically become referred to as "fruit" in particular
experiential contexts (cf. Bloom, 1996). On this view, the concept underlying
"fruit" may be conceived as comprising a probably fuzzy collection of
combined concept/-e.g. fresh fruit salad fruit, garden fruit, exotic fruit,
cooked desert fruit, forest tree fruit, botanical textbook fruit. The prototypical
regularities that have been found in analyses of taxonom ic concepts (e.g. Rosch
& Mervis, 1975) may reflect a pragmatic default of reporting about sets of
instances in common contexts in the absence of any specific directive
otherwise-subjects respond cooperatively to what sense they can make of
7 The term combined concept (or related terms such as conjunctive concept or conjunctive
category) is commonly taken as designating concepts whose verbal label consists of more than a
single word. We do not address the question of cases in which the components of a combined concept
may combine in a compositional manner. As used here the term refers to phrases that we see as
acting in the manner of pointers to prestored experientially related bodies of information. Thus the
term "garden fruit" may be thought of as a verbal shorthand for "fruit that people grow in their
gardens" and not one whose m eaning is to be corn puted from the separate meanings of .. garden"
and of "fruit". We suggest later that monolexemic terms may behave in a similar fashion.
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the investigator's intent. The commonalities that we found in our subjects'
strategies for retrieving instances of common taxonomic categories and a variety
of ad hoc categories would be consistent with this view. Some recent discussions
of the role played by the retrieval of stored instances in the comprehension of
combined concepts are compatible with this view (e.g. Gray & Smith, 1995;
Hampton, 1997).
Barsalou (1983, 1985) noted a variety of measures that, to varying extents,
were correlated with judgements of goodness of category membership.
Similarity to a category ideal and frequency of instantiation (experiencing
potential instances as members of the named category) corre lated with
membership judgements in both his ad hoc and in common taxonomic
categories. Ad hoc and established goal-oriented categories, ex hypothesi, do not
cut nature at the joints and nor do conventional categories of artefacts (e.g.
furniture, vehicles, tools, weapons, clothing) or social roles (e.g. professions). In
fact membership in both artefact and social role categories conforms to the sort
of satisfaction criteria that apply to explicitly goal-oriented categories-hence
good members are close to some ideal(s) and are likely to be frequently
encountered instances. Is there good reason to suppose that so-called natural
kind categories are different? Our retrieval data suggest not, as do Barsalou's
aforementioned findings. If not, then there may be a crucial difference between
the technical use of terms and the folk uses (as in the classic arguments about
whether tomatoes should be called fruit8 or penguins called birds) which we
assume that experimental subjects generally employ.
There is in fact good reason to doubt whether, even in their technical
scientific sense, many (most?) natural kind categories are as clear-cut as seems
to be commonly assumed. Referring to "species" in his exposition of the
Darwinian legacy Dennett (1995, pp. 93-94) remarks that" As Darwin pointed
out, if it weren't for the separations that time and the extinction of the
intermediate stepping-stones has created ( ... ) we could not put them into a
'natural classification'-we need the biggish gaps between extant forms to form
8 The technical definition of "fruit" is "the matured ovulary of angiosperms" (Greulach &
Adams, 1976). It is interesting to note that this is a reference to historical origin rather than to
characteristics of an entity taken out of (developmental) context. On this definition pea, bean, peanut,
walnut, olive, pumpkin, and cucumber are fruit, as well, of course, as tomato. "Vegetable" seems to
be a culinary rather than biological category. Standard dictionaries seem to offer meanings for the
vernacular use of terms, and for "fruit" describe a variable, albeit qualified mix of culinary,
physical, developmental, and sensory characteristics, together with instances, exceptions and contrast
categories, e.g ... An edible part of a plant, generally sweet, acid and juicy, esp. a part that contains
the seed, but sometimes extended to include other parts (e.g. the leaf stalk in rhubarb), and popularly
distinguished from the vegetable, its savoury, firm-fleshed counterpart." (The Cham bers dictionary,
1994); "Something that you can eat that grows on a tree or bush. It has soft or firm flesh, and
contains seeds or a stone. Oranges, bananas and grapes are fruit. Fruit is eaten raw or cooked, usually
as a dessert." (Collins COB UILD dictionary, 1987). The vagueness and contradictions and
differences in emphasis of these two accounts are striking.
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the 'boundaries' of any such classes' (emphasis In the original). Addressing
higher levels of taxonomic classification Morris (1995, p. 662) remarks that
"Even now there are several very peculiar animals ... which apparently defy
placement in known metazoan groups." The extent to which natural kinds are
experienced as distinct kinds (M alt, 1995) may depend on experiencing only a
limited range of variation in a particular ecological range. There is also clear
evidence that folk uses of many purportedly biological natural kind terms differ
from the uses of the same terms in a scientific biological sense in quite radical
ways (Dupre, 1981; Gould, 1990), subdividing and crosscutting scientifically
differentiated kinds.
Perhaps one of the most puzzling questions about conceptual representation is
similar to one concerning beliefs about the paranormal. With respect to the latter
it is not so much whether paranormal phenomena occur or not, as why there
appears to be such a widespread belief that they do. Similar, perhaps, is the
puzzle as to why there appears to have been a widespread view that vernacular
concepts of the sorts discussed here are most usefully characterised by reference
to a singular, integrated, coherent, and context-free meaning at their core. The
view sketched here suggests that common folk concepts of natural, social, and
artefact categories may profitably be viewed as collections of representations of
(partially overlapping) contextually focused combined categories with sub-
stantial autobiographical reference. The independent status of the head concept
in such combinations is interesting. Consider furniture, bedroom furniture, and
schoolroom furniture. It would seem that, for most people, instances of bedroom
furniture are also instances of furniture, but at least some instances of
schoolroom furniture are not (Hampton, 1982, 1988). From the current
perspective this apparent anomaly may arise because a common but restricted
set of furniture (household furniture perhaps) is being queried for the
membership of, say, chalkboard. Naming a superordinate category with a
common monolexemic designator does not mean that all the category is
accessed. The category may be instantiated by an experientially bound but
limited subset of the general category. In this sense a concept is created on the
fly.
Our retrieval data, together with Barsalou et al.'s (1993) theoretical
framework, suggest that at least for concepts of common superordinate
categories there is an important type of constituent conceptual organisation
distinct from that of a taxonomic organisation of subordinates. This level is
organised on a foundation of generic autobiographical experiences and consists
of a corresponding variety of combined concepts whose experiential
perspectives integrate the specific and generic individuals falling within their
range. Such experientially based combined concepts would have a coherence
that derived precisely from the points of view or standpoints or goals that
characterised those experiences and in this sense they may share organisational
characteristics with ad hoc or explicitly goal-oriented concepts.
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Autobiographical Memory and the Meaning of
Objects
The literature on the conceptual representation of categories makes little
systematic reference to the circumstances in which everyday concepts are
applied and which sustain their meaning. There is evidence, however, that
supports the importance of autobiographical memory in underpinning meaning.
Work with neuropsychological patients with semantic dementia reported by
Snowden, Griffiths, and Neary (1994; see also 1995) has shown that even if
these patients' performance on general tests of word comprehension is
extremely poor, their understanding of objects, places, and people that are
encountered on a regular basis is relatively intact. Snowden et al. (1994, p. 287)
argued that it is "the experiential input into the meaning system" that sustains
their meaning. The meaning of objects, places, and people that were part of the
patients' lives some time in the past is lost. This difference "highlights the role
of autobiographical experience in the maintenance of meaning, and underlies the
interrelationship between episodic and semantic memory" (Snowden et al.,
1994, p. 265).
Conway's research has also pointed to a close interdependence between
autobiographical memory and semantics. Conway (1987) asked subjects to
verify true or false semantic facts and autobiographical facts. Semantic
verifications were of the form "is an apple a fruit?", while autobiographical
verifications took the form" are apples your favourite fruit?". These questions
were preceded either by a neutral word or by a category-name prime, for
example "fruit". Semantic verifications were, as expected, faster when
preceded by the presentations of the relevant category-name primes.
Importantly, autobiographical verifications were also primed by the presentation
of a relevant category name, e.g. "fruit" speeded responses to "are apples your
favourite fruit?". Conway (1990b, p. 176) suggested that "frequent and current
autobiographical knowledge might be stored in memory with semantic
knowledge and so help 'customize' the semantic system."
Conway (1990c) provides evidence that memories of specific and generic
personal experiences are closely connected to representation of common and ad
hoc categories. The general procedure employed in that study involved giving
subjects names of categories and asking them to "bring to mind an image of
whatever [you take] the word or phrase to refer" (Conway, 1990c, p. 134).
Conway supplied subjects with three predetermined categories in which to
classify their images: (1) specifically dateable autobiographical memory images;
(2) loosely dateable generic images derived from specific experiences; and (3)
images not based on specific or generic experiences which Conway labelled
"semantic" images. The majority of images elicited by ad hoc categories (e.g.
things to take on holiday) were dateable autobiographical memories (53%;
Experiment I) and 23.5% were generic images. In the classification of the
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protocol segments in our studies, the specific and generic images categories
were fused into the experiential mediation category. On average, 72.6% of the
strategies for the (familiar) ad hoc categories were experiential, a figure that
closely corresponds to the sum of the two percentages just quoted (76.5%). This
convergence is important because, unlike in Conway (1990c), we did not
provide our participants with predetermined categories that would help them
identify their retrieval strategies. Furthermore, the sum of the percentage of the
specific (33.8%) and generic (36.8%) images generated by common category
labels summed to approximately the same value, namely 70.6% (note the
correspondence with the figure reported in Walker & Kintsch, 1985, of 77%
episodic retrieval strategies). Thus, Conway's studies provide further evidence
of the close connections between memory of personal life events and concepts.
The traditional characterisation of semantic and episodic memory (e.g.
Tulving, 1972) attributes language comprehension to semantic memory and the
storage of dateable events to episodic memory. As the basic building blocks of
knowledge are specific episodes, one challenge has been cast as documenting
the process by which more abstract conceptual know ledge emerges out of
individual experiences (e.g. Lucariello & Nelson, 1985). The intimate
connection between personal experience and category instances, as demon-
strated by the former's ability to retrieve the latter, should also encourage the
investigation of the role of specific personal experiences in grounding meaning
and governing reasoning.
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APPENDIX 1
Production frequencies for the categories used in Study 1 and Study 2 (the categories appear in
alphabetical order). An item is included if a minimum of 10% of the subject sample produced it (i.e.
minimum N = 14 when the category was used in both studies, minimum N = 5 when the category was
used in Study 1 only, and minimum N =9 when the category was used in Study 2 only). In Study 2
the ad hoc category descriptions were altered in Condition C (see text), and these are marked by an
asterisk.
Animals found on the Galapagos
Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C
BIRDS 26 26
INSECTS 17 17
TURTLES 16 16
LIZARDS I 5 15
TORTOISES 12 12
MONKEYS 10 10
SNAKES 10 10
FISH 9 9
CRABS 7 7
PARROTS 7 7
SEALS 7 7
IGUANAS 6 6
PEOPLE 6 6
REPTILES 5 5
SEAGULLS 5 5
Bird
Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C
EAGLE 50 17 16 17
ROBIN 49 17 12 20
SPARROW 44 14 17 13
BLACKBIRD 43 14 14 15
BLUE TIT 40 13 14 13
PIGEON 28 7 9 12
THRUSH 28 7 12 9
PARROT 26 8 10 8
DUCK 24 9 10 5
MAGPIE 24 5 11 8
STARLING 22 4 9 9
OWL 21 7 4 10
CROW 20 4 6 10
SEAGULL 16 5 5 6
CHICKEN 15 8 6
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Overall
Item Frequency I 2.A 2.B 2.C
OSTRICH 15 4 4 7
WOODPECKER 14 6 4 4
BUDGIE 14 5 5 4
CANARY 14 5 6 3
HAWK 13 6 4 3
SWAN 13 4 8 I
GREAT TIT 12 3 6 3
SWALLOW 12 3 7 2
TURKEY 11 5 4 2
FINCH 1 1 4 4 3
GOOSE I I 4 4 3
RAVEN 1 1 4 3 4
PHEASANT 1 1 3 4 4
PEACOCK 10 4 1 5
KESTREL 9 3 2 4
WREN 9 3 5
CUCKOO 9 2 4 3
Excuses for arriving somewhere late
Overall
Item Frequency I I.A 2.B i.c
CAR BREAKDOWN 34 34
HEA VY TRAFFIC 22 22
OVERSLEPT 21 21
BUS LATE 15 15
LOST WAY 14 14
PHONE RANG AS I W AS LEA VING 14 14
DELA Y ON TRA IN 13 13
MISSED BUS 12 12
ALARM FAILED 1 1 1 1
TRAFFIC JAM 1 1 1 1
FORGOT 10 10
ACCIDENT-ROAD 9 9
COULDN'T FIND KEYS 8 8
ILLNESS (SELF) 8 8
WATCH STOPPED 8 8
WEATHER CONDITIONS 8 8
COULDN'T FIND THE PLACE 6 6
THOUGHT YOU SAID ANOTHER TIME 6 6
SOMEONE CALLED AS I WAS LEAVING 6 6
CLOCK STOPPED 5 5
EMERGENCY 5 5
FORGOT SOMETHING 5 5
TRANSPORT FAILURE 5 5
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Fruit
Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C
APPLE 134 49 29 29 27
BANANA 131 46 28 28 29
ORANGE 127 44 29 26 28
PEAR 101 36 21 25 19
GRAPE 91 41 15 17 18
STRAWBERRY 86 22 24 20 20
KIWI 83 34 17 18 14
MELON 77 26 20 17 14
PINEAPPLE 76 26 17 \5 \8
GRAPEFRUIT 68 30 16 12 10
PEACH 68 24 11 18 15
PLUM 63 25 7 13 18
MANGO 61 21 11 13 16
RASPBERRY 60 17 18 13 12
CHERRY 52 18 10 11 13
LEMON 50 19 12 10 9
TOM ATO 47 25 7 10 5
BLACKBERRY 45 15 I1 12 7
NECTARINE 40 16 3 II 10
LIME 34 13 7 7 7
PASSION FRUIT 30 1I 7 5 7
STAR FRUIT 29 12 8 5 4
APRICOT 26 10 7 3 6
GOOSEBERRY 26 9 8 6 3
BLACKCURRANT 25 8 7 5 5
BLUEBERRY 24 8 7 6 3
SATSUMA 23 13 5 I 4
TANGERINE 23 11 4 2 6
LYCHEE 23 9 6 4 4
GUAVA 19 8 3 3 5
AVOCADO 17 6 3 4 4
POMEGRANATE 16 8 3 2 3
CLEMENTINE 15 14 0 0
Furniture
Overall
Item Frequency I 2.A 2.B 2.C
CHAIR 83 28 26 29
TABLE 81 27 27 27
BED 68 22 24 22
WARDROBE 53 16 14 23
SOFA 43 7 18 18
DESK 42 14 16 12
STOOL 30 13 13 4
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Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C
CUPBOARD 30 9 13 8
CHEST OF DRA WERS 25 8 8 9
CABINET 24 12 5 7
COFFEE TABLE 24 9 10 5
SETTEE 24 7 11 6
DRESSING TABLE 23 7 8 8
SIDEBOARD 23 7 8 8
ARMCHAIR 17 6 5 6
DINING TABLE 16 5 8 3
LAMP 14 8 3 3
Reasons for going on holiday
Item
Overall
Frequency
TO RELAX
TOGETATAN
FOR FUN
SUN
TO REST
BREAK
VISIT FAMILY
VISIT FRIEND
M EET NEW PEOPLE
TO SEE NEW PLACES
SPEND TIME WITH FAMILY
STRESS
CHANGE OF SCENERY
LEARN ABOUT DIFFERENT CULTURES
WIN A HOLIDAY
CHANGE OF CLIMATE
FOR PLEASURE
SEA
SEE THE WORLD
SPEND TIME WITH FRIENDS
TO GET AWAY
FOR A CHANGE
LEARN ABOUT DIFFERENT CUSTOMS
SPORTS
TO TR Y DIFFERENT FOODS
WARMTH
26
16
14
14
13
1 1
1 1
10
9
9
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
1 2.A
26
16
14
14
13
11
11
10
9
9
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
2.B 2.C
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Things dogs chase
Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C*
CATS 137 46 3 I 30 30
BALLS 94 37 18 20 19
OTHER DOGS 90 26 23 24 17
STICKS 75 34 12 13 16
CARS 67 22 17 15 13
POSTMEN 67 17 18 16 16
PEOPLE 66 30 11 16 9
RABBITS 66 19 14 15 18
BIRDS 56 17 17 10 12
OWN TAIL 49 21 12 12 4
CHILDREN 40 8 13 10 9
BICYCLES 29 9 10 5 5
FLIES 24 9 7 6 2
BONES 22 6 2 6 8
SHEEP 20 6 3 8 3
FOXES 19 9 3 3 4
FRISBEES 18 9 8 0 1
TOYS 18 8 4 5 I
BURGLARS 18 6 6 4 2
LEA YES 15 6 2 6
SQUIRRELS 14 6 3 2 3
Things made mostly of plastic
Overall
Item Frequency I 2.A 2.B 2.C
PENS 19 19
COMPUTERS 15 15
TOYS 15 15
BAGS 1 1 11
CARRIER BAGS 10 10
CHAIRS 7 7
FOOD CONTAINERS 7 7
BIN LINERS 6 6
BIROS 6 6
BOWLS 5 5
CONTAINERS 5 5
DRINK BOTTLES 5 5
TUPPERWARE 5 5
WASHING UP BOWLS 5 5
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Things people hate when they are ill
Overall
Item Frequency I 2.A 2.B 2.C*
NOISE 38 10 15 13
FOOD 30 13 10 7
TAKING MEDICINE 28 10 II 7
BEING TOO HOT 19 8 9 2
VOM ITING 18 8 4 6
PAIN 17 6 9 2
HOSPIT ALS 15 8 7 0
DOCTORS 15 6 6 3
HA VING TO WORK 15 5 5 5
BEING TOO COLD 14 9 4 1
Things people keep in their pockets
Overall
Item Frequency I 2.A 2.B 2.C*
KEYS 117 42 22 27 26
MONEY 106 39 17 27 23
PENS 93 33 23 18 19
WALLET 90 35 18 23 14
HANDKERCHIEF 73 29 18 14 12
SWEETS 66 29 8 14 15
TISSUES 62 27 12 13 10
CREDIT CARD 42 19 8 9 6
LOOSE CHANGE (COINS) 40 12 15 6 7
CIGARETTES 37 15 8 12 2
PURSE 32 8 )0 9 5
BITS OF PA PER 31 9 14 2 6
COMB 29 13 10 4 2
LIGHTER 27 12 5 8 2
CHEWING GUM 25 1 1 7 4 3
DIARY 22 10 4 4 4
PENCILS 22 5 5 7 5
ID CARD 21 8 5 5 3
LIPSTICK 21 6 5 5 5
CONDOMS 20 4 8 4 4
MATCHES 19 12 5 1
WATCH 19 6 4 3 6GLOVES 14 8 2 3 1RECEIPT 14 7 3 3
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Things people put on walls
Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C
PICTURES 76 25 25 26
WALLPAPER 66 22 24 20
PAINT 53 18 18 17
POSTERS 43 17 16 10
SHELVES 40 13 15 12
PHOTOS 34 13 14 7
MIRRORS 27 8 9 10
LA MPS/LIGHTS 25 7 12 6
PAINTINGS 21 8 8 5
CUPBOARDS 18 6 6 6
GRAFFITI 16 6 7 3
CLOCKS 16 5 7 4
HOOKS 16 6 4 6
PLATES 14 6 4 4
NOTICEBOARDS 12 5 5 2
(LIGHT) SWITCHES 12 3 6 3
TAPESTRY 10 5 3 2
CALENDARS 10 4 4 2
PLASTER 10 4 4 2
TELEPHONES 10 4 4 2
ORNAMENTS 10 3 4 3
BLACKBOARDS 9 3 2 4
NAILS 9 3 2 4
Things people take to a wedding
Overall
Item Frequency 1 2.A 2.B 2.C
PRESENTS 45 45
CAMERA 30 30
CONFETTI 25 25
FLOW ERS 21 21
CARD 19 19
HAT 18 18
CARS 14 14
RINGS 14 14
MONEY 11 11
CHILDREN 10 10
INVITATION 9 9
HANDBAG 7 7
RICE 7 7
VIDEO CAMERA 7 7
HORSESHOE 6 6
THEMSELVES 6 6
CAKE 5 5
FRIEND 5 5
RELATIVES 5 5
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Things sold on the black market in Russia
Overall
Item Frequency 1 20A 20B 20C
DRUGS 74 23 18 16 17
FOOD 73 24 15 19 15
CLOTHES S9 19 13 12 IS
JEANS 52 20 12 II 9
ALCOHOL 40 16 7 11 6
FOREIGN MONEY 35 14 7 6 8
CIGARETTES 34 7 13 8 6
MEAT 25 10 9 3 3
CARS 24 7 5 6 6
JEWELLERY 22 4 6 7 5
ELECTRICAL GOODS 19 8 3 6 2
GUNS 19 6 3 5 5
BREAD 18 3 8 6
TV 17 7 4 3 3
WATCHES 17 4 6 4 3
MEDIC INES 14 3 3 7
PASSPORTS 14 7 3 2 2
DOLLARS 14 5 3 3 3
Vehicle
Overall
Item Frequency 1 20A 20B 20C
CAR 126 47 29 22 28
BICYCLE 92 34 22 17 19
BUS 80 33 19 12 16
MOTORCYCLE 78 34 10 14 20
LORRY 75 31 15 13 16
TRAIN 66 29 16 11 10
PLANE 65 29 11 12 13
VAN 58 20 15 12 11
BOAT 36 16 3 9 8
COACH 33 12 10 6 5
TRACTOR 31 9 5 10 7
TRAM 27 11 7 6 3
TRUCK 25 12 6 6 1
HELICOPTER 21 13 2 3 3
MOPED 21 7 4 3 7
SHIP 21 6 4 3 8
HOVERCRAFT 17 12 2 2 1
TRICYCLE 17 8 3 3 3
SCOOTER 16 5 4 1 6
FERRY 14 13 0 0
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Thank you for taking part in this study
INSTRUCTIONS
This booklet consists of 10 exercises. At the top of the first page of each exercise you will see
the name of a category, for example,
THINGS THAT HAVE TO BE WASHED OFTEN
You are asked to list the names of items which you think belong in this category. You will be
allowed 90 seconds in which to list as many items as possible. On the next page you will be
asked to answer three written questions about the list you have just produced. A further 90
seconds will be allowed to complete your answers.
You should repeat this procedure for each of the 10 exercises.
You will be told when to start each exercise and when the 90 seconds allowed for each
section is up.
There are no right or wrong items to list. All that is required is that you list the items which
occur to you personally.
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------------------------------------------------
...------------------------ .._------------------
--------------------------_.--------------------
------------------------------------------------
-------------- ....__ .-....._--------- .._-- .._---
------------------------------------------------
---_ _------------ .._----------------------
--_.--- ..-- _-_._-- _--_ _------ ..
---_ ..._-----------------._------------_._--_ ...
------------- ....._---._---_ .._--..._------- ....
_ -----_ _-_._-- _------._-- _
-_...._..._--------_ ...-._...._----------._._._.
--------------------------_._-----------------.
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Please complete the following questions
1) Place a mark on the scale below to indicate how difficult it was to think of items for
this category?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not difficult at all Very difficult
2) If you were given another 10 minutes, how many more items do you think you would
be able to produce? (give a number)
3) How did you go about thinking of items for this category?
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Thank you for taking part in this study
INSTRUCTIONS
This booklet consists of 9 exercises. At the top of the first page of each exercise you will see
the name of a category, for example,
THINGS THAT HAVE TO BE WASHED OFTEN
Or, perhaps
VEGETABLE
You are asked to list the names of items which you think belong in this category. You will be
allowed 90 seconds in which to list as many items as possible. On the next page you will be
asked to answer three written questions about the list you have just produced. A further 90
seconds will be allowed to complete your answers.
You should repeat this procedure for each of the 9 exercises.
You will be told when to start each exercise and when the 90 seconds allowed for each
section is up.
There are no right or wrong items to list. All that is required is that you list the items which
occur to you personally.
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---------------.-------- .._---------- ..._-------
--------------_ .._._------_._--------------_._--
---------------------------------------------._-
-----------_._---_._--_._-_._-------------------
----------_ .._------.---------------------------
..._------_._- ..__ .._-----_ ...._- ..-._-_._------
_.._._----_._ __ __ .._.._-_._--_ .
_..-----_._ _ _-._._._----.-._- .._ _-
-----_ ..__ ._._ ...._-_. __ ....._-_.- ..-._..-.._---
VEHICLE
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Please complete the following questions
1) Place a mark on the scale below to indicate how difficult it was to think of items for
this category?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not difficult at all Very difficult
2) If you were given another 10 minutes, how many more items do you think you would
be able to produce? ( give a number)
3) How did you go about thinking of items for this category?
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INSTRUCTIONS
Groups of objects or entities tend to be grouped together in Categories. There are some
categories, such as Vegetable or Sport which are very familiar to you and for which you
would easily be able to think of examples or members. There are other categories which may
seem more unusual, such as Things people leave behind in Theatres or Things that need
painting regularly - you may find it a little harder to think of members of these categories.
What we have done in this study is provide you with the names of some categories ( some
familiar, some less so) and a list of things which are members. What we would like you to do
is consider these members and make decisions about how good an example of the category
any particular member is. For example, if you think of the category SPORT, you may
consider that the member Football is a very good example of this category, that volley-ball is
quite a good example but not as good as football and that Chess is a very poor example.
THE TASK YOU ARE REQUIRED TO DO HAS TWO STAGES.
StaKe 1
At the top of each of page in this booklet you will see the name of a category. Below that will
be the names of 15 members of that category. What we would like you to do first is to
arrange those members in your own PERSONAL order of "goodness of example" for the
category name given. For example:-
VEGETABLE My Order of "Goodness of Example"
Carrot
Potato
Pea
Aubergine
Lettuce
Onion
Cauliflower
Cabbage
Cucumber
Sweetcorn
Radish
Runner bean
Broccoli
Artichoke
Mushroom
I.Potato
2.Lettuce
3Pea
4.0nion
5.etc.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
If you thought Potato was the best example of the category VEGETABLE you would put that
in position 1 - if you thought Lettuce was the next best example then that would occupy
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position 2 etc. down to the least good example of the category which you would put in
position 15.
Stage 2.
When you have done that for the first category, we want you to go back to each item in the
order you have produced and give it a rating of "goodness of example" by circling the
appropriate number on the rating scale beside each member. The scales look like this:-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Example Excellent Example
So if you were considering Lettuce as an example of the category Vegetable you may think
this a good example but not the best possible example and so circle a rating of say, 7.
Remember. you have only been given a selection of members for each category so you may
not necessarily consider any of them to be an 'Excellent' example of that category, not even
the one you put in first position on your ordering. In the same way, the member that came last
in your ordering need not necessarily be a poor member - it may be quite a good member but
the worst of the selection you were given.
If you wish, you may give the same rating to more than one member.
Oyerall Procedure
When you have completed the ratings for all members of that category then tum to the next
category and repeat the procedure i.e. order the members first in order of goodness-of-
example- then give each member a goodness-of-example rating, and so on until you have
completed all categories in the booklet. Take your time, we'd like you to think about this
exercise carefully.
There are no right or wrong responses, it is your personal orderinKs and ratinKs which
we are interested in.
It's quite difficult to decide how a number of items should be ordered and so you have been
provided with scrap paper so you can have a go at trying different orders until you find one
which you are happy with and that should be given as your "final ordering". Your final
ordering and ratings should be given in the answer booklet provided.
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Sample Page:
CATEGORY; FRUIT
ORANGE
GRAPE
PEAR
MELON
APPLE
KIWI
PINEAPPLE
GRAPEFRUIT
PEACH
CHERRY
LEMON
BLACKBERRY
BANANA
MANGO
CLEMENTINE
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APPENDIXE
STIMULI USED TO OBTAIN TYPICALITY RATINGS
310
Stimuli for Typicality ratings
BIRD FURNITURE SHELF DOGS CHASE
Eagle Chair CDs Cats
Robin Table Newspapers Other Dogs
Blackbird Piano Photographs Balls
Sparrow Sofa Plants Sticks
Blue Tit Bed Bottles Bicycles
Starling Wardrobe Stereo Postman
Hen Desk Pictures Birds
Gull Cabinet Videos Cars
Thrush Cupboard Screws Rabbit
Vulture Stool Tel~hone Their own Tails
Emu Sideboard Vases Burglars
Pelican Footstool Clock Squirrels
Owl Dressing Table Ornaments Their owners
Crow Cushion Books Strangers
Wren Bookshelves Plates Cows
ATTIC WEDDING BLACK MARKET VEHICLE
Xmas Decorations Flowers Food Car
Memories Confetti Drugs Bicycle
Old Clothes Present Jeans Lorry/Truck
Books Card Clothes Bus
Spiders Champagne Cigarettes Train
Dust Cake Cars Plane
Suitcases Rin_gs Currency Van
Toys Video Camera GunslWeapons Coach
Furniture Food Electrical goods Boat
Old letters Suit Jewellery Tram
Antiques Hat Video Recorders Submarine
Cobwebs Family T.Vs Rickshaw
Water Tank Cars Magazines Yacht
Animal Nest Rice Furniture Trailer
Boxes Camera Fashion Accessories Moped
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Stimuli for Typicality ratings contd.
FRUIT POCKETS
Apple Keys
Orange Money
Banana Pens
Pear Wallet
Grape Handkerchief
Melon Tissues
Grapefruit Scraps of paper
Lemon Sweets
Pineapple Credit cards
Kiwi Fruit Cigarettes
Pomegranate Chewing gum
Apricot Receipt
Peach Lipstick
Clementine Condoms
Avocado Buttons
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APPENDIXF
TYPICALITY RATINGS: ANSWER BOOK SAMPLE PAGE
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FRUIT
ORDER OF IIGOODNESS OF EXAMPLE"
EXAMPLE"
RATING OF IIGOODNESS OF
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor
Excellent
example
example
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
11- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
13. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
14. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
15. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Poor Excellent
314
APPENDIXG
TYPICALITY RATINGS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
(Items chosen for use in similarity study shown in bold)
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TYPICALITY RATINGS' MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
VEHICLE fRUIT
CAR 9 0 APPLE 8.53 1.61
BUS 8.02 1 ORANGE 8.51 1.45
LORRY 7.2 1.64 BANANA 7.98 1.73
TRAIN 7.02 1.82 PEAR 7.3 1.63
COACH 7.02 1.61 PEAO-I 6.37 1.7
VAN 7 1.79 GRAPE 6.33 2.07
PLANE 5.98 2.21 PINEAPPLE 5.91 1.95
BICYaE 5.89 2.37 MELON 5.53 1.97
BOAT 5.41 2.23 LEMON 5.14 2.4
~ 4.84 1.94 CLEMENTINE 5.14 2.26
TRAM 4.25 1.88 APRICOT 5.02 2.02
YACHT 3.23 1.82 GRAPEFRUIT 5.02 2.01
TRAILER 3.11 1.93 KIWI 4.74 2.18
RICKSHAW 2.55 2.02 POMEGRANfTE 3.14 2.36
SUBMARINE 2.41 1.7 AVOCADO 2.4 1.94
WEDDING DOGS
RN3S 6.66 2.48 CATS 8.14 1.09
PRESENT 7.5 1.72 STlCKS 8.07 1.47
CAMERA 7.3 1.49 BALLS 7.52 1.7
CONFETTII 7.11 1.85 OTHER DOGS 6.61 1.99
FAMILY 6.7 2.54 POSTMENT 6.07 2.49
SUIT 6.43 2 RABBITS 5.66 2.37
RONERS 6.3 1.94 OWN TAILS 5.55 2.37
VIDEO 6.16 1.95 BIRDS 5.45 2.26
CAMERA
CARD 5.89 2.33 BURGlARS 5.05 2.28
CARS 5.48 2.42 STRANGERS 5.02 2.2
CHAMPAGNE 5.11 2.13 00UIARa.S 4.51 2.4
HAT 5.09 2.25 CARS 3.93 2.28
CAKE 4.8 2.52 BICYCLES 3.86 2.03
FOOD 3.91 1.84 OWNERS 3.82 2.3
FICE 2.93 2.24 COWS 1.84 1.35
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TYPICALITY RATINGS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS Contd.
B.MARKET arne
DRUGS 7.41 1.81 BOXES 8.00 1.00
GUNS 7.02 1.97 WATER 7.55 1.63
TANK
ELECTRICAL 6.52 1.7 DUST 7.09 2.63
GOODS
CIGARETTES 5.95 2.31 SUITCASES 6.73 2.10
QJARB\CY 5.93 2.4 TOYS 6.64 1.75
FOOD 5.86 3.02 XMASDECOS 6.64 2.16
VIDEOS 5.84 2.08 we.mIES 6.36 2.46
TVS 5.82 1.79 COBWEBS 6.27 2.41
JEWEUERY 5.77 2.04 OLD CLOTHES 6.18 1.47
CLOTHES 5.14 1.9 OLD LETTERS 6.00 2.32
JEANS 4.91 2.09 SPIDERS 5.55 2.16
CARS 4.91 2.25 RJRNrTURE 5.55 1.81
FASHION 3.64 5.82 ANTIQUES 5.27 1.74
ACCESSORIES
FURNrruRE 3.2 1.86 BOOKS 5.18 2.18
MAGAZINES 2.48 1.64 ANIMAL 4.80 3.05
NESTS
SHELl: fOCKElS
ORNAMENTS 8.64 0.67 MONEY 8.43 0.9
BOOKS 7.91 2.12 WALLET 8.27 1.11
PHOTOS 7.73 1.27 KEYS 8.2 1.07
VASES 6.45 1.86 TISSUE 6.75 1.81
CLOCKS 6.36 1.91 CIGARETTES 6.55 1.89
PLANTS 6.27 1.56 CHEWING aM 6.36 1.91
VIDEOS 6 2.24 CREDIT CARD 6.11 2.21
CD 5.82 2.4 HANKY 5.75 2.14
sornss 5.45 2.11 RECEPr 5.39 2.01
PLATES 5.09 2.51 SWEETS 5 1.8
STEREO 4.91 2.34 PAPER 4.86 2.39
PICTURES 4.55 2.5 CONDOM 4.7 2.02
TELEPHONE 3.64 1.57 PEN 4.61 2.06
NEWSPAPER 2.45 1.51 UPSllCK 4.14 2.06
SCREWS 2 1.55 BUTIONS 2.41 2.09
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TYPICALITY RATINGS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS Contd.
fURNITURE BIRD
CHAIR 8.45 0.52 BLUE TIT 8.5 0.71
WARDROBE 7.82 1.17 SPARROW 8.5 0.71
TABLE 7.82 1.66 ROBIN 8.2 1.87
BED 7.55 1.29 BLACKBIRD B.2 1.32
CHESTCF 7.36 1.21 lHRUSH B.l 0.99
DRAWERS
SOFA 7.09 1.45 CFDN 7.B 1.23
DESK 6.91 1.64 STARLING 7.56 2.07
CUPBOARD 6.55 1.86 EAGLE 7.1 1.6
DRESSING TABLE 6.36 2.42 GULL 6.7 2.1
STOOL 6.36 2.29 VVREN 6.33 2.12
SIDEBOARD 5.82 2.93 OWL 6.2 2.26
BOOKSHELVES 5.64 1.75 VULlURE 5.9 2.1B
FOOTSTOOL 5.27 2.49 PEUCAN 5.7 2.31
PIANO 2.82 1.4 HEN 4.6 2.27
CUSHION 2.55 1.97 EMU 4.2 2.66
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APPENDIXH
ITEM PAIRINGS FOR SIMILARITY STUDY
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Item Pairings for similarity rating study
Typical - Typical Typical-atypical AWical-atypical
FRUIT
Apple-Orange Apple- Avocado Avocado- Pomegranate
Orange- Banana Apple -Pomegranate Pomegranate- Kiwi
Apple -Banana Apple-Kiwi Avocado-Kiwi
Orange- Avocado
Orange- Pomegranate
Orange- Kiwi
Banana-Avocado
Banana- Pomegranate
Banana-Kiwi
FURNITURE
Chair-Table Chair-Cushion Cushion- Piano
Table-Wardrobe Chair-Piano Piano- Footstool
Chair- Wardrobe Chair-Footstool Cushion- Footstool
Table-Cushion
Table-Piano
Table-Footstool
Wardrobe-Cushion
Wardrobe-Piano
Wardrobe- Footstool
BIRD
Sparrow-Blue Tit Sparrow-Emu Emu-Hen
Blue-Tit - Robin Sparrow-Hen Hen-Pelican
Sparrow-Robin Sparrow-Pelican Emu-Pelican
Blue-Tit - Emu
Blue-Tit - Hen
Blue-Tit - Pelican
Robin- Emu
Robin-Hen
Robin- Pelican
VEHICLE
Car-Bus Car-Submarine Submarine- Rickshaw
Bus- LC>!!)' Car-Rickshaw Submarine- Yacht
Car-Lorry Car-Yacht Rickshaw- Yacht
Bus-Submarine
Bus-Rickshaw
Bus-Yacht
Lorry-Submarine
Lorry-Rickshaw
Lqrry- Yacht
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Typical - Typical Typical-atypical Atypical-atypical
THINGS DOG CHASE
Cat-Stick Cat-Cow Cow-Owner
Stick-Ball Cat-Owner Owner-Bi9'_cle
Cat-Ball Cat-Bicycle Cow-Bicycle
Stick-Cow
Stick-Owner
Stick-Bicycle
Ball-Cow
Ball-Owner
Ball-Bicycle
THINGS YOU FIND IN AN ATTIC
Box-Water Tank Box-Book Book-Antigue
Water Tank-Dust Box-Antique Ant!9..ue-~ider
Box-Dust Box-Spider Book-Spider
Water Tank-Book
Water Tank-Antique
Water Tank-~ider
Dust-Book
Dust-Antique
Dust-Spider
THINGS PEOPLE TAKE TO A WEDDING
Present-Camera Present-Rice Rice-Cake
Camera-Confetti Present-Cake Cake-Hat
Present-Confetti Present-Hat Rice-Hat
Camera-Rice
Camera-Cake
Camera-Hat
Confetti -Rice
Confetti-Cake
Confetti-Hat
Photograph- Tel~hone
Clock-Screw
Clock- Newspaper
Clock- Telephone
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Typical - Typical Typical-atypical Atypical-atypical
THINGS YOU FIND ON A SHELF
Ornament- Ornament-Screw Screw-Newspaper
Photograph
Ornament -Clock Ornament-Newspaper Newspaper-Telephone
Photograph-Clock Ornament-Telephone Screw-Telephone
Photograph- Screw
Photograph- Newspaper
Photograph- Telep_hone
Clock-Screw
Clock- Newspaper
Clock- Telephone
THINGS SOLD ON THE BLACK MARKET IN RUSSIA
Drugs-Gun Drugs- Magazine Magazine -Furniture
Gun- Electrical Drugs- Furniture Furniture- Fashion
Goods Accessories
Drugs- Electrical Drugs- Fashion Magazine- Fashion
Goods Accessories Accessories
Gun- Magazine
Gun- Furniture
Gun- Fashion
Accessories
Electrical Goods-
Magazine
Electrical Goods-
Furniture
Electrical Goods-
Fashion Accessories
THINGS THAT MAYBE CONVENIENTLY KEPT IN POCKETS
Money-Wallet Money-Button Button-Lipstick
Wallet-Key Money-Lipstick Lipstick-Pen
Money-Key Money-Pen Button-Pen
Wallet-Button
Wallet-Lipstick
Wallet-Pen
Key-Button
Key-Lipstick
Key-Pen
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APPENDIX I
INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE PAGES OF MATERIALS FOR SIMILARITY STUDY
(No Context Retrospective Protocol)
(With Context Retrospective Protocol)
(No Context Concurrent Protocol)
(With Context Retrospective Protocol)
(No Context No Protocol)
(With Context No Protocol)
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
On each of the following pages you will see names of items presented together in pairs,
for example:
SHIRT SHOE
You will be asked to consider how similar you think these items are to each other and to
mark your judgement on a scale like this:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
You indicate your judgement by circling the appropriate number on the scale. For
example, if you felt that the items were quite dissimilar but did have some similarity to
each other then you might want to circle the 3 or 4. If you felt that they were very
similar you might want to circle the 7,8 or 9 depending on the strength of your feeling.
You will be required to write down the things that you considered when you made your
judgement. Try to give as full account as possible.
You will be given 90 seconds to complete each page. You will be told when to start each
page and when the 90 seconds allowed for each page is up.
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OWNER BICYCLE
HOW SIMILAR ARE AN OWNER AND A BICYCLE?
Mark your judgement about the similarity of an OWNER and a BICYCLE on the scale
below
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
NOW WRITE DOWN THE THINGS YOU ARE CONSIDERING IN MAKING YOUR
JUDGEMENT OF SIMILARITY.
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
On each of the following pages you will see the name of a category and below that the
names of two members of that category presented together in pairs, for example:
THINGS THAT PEOPLE WEAR
SHIRT SHOE
You will be asked to consider how similar you think these items are to each other and to
mark your judgement on a scale like this:
not similar at aU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
You indicate your judgement by circling the appropriate number on the scale. For
example, if you felt that the items were quite dissimilar but did have some similarity to
each other then you might want to circle the 3 or 4. If you felt that they were very
similar you might want to circle the 7,8 or 9 depending on the strength of your feeling.
You will be required to write down the things that you considered when you made your
judgement. Try to give as full account as possible.
You will be given 90 seconds to complete each page. You will be told when to start each
page and when the 90 seconds allowed for each page is up.
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THINGS DOGS CHASE
OWNER BICYCLE
HOW SIMILAR ARE AN OWNER AND A BICYCLE?
Mark your judgement about the similarity of an OWNER and a BICYCLE on the scale
below
not similar at all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
NOW WRITE DOWN THE THINGS YOU ARE CONSIDERING IN MAKING YOUR
JUDGEMENT OF SIMILARITY.
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
On each of the following pages you will see names of items presented together in pairs,
for example:
SHIRT SHOE
You will be asked to consider how similar you think these items are to each other and to
write down the things you are considering in making a judgement of similarity. Try to
give as full an account as possible. When you have done this, you will be required to
mark your judgement on a scale like this:
not similar at aU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
You indicate your judgement by circling the appropriate number on the scale. For
example, if you felt that the items were quite dissimilar but did have some similarity to
each other then you might want to circle the 3 or 4. Ifyou felt that they were very
similar you might want to circle the 7,8 or 9 depending on the strength of your feeling.
You will be given 90 seconds to complete each page. You will be told when to start each
page and when the 90 seconds allowed for each page is up.
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OWNER BICYCLE
HOW SIMILAR ARE AN OWNER AND A BICYCLE?
WRITE DOWN THE THINGS YOU ARE CONSIDERING IN MAKING YOUR
JUDGEMENT OF SIMILARITY.
Now mark your judgement about the similarity of an OWNER and a BICYCLE on the scale
below
not similar at all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
On each of the following pages you will see the name of a category and below that the
names of two members of that category presented together in pairs, for example:
THINGS THAT PEOPLE WEAR
SHIRT SHOE
You will be asked to consider how similar you think these items are to each other and to
write down the things you are considering in making a judgement of similarity. Try to
give as full an account as possible. When you have done this, you will be required to
mark your judgement on a scale like this:
not similar at all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
You indicate your judgement by circling the appropriate number on the scale. For
example, if you felt that the items were quite dissimilar but did have some similarity to
each other then you might want to circle the 3 or 4.1f you felt that they were very
similar you might want to circle the 7,8 or 9 depending on the strength of your feeling.
You will be given 90 seconds to complete each page. You will be told when to start each
page and when the 90 seconds allowed for each page is up.
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THINGS DOGS CHASE
OWNER BICYCLE
HOW SIMILAR ARE AN OWNER AND A BICYCLE?
WRITE DOWN THE THINGS YOU ARE CONSIDERING IN MAKING YOUR
JUDGEMENT OF SIMILARITY.
Now mark your judgement about the similarity of an OWNER and a BICYCLE on the scale
below
not similar at all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
On each of the following pages you will see the names of items presented together in
pairs, for example:
SHIRT SHOE
You will be asked to consider how similar you think these items are to each other and to
mark your judgement on a scale like this:
not similar at aU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
You indicate your judgement by circling the appropriate number on the scale. For
example, if you felt that the items were quite dissimilar but did have some similarity to
each other then you might want to circle the 3 or 4. If you felt that they were very
similar you might want to circle the 7,8 or 9 depending on the strength of your feeling. I
would like you to give each pair and each rating some thought but ask you not to spend
too long on each pair.
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OWNER BICYCLE
HOW SIMILAR ARE AN OWNER AND A BICYCLE?
Mark your judgement about the similarity of an OWNER and a BICYCLE on the scale
below
1 2 73 4 5 6 8 9
not similar at all very similar
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
On each of the following pages you will see the name of a category and below that the
names of two members of that category presented together in pairs, for example:
THINGS THAT PEOPLE WEAR
SHIRT SHOE
You will be asked to consider how similar you think these items are to each other and to
mark your judgement on a scale like this:
not similar at aU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very similar
You indicate your judgement by circling the appropriate number on the scale. For
example, if you felt that the items were quite dissimilar but did have some similarity to
each other then you might want to circle the 3 or 4. Ifyou felt that they were very
similar you might want to circle the 7,8 or 9 depending on the strength of your feeling. I
would like you to give each pair and each rating some thought but ask you not to spend
too long on each pair.
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TmNGS DOGS CHASE
OWNER BICYCLE
HOW SIMILAR ARE AN OWNER AND A BICYCLE?
Mark your judgement about the similarity of an OWNER and a BICYCLE on the scale
below
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
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APPENDIXJ
INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE PAGE OF MATERIALS FOR COLLECTION OF
ITEM-TO-EVENT DATA
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
Please read the following instructions very carefully and ensure that you fully
understand the task that is required of you.
When you think of an event or situation, there are a variety of items that may
come to mind. For example, when I think of a lecture I think of a white board,
an overhead projector, students, handouts etc. At the top of each of the
following pages, you will see the name of an event or situation. For each page
you will be allowed 90 seconds to list as many items as you can which the event
or situation bring to mind. At the bottom of each page I would like you to
indicate how often you have been in this situation by ticking one of the
following options:
Never less than 10 times more than 10 times more than 50 times
o 0 0 0
You will be told when to start each page and when to turn over and start the next page.
Please do not start each page until you are told to do so.
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HAVING A SHOWER
I have been in this situation
Never less than 10 times
o
more than 10 times
o
more than 50 times
o 0
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APPENDIXK
ITEMS GENERATED TO EVENTS (FREQUENCIES)
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SHOWER GOINGOUf 3 DENTIST 9
SHAMPOO 24 BODYWASH 2 NEEDLES 7
FAVOURITE SHAMPOO BATH CREME WAITING A:Ov1 7
TOWEL 20 RADOX DENTIST'S M..RSE 7
WARM FLUFFY TOWEL BODYSCRUB WHITE COAT 6
WARM TOWELS FACE WASH 2 LARGE WHITE COAT
SHOWERGEL 16 MOISlURISER 2 MAGAZINES 6
OOAP 14 TILES 2 TOOlHBRUSH 6
NICE STRAWBERRY BUFPUF 2 INJECTION 5
OOAP
UQUIDSOAP BATH CREME 2 RECEPTION 5
SHOWER CURTAIN 13 ~ 2 RECEPTION A:Ov1
WATER 12 TOOTHPASTE 2 WAITING AREA
HOT WATER BODY 2 RECEPTION AREA
COLDWATER TEMPERATURE 2 RECEPTIONIST 5
CONDITIONER 10 COLDWATER 2 FACE MASK 5
FAVOURITE WARM 2 TEETH 5
CONDITIONER
HOT 8 REFRESHN3 2 BRACES 4
HOT WATER 6 WAKE lP 2 WfR)R 4
STEAM 6 BATH 2 FEAR 4
SHAVE/SHAVING 6 SUPPERY 2 WAITING 4
RAZOR 5 WASH 2 WAITING AND WAITING
COlD 5 ro=Le 2 PEOPLE WAITING IN
Cl.JEU:S
CLEAN 5 SII\GII\G 2 Cl.EUE
WET 5 DENTIST PLASTICIRUBBER 4
GLOVES
TAP(S) 4 DRILL 19 INSTRUMENTS 3
HOT TAP (DENTIST) CHAIR 17 METAL INSTRUMENTS
COLD TAP RECLINING CHAIR PICK
SPCN3E 4 BIG CHAIR LONG METAL
INSTRUMENTS
BATH MAT 4 SEAT SCALPEL LIKE ITEMS
RELAXING 4 FIWNGS 16 SILVER INSTRUMENTS
Ra.AX LlGHT(S) 12 SMELL(AT DENTISn 4
DEOOERANT 3 BIG LIGHT IN "r'CX.R SMELL OF DENTIST
FACE OFFICE
TALC 3 LIGHT PFnECTOR SMELL
SHOWERHEAD 3 SWIVEL LAMP DENTAL ASSISTANT 3
Sl-K)\lVER UNIT 3 PAIN 10 RIJ\6E 3
LOOFAH 3 PAINFUL PULLING TEETH OUT 3
FLANNEL 3 PAIN IN MY MOUTH HYGIENIST 3
HAIR 3 HlJU ANAESTHAETIC 2
BATHROBE 3 s:Fe SMALLWfR)R 2
SHOWERHAT/CAP 3 ~PAlN POSTERS ON CEIUNG 2
WARMTH 3 MOUTHWASH 9 PICTURES ON CEIUNG
tvORNlNG 3 DRINK(PINK LIQUID) PCSTERS 2
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DENTIST Contd. XMAS PUOONG 8 COLD 3
SPITBOWl 2 FCXD 8 LAUGHTER 3
WATER 2 BREAKFAST GRAVY 2
GLOVES 2 BACON SANDWICH ~ DINNER 2
BKFAST
WISDOM TOOTH 2 SNACKS ROAST DINNER
TOOTHPASTE 2 CRISPS FILMS 2
ORALB DECORATIONS 7 OLD FILMS
COLGATE (XMAS) CAKE 7 GOOD FILMS
tv()NEY 2 DRINKCS) 7 JESUS CHRIST 2
CREDrTCARD FIZZY DRINKS CANDLES 2
FLOSS 2 St¥:JN 7 CAROLS 2
NERVOOSNESS 2 FRIENDS 7 HYWJS
APPREHENSION CHOCOLATE 6 PEOPLE
DREAD 2 STOCKINGS 5 MEETING PEOPLE
PANIC 2 FATHER XMAS 5 EARLY RISING 2
ROOT CANAL 2 SANTA EARLY RISING
TOOLS 2 (ROASn POTATOES 5 VERY EARLY
NUMBMOUTH 2 SPRaJTS 5 EXCITEMENT 2
NUMB 2 STUFFING 5 HAPPINESS 2
NASTY SMELL2 2 CHILDREN 5 HAPPY
WINDOW 2 WRAPPING PAPER 4 JOy
OPENMOVTH 2 UGHTS 4 JOYFUL
XMAS DAY CHvRl-I 4 fU'..I 2
PRESENTS 23 GAMES 4 MIDNIGHT MASS 2
TFEE 23 BOARD GAMES PI-ONE CALLS 2
TURKEY 18 TRIVIAL PURSUITS ccx::lKJNG 2
FAMILY 15 BLOODY TRIVIAL WESS 2
PURSUITS
FAMILY GATHERING 2 MUSIC 4 BEACH
BEING WITH FAMILY ~ SANDCASTLES 24
RELATIVES XMAS~ SAND 23
FAMILY DAY ROAST DINNER GOLDEN SAND
FAMILY FU.I LUNCH SANDY
HAVING ALL FAMILY XMAS DINNER 3 SEA 23
OVER
DAD TRADITIONAL XMAS SEASIDE
DINNER
SISTER-IN-LAW MINCE PES 3 SPADE 17
CARDS 10 SWEETS 3 BUCKET 16
CRACKERS 10 ALCOHOL 3 TOWEL 15
TELEVISION 10 9-EfR( LARGE TOWELS
LATE NIGHT FILMS LOTS OF ALCOHOL SWIMMING COSTUME 14
OLOFILMS WINE 3 SlJ'.J 13
GOODRLMS MIDNIGHT MASS 3 ICECREAM 12
QUEEN"S SPEEQi 9 JESUS'8IRTHDAY 3 SWIMMING 12
QUEEN3PM FA: 3 SWIM
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BEACH Contd. CUFFS 2 RED FlAG
CHILDREN 10 ROCKPOOL 2 TOES 2
SUNTAN LOTION 8 SEAWEED 2 PUNCH AND JUDY 4
(COLD) DRINKS 8 BEACHBALLS 2 ATTIC
BEER FOOTBALL 2 LADDER 20
SHELLS 7 FRISBEE 2 DARK 17
WATER 6 SUNHAT 2 BOXES 16
SALTWATER BEACH TOWEL 2 BIG BOXES
FAMILY 6 SUNBLOCK 2 DUST 13
HUSBAND ICE LOLLIES 2 COBWEBS 9
PICNC 6 FISH AND CHIPS 2 (OLD) TOYS 8
HOT 6 CANDY FLOSS 2 OLD TEDDY BEARS 2
BOATS 6 (PICNIC) BLANKET 2 OLD GAMES
RXKS 5 FAlRGRQlJ\JD 2 JUNK 8
PER 5 AMUSE,MENTS SPDERS 7
CRAB 5 AMUSEMENT ARCADES RUBBISH 6
DECKCHAIR 5 AMUSEMENT PARK DUSTY 6
ASH 4 ARCADES (OLD) BOOKS 5
PEBBLES 4 FAIR OLD CLOTHES 5
BALL 4 PEDALOES 2 CLOTHES
JELLYFISH 4 DINGHY 2 XMAS DECORATIONS 5
SUNTAN OIL 4 GAMES 2 XMAS ITEMS
FOOD TO TAKE 4 TOES 2 lORCH 5
FOOD WET 2 WATER TANK 5
HOTDOGS (EDIBLE ROCK) 1 COlD 5
El.R3ERS SUNBATHING 2 INSULATION 4
SNACKS UFEGUARDS 2 INSULATOR
CHIPS PEOPlE 2 SUITCASES 3
SAUSAGEROLLS TOURISTS CASES
SEAFOOD t..te\I BABY CLOTHES 3
WINDBREAK 4 BLOKES BLACK BAGS 3
SUNGLASSES 4 OLD MEN LIGHT SWITCH 3
PARASOLS 4 Sl.fFERS UGHTS 3
RUBBERRN3S 4 SUNBATHERS TILES 3
INFLATABLES SW1tJMERS SLATES
LILO SANDWCHES 2 ROOFTILES
PUNCH AND JUDY 4 &:X3GY SANDWCHES FLOORBOARDS 3
WAVES 3 BEACH MAT 2 WOODENFLOORBOARD
S
BIKINI 3 RAGS PAPERS 2
HATS 3 YELLOW FLAG BOARD GAMES 2
SHORTS 3 GREENR.AG PICTURES 2
SlN3URN 3 RED FLAG ANTIQUES 2
VOLLEYBALL 3 GREENR.AG DWETS 2
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ATTIC Contd. BICUITS 8 HOT WATER 2
BAGS 2 NESCAFE 5 COFFEE GRANUL;ES 2
BIN BAGS KENCO BRANDY 2
PLASTIC BAGS GOLD BLEND STEAM 2
PHOTOS 2 DECAFF 5 RELAXING 2
PHOTO ALBUMS CAFETlERE 4 WATCH TV 2
M:SS 2 REGULAR BOILING WATER 2
LIGHT SWITCH 2 LAnE WAITING 2
SLANTED Rn= 2 TURKISH cx:FFEE STlR 3
AXF CAPPUCINO WAKELP 2
JOISTS EXPRES:O CHAT 2
BEAMS 2 FREEZE DAlEO CONVERSATION
RAFTERS IRISHCOFFEE CHILD PARTY
WOODEN BEAMS INSTANT PRESENTS 20
PIPES 2 FILTER cx:FFEE GIFTS
WATER PIPES HOT 4 BALLOONS 16
AERIAL 2 KITCHEN 4 GAMES 15
OLD ITEMS 2 FROOE 4 CAKE 14
OLD STUFF CREAM 4 CLOWN 13
OLD THINGS FRIENDS 4 NOISE 1 1
DIRTY 2 WDTHER CANDLES 10
DIRT PEOPlE JELLY 10
DAMP 2 RELATIVES CH)PS 9
STORAGE 2 BREAKFAST 4 HATS 9SMELLY 2 SAl.CER 3 PASS THE PARCEL 8QUIET 2 TEASPOON 3 MUSICAL CHAIRS 8f:CPR( 2 ElECTRlCTY 3 PARTY BAGS 8CREAKY 2 ELECTRIC TAKE HOME BAGS 2COFFEE BOILING WATER 3 MUSIC 8
MILK 23 COFFEE BEANS 3 CHILDREN 7SLGAR 23 TEA 3 LOTS OF CHILDREN
KETTLE 18 TEABAGS CAKES 7
KETTLE FULL CF CAFFEINE 3 PARENTS 6BOILING WATER
WHITE ELECTRIC COFFEE MAKER 2 ENTERTAINERS 6KETTLE
WATER 17 PERCOlATOR R)Q[) 6aP 14 COFFEE JAR 2 SAUSAGERa.I...S
SPEClALaP ALTER 2 PARTYFOOO
BIGCUP SINK 2 BREAD STICKS
SMALLa.PS TAP 2 ICECREAM 6ro=FEE 14 COLD TAP JELLY AND ICECREAM
SPOON 13 A...UG 2 SWEETS 6M..G 11 ELECTRIC A...UG DRINKS 6BlGMUG WINE
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PARTY Contd. EXCITEMENT 2 TOWELS 3
MAGICIAN 5 WESS 2 KEYS 3
MUSICAL CHAIRS 5 DISX> 2 M:l'JEY 3
PARTY GAMES 4 lHEMES 2 FIRST AID OOX 3
DONKEY PACKING CAR FAMILY 3
PIN THE TAIL ON THE (SUIT)CASES 16 CHILDDREN
DONKEY
PARlY DRESSES 4 FOOD 9 DAD
PARTY HATS 4 FOOD FOR JOURNEY NOISY KIDS
SILLY HATS FOOD AND DRINK R:R TYRES-PRESSUR AND 3
JOURNEY TREAD
DECORATIONS 4 DRINKS CDS 3
LAUGHTER 4 SNACKS EXCITEMENT 3
SCREAMING 3 &LP LLGGAGE 2
CRYNG 3 CLOlHES 9 HAND LUGGAGE
MOTHERS 3 TRJUSERS OOXES 2
RELATIVES SHIRTS STRESS 2
FRUSTRATED PARENTS TRACKSUIT BOTTOMS FRIENDS 2
GRANDPARENTS SOCKS SWEETS 2
FAMILY BOXER SHORTS LAST MINUTE SWEETS
BOUNCY CASTLE 3 SHORTS &MMNEAR 2
SANDWICHES 3 JEANS SWIMMING TRUNKS
HALL 3 BAGS 8 SUNHAT 2
FRIENDS 2 CARRIER BAGS BIKE RACK 2
BIRlHDAY CAKE 2 BIG BAGS PETROL 2
SAUSAGES 2 SMALL Bl\GS SPARETYRE 2
SAUSAGE ON STICKS 2 HEAVY BAGS PILLOWS 2
SNACKS 2 HOLDALLS TOO MUlCH STUFF 2
CHOCOLATE 2 RUCKSACK GAMES 2
BISCUITS 2 GIRLS'BAGS am&NORDS
PLASTICQFS 2 PASSPORT 6 SUNGLASSES 2
PAPER PLATES 2 ROOF RACK 5 CAMERA 2
PLATES CASSETTE TAPES 5 VIDEO 2
FIZZY DRINKS2 2 M..SC SUNTAN CREAM 2
cn<E MUSIC TO LISTEN TO SUNTAN OIL
LEMONADE 2 BLANKETS 4 COOLER BAG 2
PARTY CLOTHES 2 TICKETS 4 LISTS 2
PRETTY DRESSES 2 DRINKS 4 PICNIC
FANCY DRESS 2 BOOKS 4 DRINKS(S) 19
BIRTHDAY 2 SHJES 3 BASKET 16
STREAMERS 2 FUPFPLOS PICNIC BASKET
TOYS 2 TRAINERS SANDWICHES 15
CARDS 2 BOOT 3 FRESH SANDWICHES
BIRTHDAY CARDS CAR 3 CAKEj_Sl 13
DRESSINGlP 2 TYRES- PRESSlFE AND 3 BLANKET 13
TREAD
344
PICNIC Contd. WEATHER FORECAST 2 MAGAZINES 4
PICNIC BLANKET PLASTICClPS 2 TINS 2
FRUIT 11 WET WIPES 2 PASTA 3
CRISPS 10 KITCHEN ROll. 2 TESCOS 3
FOOD 9 TOWEL 2 SAINSBURY
BREAD 9 LARGE TOWEL WAITROSE
FRENCH BREAD COOLBOX 2 (COLD) Ft+EZERS 3
ROLLS COOLBAG ALCOHOL 2
CUTLERY 8 OOX 2 REWARD CARD 2
PLATES 8 BOXES STOREC'ARD
a.FS 7 SUNAN LOTION 2 CREDIT CARD 2
BUTTER 6 MUSIC 2 BARGAINS 2
MAroE MAKING SANDWICHES 2 2FOR1DEALS 2
Q-EESE 6 SUPERMARKET DEUCOUNTER 2
NAPKIN 6 TROllEY 23 CIGARETTES 2
WINE 6 CHECKOUT 16 CASHPOINT CARD 2
5U'J 6 VEGETABLES 15 EOO3 2
SUNNY FOOD 15 EXPENSIVE 2
SUNNY DAY FOODS SALES ASSISTANTS 2
HAMPER 4 FRUIT 13 ~IERS 2
CHOCOLATE 4 fI,O\JEY 9 SCREAMING CHILDREN 2
SALAD 4 AISLES 9 CHILDREN 2
FORKS 3 SHOPPING LIST 8 WINE 2
KNIVES 3 BASKET 8 VIDEOS 2
SPCXlNS 3 SHOPPING BASKET SHELF STACKERS 2
SAUSAGEROLLS 3 MEAT 7 SHOPPING BAGS 2
THERtvDS 3 BREAD 6 CARRIEIR BAGS
HAM 3 PEOPLE 6 OOXES 2
FAMILY 3 DRINK 6 FROZEN FOOD 2
FRIENDS 3 DRIf\JKS 5 TOILETRIES 2
BISCUITS 3 0Cl02E CAKES 2
an 3 TILL(S) 6 CHOCOI.ATES 2
JAM 2 ('AA 5 RESTAURANT 2
PORKPIES 2 010£ 5 DOUGHNUTS 2
CRACKERS 2 CAR PAR 5 a.e..e 2
PES 2 a.e..e 5 LONGCUiE 3
SWEETS 2 MILK 5 EXPENSIVE 2
CO<E 2 MUSIC CDSlTAPES 5 CAMPING TRIP
FRUIT SQUASH 2 BAKERY 5 TENT 27
cn=FEE 2 CLOTHES 4 SLEEPING BAGS 22
CX)UNTRYSIDE 2 DELICATESSANT 4 FIFES 10
PARK 2 BISCUITS 4 RUCKSACK 9
GRASS 2 SHELVES 4 FOOD 9
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CAMPING Contd. POlES 2 TEMPLE
DRYFOOD GAS STOVE 2 FAMILY 14
TINNED FOOD CAMPINGGAZ MOTHER OF BRIDE
TENT PEGS 8 CALOR GAS STOVE MOTHER IN LAW
COLD 7 CAMPING STOVE FATHER OF BRIDE
COMPASS 7 STOVE FATHER IN LAW
GRASS 6 PRIMUS STOVE BRIDESMAIDS 14
SAUSAGES 6 GAS HOB FOOD 14
lREES 6 TOWEL 2 VICAR(PRIESn 12
TORO-! 6 FAMILY 2 MINISTER
RAIN 5 MUM AND DAD RECEPTI<JI\I 1 1
MARSHMALLOWS 5 DAMP 2 DANCING 1 1
M.JD 5 CANVAS 2 FRlGJDS 10
MUDDY CARAVAN 2 FLOWERS 10
GROUND SHEET 4 TOILET BLOCK 2 DRINK(S) 9
CAR 4 SHOWER BLOCK WINE
CLOTHES 4 TOLIET PAPER 2 CHAMPAGNE 8
OLD CLOTHES RAINCOAT 2 WHITE I:)f£$ 7
WARM CLOTHES STARS 2 CAR(S) 7
CHANGE OF CLOTHES FOREST 2 POSH CARS
CLEAN UNDERWEAR WCI:XJ WEDDING CAR
WATERPROOF WOODS BIG EXPENSIVE CARS
WATERPROOF LAKES 2 BEST MAN 7
CLOTHING
ANORAK FISH 2 SPEECH 7
BEANS 4 FISHING Fa) 2 RING(S) 7
MAP 4 FRlEI\IDS 2 WEDDINGRN3
PEOPLE 4 El.GS 2 SUITS 6
CAMPFR: 4 SPDERS HIRING A SUIT 6
ARESIDE FLIES CAKE 6
WIND 3 LANTERNS 2 WEDDING CAKE 5
WINDY WELLINGTON BOOTS 2 TIERED CAKE
WET 3 DRINK(S) 2 PAGE~ 6
TORRENTIAL RAIN POLES 2 PHOlOGRAPHS 6
THUNDERSTORMS HIKING 2 CONFETTI 6
FLOOD MATCHES 2 GUESTS 5
FIELDS 3 DISCOMFORT 2 EXPENSIVE 4
RIVERS 3 COOKING 2 CHILDREN 4
INSECTS 3 scours 2 DF£SS 4
BAGS 3 WEDDING REGISTRY OFFICE 4
PILLOW 3 BADE 21 INVITATIONS 4
WATER 3 CRXl\1 21 ~ 4
WALKING 3 a-t.fO-I 21 PARTY 4
RJ'.J 3 SYNAGOGUE HATS 3
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WEDDING Contd. WAVES 5 SELECT NICE SHOES
TOP HAT BIG WAVES 2 SPECIAL SHOES
WEDDING DRESS 3 FEAR 4 BATH 6
BEAUTIFUL DAESS DANGER 4 HAIR DO/STLE 5
WHITE 3 DANGERS WASH HAIR 5
HONEYMOON 3 PANIC 4 CLOTHES 5
BOUQUETS 3 PEOPLE 4 FRIENDS 5
CEFaIONY 3 FfJCKS 3 PEFRM: 4
HYMNS 3 DROWNING 3 DEOOERANT 4
PRESENlS 3 HELP 3 fvO\JEY 4
BALLOONS 2 FLARE 3 MUSIC 4
SERVICE 2 LIFE RING 3 PRESENT 4
PEOPLE 2 WHISTLE 3 TfOJSERS 4GIFTS 2 COASTGUARD 3 TIE 4
USHERS 2 BIG WAVES 2 POSSBLYTIE 4
BAGPIPES 2 BEACH 2 JACKET 3
CAMERAMAN 2 TITANIC 2 SHIRT 3
PHOTOGRAPHER 2 RNLA 2 SHAVE 3
BELLS 2 FAMILY 2 HAlRDRYER 3
SHOES 2 LIFE BELT 2 IRONING CLOTHES 3
JEWELLERY 2 CHOPPY~ 2 PEFRM: 2
MOTHER IN LAW 2 WATER 2 HAIR 2IN LAWS SUNKEN SHIPS 2 FIX HAIR
SMILES 2 SHIP 2 SORT HAIR OUT
HEN NIGHT 2 TOWELS 2 BRUSH HAIR
100 2 TV 2 OOINGHAIR
SPECIAL 2 AFRAID 2 NEW CLOTHES 2COMMITMENT 2 DEATH 2 NAILS 2RESCUE AT SEA NOISE 2 DRESS 2
HELICOPTER 23 NAVY 2 DRESSJr..X3 2LIFEBOAT 19 ARMBANDS 2 NICE CLOTHES
LIFE JACKET 13 RESUSSrrATION 2 SMART DRESS
SOATeS) 8 SINKING 2 SPECIAL DRESS
FEfRV OCCASION DRESSLP 2
YACHT MAKEUP 12 SORTING OUT CLOTHES 2UFEGUARD 8 DOING MAKEUP SMART 2COLD 8 FACE POMJER TIME 2STORMeS) 6 CONCEALER Fl.SH 2WET 6 LIPSTICK EXCrrEMENT 2WIND 5 EYESHADOW NERVOUS 2RFE 5 MASCARA ORGANISING 2
TRANSPORT
SEA 5 St-CNVER 11 BABYSITIER 2DINGHIES 5 St-OES 7 WINE 2
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OCCASION Condo USI-ERS 4
HANDBAG 2 EXCITEMENT 4
SELECT NICE BAG OOMEDY 4
SUIT 2 ROMANCE 3
TIGHTS 2 LAUGHTER 3
AFTERSHAVE 2 coe 3
WEDDINGS 2 SURROUND SOUND 3
BIRTHDAY FRIENDS 3
PARTIES TOILET 3
ANNIVERSARIES NACHOS 3
EATING OUT ACTORS 2
MEAL STAR 2
BABYSITTER 2 ACTRESSES 2
FAMILY 2 FIZZYDRINK 2
OUTFIT 2 WIDE SCREEEN 2
CINEMA UNCOMFORTABLE 2
POPCORN 25 MONEY 2
DARK 21 TALK 2
THE DARK LOTS OF PEOPLE 2
DARK RXJv1 CRCMIDS
DRINKS 16 CHOCOLATE 2
COLD DRINKS TOFO-IES 2
BIG DRINKS WITH NACHOS 2
STRAWS
TICKET 12 PFOJECTOR 2
SWEETS 10 BUY TICKETS 2
I-UGE SCREe>J 7 (R(NG 2
&::FE8'J 5 t-mm 2
ALM PREVIEWS 6 SCIENCE FICTION 2
ICECREAM 6 AIR CONDITIONING 2
PEQJl£ 6 FALL ASLEEP 2
SEAT 5
RED SEATS
FOLD DOWN SEATS
BIG SEATS
SEATING
COMFY SEATS 3
a-IAIRS 3
CHAIRS IN ROWS 2
ADVERTS 5
LOUD 5
f\OISE 5
FILM 4
HOTDOGS 4
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APPENDIXL
INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE MATERIALS FOR COLLECTING
EVENT-TO-ITEM DATA
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INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
Please read the following instructions very carefully and ensure that you fully
understand the task that is required of you.
When you think of an object or item, there are a variety of events/situations
which may come to mind. For example, when I think of a newspaper, I may
think of being in a shop buying one, or reading one on the train, or someone
using one to light a fire or putting them out in the rubbish. On each of the
following pages, you will see a word which is the name of an object or item.
Some of the words could be treated as verbs but I want you to think of them all
as names of objects or items. For each page, you will be allowed 30 seconds to
list as many events or situations as you can which the object/item brings to your
mind. I will tell you when to start each page.
Please indicate your age, gender and course code below:
Age .
Gender .
Course code .
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SAND
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APPENDIXM
EVENTS GENERATED TO ITEMS (FREQUENCIES)
(PLUS OTHER EVENTS FROM ORIGINAL SET GENERATED TO SAME ITEMS)
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ITEM TARGET FREQUENCY ITEM TARGET FREQUENCY
EVENT (N=lS) EVENT (N=lS)
BUCKET BEACH 7 CARAVAN CAMPING 2
CANDYFLOSS BEACH 0 COMPASS CAMPING 5
DINGHY BEACH 0 DISCOMFORT CAMPING 0
FRISBEE BEACH 10 ASH CAMPING 0
LIFEGUARD BEACH 10 FISHING R:D CAMPING 0
SAND BEACH 9 GRASS CAMPING 0
SANDCASTLE BEACH 12 LANTERN CAMPING 3
SEA BEACH 6 MATCHES CAMPING 0
SEAWEED BEACH 9 RUCKSACK CAMPING 4
SHELLS BEACH 10 SAUSAGES CAMPING 0
SPADE BEACH 2 SCOUTS CAMPING 9
SUNHAT BEACH 6 SLEEPING BAG CAMPING 14
SUNTAN BEACH 4 STOVE CAMPING 0LOTION
SWIMMING BEACH 7 TENTPB3S CAMPING 10COSTIJME
TOES BEACH 3 TENT CAMPING 11
WET BEACH 0 WELLINGTON CAMPING 0
BOOTS
BISCUITS CX)FFEE 6 CHAIR DENTIST 0
BRANDY ca=FEE 0 DENTIST DENTIST 9<XFFEE OOFFEE 0 DREAD DENTIST 0Q.P OOFFEE 6 DRILL DENTIST 0ELECTRICITY OOFFEE 0 FILLINGS DENTIST 11FILTER ca:FEE 6 FLOSS DENTIST 6FAroE OOFFEE 0 GLOVES DENTIST 0KETTLE CXlTEE 13 UGHT DENTIST 0MILK ca:FEE 4 MOUTHWASH DENTIST 5A..UG OOFFEE 0 NEEDlE DENTIST 0RELAXING ca:FEE 0 PAIN DENTIST 0SINK OOFFEE 0 Pam:RS DENTIST 0SPOON ca:FEE 5 SMALL DENTIST 0
~
SU3AR OOFFEE 0 TOOTHPASTE DENTIST 2TAP OOFFEE 0 WINDOW DENTIST 0WATER OOFFEE 0 WISDOM DENTIST 8TOOTH
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ITEM TARGET FREQUENCY ITEM TARGET FREQUENCY
EVENT (N=15) EVENT (N=15)
BLANKET PICNIC 0 BATHROBE St-OVVER 7
CCX)l8OX PICNIC 11 BODY St-OWER 0
CRSPS PICNIC 0 BODYWASH St-OVVER 10
FRurr PICNIC 0 CONDrTIONER 9-OWER 3
SQUASH
FRUrr PICNIC 0 FLANNEL St-OWER 10
KrrCHEN PICNIC 0 HAIR St-OJVER 2
ROLL
NAPKIN PICNIC 0 HOT St-OWER 0
PLASTIC OJP PICNIC 4 WOISTURISER St-OWER 0
PLATES PICNIC 0 RAZOR St-OWER 2
PORK PIES PICNIC 3 SHAMPOO SI-OWER 4
an PICNIC 0 SI-OWER 9-ONER 10
CURTAIN
SANDWICHES PICNIC 5 SOAP SI-OWER 6
SlJ'.J PICNIC 0 STEAM SI-OWER 0
lHERWOS PICNIC 5 TALCUM SI-OWER 2
POJVDER
WETWIPES PICNIC 3 TILES SI-OWER 0
WINE PICNIC 0 TOWEL SI-OWER 10
CANDLES XMAS DAY 2 AERIAL ATTIC 0
CARDS XMAS DAY 9 ANTIQUES ATTIC 0
CAROLS XMAS DAY 10 BAGS ATTIC 0
COlD XMAS DAY 0 OOXES ATTIC 0
CRACKERS XMAS DAY 13 COBWEBS ATTIC 0
DIf\l>JER XMAS DAY 0 DAMP ATTIC 0
FILMS XMAS DAY 0 DUST ATTIC 0
HAPPINESS XMAS DAY 0 JUNK ATTIC 0
MINCE PIES XMAS DAY 13 LADDER ATTIC 3
QJEENS XMAS DAY 9 LIGHT SWITCH ATTIC 0
SPEEO-t
Sf'ON XMAS DAY 7 OLD BOOKS ATTIC 0
TELEVISION XMAS DAY 0 PHOTOS ATTIC 0
'l"FE XMAS DAY 0 PFES ATTIC 0
TIJRKEY XMAS DAY 13 SPIERS ATTIC 2
WRAPPING XMAS DAY 13 SUrrCASES ATTIC 0
PAPER
XMAS XMAS DAY 6 XMAS ATTIC 0
PlIDINGS DECORATIONS
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ITEM TARGET FREQUENCY ITEM TARGET FREQUENCY
EVENT (N=lS) EVENT (N=lS)
BALLOONS CHILDS PARTY 14 AISLES SUPERMARKET 6
BOUNCY CHILDS PARTY 6 BASKET SUPERMARKET 9
CASTLE
CAKE CHILDS PARlY 0 CASHIERS SUPERMARKET 8
CHOCOLATE CHILDS PARlY 0 CASHPOINT SUPERMARKET 3
CLOWN CHILDS PARTY 3 CHECKOUT SUPERMARKET 9
DECORATIONS CHILDS PARlY 0 CIGARETTES SUPERMARKET 0
HATS CHILDS PARTY 0 CREDIT CARD SUPERMARKET 9
JELLY CHILDS PARTY 10 EXPENSIVE SUPERMARKET 6
LEMONADE CHILDS PARTY 0 MAGAZINES SUPERMARKET 0
OOISE CHILDS PARTY 0 MEAT SUPERMARKET 0
PAPER CHILDS PARTY 6 M:)\JEY SUPERMARKET 7
PLATES
PARTY BAG CHILDS PARTY 7 SHOPPING SUPERMARKET 13
LIST
PRESENTS CHILDS PARlY 0 TINS SUPERMARKET 7
PRETTY CHILDS PARTY 0 TROLLEY SUPERMARKET 13
DFES
STREAMERS CHILDS PARTY 0 VEGETABLES SUPERMARKET 0
TOYS CHILDS PARTY 0 VIDEOS SUPERMARKET 0
BAGPIPES WEDDING 4 ACTRESS CINEMA 1
BELLS WEDDING 8 ADVERTS CINEMA 0
BRIDE WEDDING 14 COKE CINEMA 0
CAMERAMAN WEDDING 2 DARK CINEMA 0
CHAMPAGNE WEDDING 6 ICECREAM CINEMA 0
a-u=o-t WEDDING 6 LAUGHTER CINEMA 0
CONFETTI WEDDING 15 NACHOS CINEMA 4
R..OvVERS WEDDING 3 ~ CINEMA 14
HYtvN) WEDDING 3 PRlJECTOR CINEMA 3
INVITATIONS WEDDING 7 s::AEEN CINEMA 8
JEWELLERY WEDDING 0 SEAT CINEMA 0
RNl WEDDING 9 SWEETS CINEMA 0
SH)ES WEDDING 0 TICKET CINEMA 3
SMILE WEDDING 0 TOILET CINEMA 0
VICAR WEDDING 4 TORCH CINEMA 0
WHITEDFES WEDDING 15 UHR CINEMA 4
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OTHER TARGET EVENTS GENERATED FROM ITEMS
LANTERN CHRISTMAS 3
BRANDY CHRISTMAS 2
WATER SHOWER 4
BATH 8
COOLBOX HOLIDAYS 5
BEACH 3
FRUIT SQUASH SUPERMARKET 2
WINE SUPERMARKET 2
HOT HOLIDAYS 6
BEACH 2
STEAM BOILING KETTLE 5
MAKING TEA 2
TOWEL BEACH 6
CANDLES BIRTHDAYS 7
CARDS BIRTHDAYS 12
FILMS CINEMA 12
DAMP SHOWER 3
PHOTOS HOLIDAYS 6
SUITCASES HOLIDAYS 11
XMAS DECORATIONS DECORRATING XMAS 9
TREE
CHRISTMAS 3
CAKE SUPERMARKET 4
CHRISTMAS 5
CHOCOLATE CHRISTMAS 2
DECORATIONS CHRISTMAS 15
PRETTY DRESS WEDDING 4
STREAMERS CHRISTMAS 2
AISLES WEDDING 8
BASKET PICNICS 3
HYMNS CHRISTMAS 4
SWEETS DENTIST 3
TORCH CAMPING 4
USHER WEDDING 12
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CANDYFLOSS FUNFAIR 12
LIFEGUARD SWIMMING POOL 9
SPADE GARDENING 10
WET RAINING 9
SWIMMING COSTUME SWIMMING POOL 8
STOVE COOKING 13
SINK WASHING UP 11
POSTERS BEDROOMS 8
WISDOM TOOTH IN PAIN 11
NEEDLE SEWING 9
BLANKET KEEPING WARM 8
KITCHEN ROLL MOPPING UP SPILLS 11
NAPKIN EATING OUT 8
PLATES WASHING UP 9
FLANNEL WASHING SELF 10
WET WIPES FEEDING BABY 8
SANDWICHES HAVING LUNCH 8
SHAMPOO WASHING HAIR 10
STEAM SEEING STEAM TRAINS 8
CANDLES GOING TO CHURCH 8
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APPENDIXN
STIMULUS PAIRS USED IN FINAL STUDY
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Stimulus Pairs used in final study.
BEACH
1 HH-LH Bucket - Frisbee
2 LL-HH Suntan Lotion - Sandcastle
3 HL-LL Spade -Dil!ghy
4 LH-LH Lifeguard-Seaweed
5 HH-HH Sandcastle-swimming Costume
6 HL-LH Sun-Shells
7 LL-LL Toes-Suntan Lotion
8 HH-HL Sea-Spade
9 HL-HL Spade-Sun
10 LH-LL Frisbee-candyfloss
COFFEE
1 HH-LH Cup-Biscuits
2 LL-HH Fridge - Kettle
3 HL-LL Coffee- Tap
4 LH-LH Biscuits - Filter
5 HH-HH Kettle - Cup
6 HL-LH Milk-Filter
7 LL-LL Brandy-Electricity
8 HH-HL Kettle - Sugar
9 HL-HL Water - Sugar
10 LH-LL Biscuits - Sink
SHOWER
1 HH-LH Soap-bathrobe
2 LL-HH Razor-Shower Curtain
3 HL-LL Conditioner -Talcum Powder
4 LH-LH Bcdvwash- Bathrobe
5 HH-HH Soap-Shower Curtain
6 HL-LH Shampoo-Flannel
7 LL-LL Hair -Tiles
8 HH-HL Towel-Conditioner
9 HL-HL ShampOO-Conditioner
10 LH-LL Flannel-Steam
XMAS DAY
1 HH-LH Presents - Mince Pies
2 LL-HH Candles - Cards
3 HL-LL Tree - Dinner
4 LH-LH Wrapping Paper-Xmas Puddings
5 HH-HH Turkey- Cards
6 HL-LH Television - Snow
7 LL-LL Films - Cold
8 HH-HL Crackers - Tree
9 HL-HL Tree - Television
10 LH-LL Snow - Dinner
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SUPERMARKET
1 HH-LH Checkout -Tins
2 LL-HH Money -Trolley
3 HL-LL Vegetables - Cigarettes
4 LH-LH Basket - Cashiers
5 HH-HH Checkout - Trolley
6 HL-LH Fruit - Credit Card
7 LL-LL Meat - Videos
8 HH-HL Trolley - Vegetables
9 HL-HL Vegetables - Fruit
10 LH-LL Shopping List - Magazines
CHILDS PARTY
1 HH-LH Balloons Paper Plates
2 LL-HH Streamers - Jelly
3 HL-LL Noise - Hats
4 LH-LH Party Bag - Paper Plates
5 HH-HH Jelly - Balloons
6 HL-LH Cake - Party Bags
7 LL-LL Bouncy Castle - Chocolate
8 HH-HL Jelly - Clown
9 HL-HL Cake - Clown
10 LH-LL Paper Plates - Lemonade
WEDDING
1 HH-LH Church Champagne
2 LL-HH Jewellerv - Church
3 HL-LL Flowers - Bagpipes
4 LH-LH Confetti - Cameraman
5 RH-RH Bride - Church
6 HL-LH Vicar- Ring
7 LL-LL Shoes - Smile
8 HH-HL Bride - Flowers
9 HL-HL Vicar - Flowers
10 LH-LL White dress - hymns
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APPENDIXO
INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE MATERIALS FOR FINAL STUDY
(With context blocked)
(With context random)
(No context blocked)
(No context random)
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.
On the following pages you will see lists of pairs of items. At the top of each page, you will
see the name of an event or situation in which these items can be found. I would like you to
look at each pair of items and think about them as they relate to that event or situation and
then give a rating of how similar you think the items are to each other on the scale provided.
The scale looks like this:
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Please circle the number that indicates your rating. So, if you think that the items are not
similar at all you would circle 1 but if you feel that they are very similar then you would
circle 9. Use the numbers in between the extremes of the scale to circle intermediate ratings
of similarity.
There is no time limit. Take your own time.
There are no right or wrong answers. I am interested in your own reactions. Please make sure
that you have given a rating for every pair. J
\
Gender .
Age .
Course code .
No. of years lived in Britain ..
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A DAY AT THE BEACH
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
SANDCASTLE SWIMMING COSTUME
1 5 6 93 72 4 8
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
SPADE SUN
1 2 3 64 5 8 97
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
BUCKET FRISBEE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
TOES SUNTAN LOTION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
LIFEGUARD SEAWEED
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.
On the following pages you will see lists of pairs of items. Just above the pairs of items, you
will see the name of an event or situation in which these items can be found. I would like you
to look at each pair of items and think about them as they relate to that event or situation and
then give a rating of how similar you think the items are to each other on the scale provided.
The scale looks like this:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Please circle the number that indicates your rating. So, if you think that the items are not
similar at all you would circle 1but if you feel that they are very similar then you would
circle 9.Use the numbers in between the extremes of the scale to circle intermediate ratings
of similarity.
There is no time limit. Take your own time.
There are no right or wrong answers. Iam interested in your own reactions. Please make sure
that you have given a rating for every pair.
Gender .
Age .
Course code .
No. of years lived in Britain .
364
Think about: MAKING A CUP OF COFFEE
How similar are thefollowing items to each other?
WATER SUGAR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
SPADE SUN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A TRIP TO THE SUPERMARKET
How similar are the following items to each other?
CHECKOUT TINS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A CHILDREN'S PARTY
How similar are the following items to each other?
BOUNCY CASTLE CHOCOLATE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Think about: A DAY AT THE BEACH
How similar are the following items to each other?
TOES SUNTAN LOTION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.
On the following pages you will see lists of pairs of items. I would like you to look at each
pair of items and then give a rating of how similar you think the items are to each other on
the scale provided. The scale looks like this:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Please circle the number that indicates your rating. So, if you think that the items are not
similar at all you would circle 1 but if you feel that they are very similar then you would
circle 9. Use the numbers in between the extremes of the scale to circle intermediate ratings
of similarity.
There is no time limit. Take your own time.
There are no right or wrong answers. Iam interested in your own reactions. Please make sure
that you have given a rating for every pair.
Gender .
Age .
Course code .
No. of years lived in Britain .
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How similar are the following items to each other?
SANDCASTLE SWIMMING COSTUME
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
SPADE SUN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
BUCKET FRISBEE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
TOES SUNTAN LOTION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
LIFEGUARD SEAWEED
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.
On the following pages you will see lists of pairs of items. I would like you to look at each
pair of items and then give a rating of how similar you think the items are to each other on
the scale provided. The scale looks like this:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
Please circle the number that indicates your rating. So, if you think that the items are not
similar at all you would circle 1 but if you feel that they are very similar then you would
circle 9. Use the numbers in between the extremes of the scale to circle intermediate ratings
of similarity.
There is no time limit. Take your own time.
There are no right or wrong answers. Iam interested in your own reactions. Please make sure
that you have given a rating for every pair.
Gender .
Age .
Course code .
No. of years lived in Britain ..
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How similar are the following items to each other?
WATER SUGAR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
SPADE SUN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
CHECKOUT TINS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
BOUNCY CASTLE CHOCOLATE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
How similar are the following items to each other?
TOES SUNTAN LOTION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not similar at all very similar
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